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Introduction 
Rebecca Haynes 
The last few years have witnessed increasing research opportunities for 
those of us working in the field of Romanian studies. Since 1989, 
Romanian archives have been open to Western scholars. In addition, a 
large number of memoirs and works of secondary literature have been 
published in Romania, relating in particular to the history of the inter-war 
period and the imposition of Communism. These new research possibilities 
are reflected in the papers presented in this volume. Contributions by 
Dennis Deletant and Rebecca Haynes are the outcome of recent research 
in the Bucharest archives and of the use of materials to which access 
would have been impossible a decade ago. Romanian original sources can 
now be used to complement the extensive British archival sources 
regarding Romania, especially those of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. The paper presented here by Mark Percival is thus a product of 
both Romanian and British Foreign Office material, while that by Maurice 
Pearton reflects the wide range of sources available in London regarding 
British interests in Romania prior to the Communist period. 
The opening of the archives and the interest amongst Romanians in 
aspects of their history hitherto either neglected or distorted by the 
Communist regime is only one aspect of the changes which have affected 
Romanian society in the years since 1989. Romania has become a peaceful 
participant in the democratic process in a way that could not have been 
foreseen at the time of the revolution. The contributions in this volume by 
Peter Siani-Davies analyse the elections of 1990 and 1996 and make use 
of the contemporary resources now available to the observer of present- 
day Romania. 
The greater openness both within Romanian society and towards the 
outside world which has taken place since 1989 is reflected in Dennis 
Deletant’s second contribution and in that by Martyn Rady. As Deletant 
shows in ‘The Post-Communist Security Services in Romania’, despite the 
often dubious activities of the security services since 1989, the Romanian 
security apparatus has increasingly come under public scrutiny, especially 
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since the installation of the government led by Emil Constantinescu in 
November 1996. Romania’s relations with Hungary have also improved 
considerably since Ion Iliescu made his ‘historic opening’ speech in 1995 
and despite the many gloomy prognostications made in 1989 and 1990 
regarding relations between the two countries. Hungary and Romania are 
now collaborating in NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme and a 
friendship treaty was signed between the two countries in 1996. It is to be 
hoped, therefore, that the time is ripe for strengthening the academic 
collaboration which has been going on at a personal level for a number of 
years. The resources of the Romanian archives can now be used to 
complement those in Hungary and hopefully prevent the nationalist 
arguments which surrounded the publication in 1987 of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences’ edition of the History of Transylvania. The 
importance of Hungarian sources for a fuller understanding of Romanian 
history is reflected in Martyn Rady’s contribution to this volume. 
But the current climate in Romania is not only favourable to foreign 
scholars of Romania. It is now possible for Romanian scholars to re¬ 
examine their history and society free from the censorship and intellectual 
restrictions of the Communist period. Nowhere is thorough examination 
more overdue than in the field of Romanian historical myths. It is therefore 
with great pleasure that we include here a discussion of such myths by one 
of the new generation of Romanian historians, Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu. 
Historic myth-making and its manipulation for political purposes is, 
however, by no means a Romanian monopoly. As a number of 
commentators have pointed out, historic myths are a necessary component 
in cementing communal identities and in facilitating and sanctioning 
political action in all societies.1 In particular, myths of ethnic origins, or 
‘foundation myths’, and the related myth of the nation’s historic ‘Golden 
Age’ have served as potent forces of national mobilization and 
consolidation among modem nations. An important aspect of such myths is 
that the nation’s glorious past should act as a call to collective action and 
self-renewal, either against foreign domination and invasion or to reverse 
the perceived trend of national decline. As Anthony Smith has written, ‘By 
returning to “basics”, by purifying ourselves of the dross of an uninspiring 
and ambiguous present through a return to the glorious past and its 
1 William H. McNeill, ‘Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History and Historians’, 
American Historical Review, 91, 1986, 1 (February), pp. 1-10; George Schopflin, 
The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’ in Geoffrey Hosking and 
George Schopflin (eds), Myths and Nationhood, London, 1997, pp. 19-28. 
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heroism, we can shed our mediocrity and enter upon the “true” destiny of 
our community’.2 
It is within this cycle of foundation and ‘Golden Age’ myths that the 
Romanians most famous historical myth belongs: the Roman and Daco- 
Roman continuity theory. The ‘myth’ of the Romanians’ pure Roman 
descent from Trajan’s colonists and their continuous presence since the 
Roman era in the Romanian lands was put to political use by Romanian 
intellectuals in Transylvania in the later eighteenth century. These argued 
that the Romanians’ ‘noble’ Roman ancestry justified their present-day 
demands for political equality with their Hungarian, Saxon and Sekler 
neighbours.3 
The Roman continuity theory can, however, be placed within the 
broader framework of the late-eighteenth-century European classical 
revival. This was particularly important in two nations aspiring not for 
political equality amongst co-nationals but for imperial splendour: Britain 
and France. In both countries the classical world was regarded as an 
‘ancestral civilization’ which served as an inspiration for modem empire¬ 
building. In France, in particular, writers ‘exhorted their countrymen to 
emulate the virtues of antique Rome [...] because that way they could 
ensure a glorious revival for France, Rome’s heir and spiritual successor’.4 
The natural culmination of this particular foundation myth was Napoleon’s 
appropriation of the imperial purple. 
During the nineteenth century, the Roman theory of Romanian origins 
gradually gave way to the Daco-Roman continuity theory. According to 
this version of the foundation myth, the modem Romanians were 
descended from the ‘native’ Dacians who had created the thriving 
kingdom of Dacia, under heroic kings such as Decebal and Burebista, 
before the arrival of the Romans, with whom they subsequently 
intermarried.5 Their Daco-Roman descendents had remained in Dacia 
following the withdrawal of the Roman legions and had retained their 
unique identity and Latin tongue in the face of subsequent barbarian 
invasions. The Daco-Roman continuity theory is one of many European 
ethnic foundation myths which stress the ‘nativist’, tribal origins of the 
modem nation. Nineteenth-century German nationalists, for instance, 
claimed descent from Anninius and the Teutonic tribes which he led to 
2 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, 1996, p 182. 
3 Keith Hit chins, The Idea of Nation: Ihe Romanians of Transylvania 1691-1849, 
Bucharest, 1988, pp, 94-140 
4 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp 195-9 (199). 
5 For the conflict between the ‘Latinists’ and the exponents of the Daco-Roman 
theory, see Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and 
Cultural Politics in Ceau$escu’s Romania, Berkeley, CA, 1991, pp. 30-40 
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victory over the Romans in remote antiquity.6 Likewise, Irish nationalists 
showed interest in Ireland’s pre-Christian Celtic past, personified in the 
shadowy figure of Cuchulain. Meanwhile, in Victorian England the works 
of historians, poets and artists reflected the popular enthusiasm for 
England’s Christian Celtic traditions and Anglo-Saxon roots. The cults of 
King Arthur and Allred the Great flowered accordingly.7 In all these cases, 
the foundation myths and related ‘Golden Ages’ served as inspiration for 
national self-renewal to achieve liberation from foreign domination or 
invasion or, in the case of independent nation-states like Britain, as 
inspiration for the pursuit of national glory. 
Historical myth-making, therefore, should not be regarded as a uniquely 
Romanian preserve. Indeed, some of the time-honoured Romanian myths 
owe their origins to non-Romanian sources. The belief that the Romanians 
were descended from the Romans was already centuries old by the time of 
its political use by Romanian intellectuals in Transylvania. It is older still 
than the Moldavian Dimitrie Cantemir (1673-1723), generally regarded as 
the first Romanian to put forward the theory. In the twelfth century, 
Kinnamos, secretary to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Comnenus, 
observed that the Vlachs were the descendents of colonists formerly from 
Italy.8 In letters written to the self-proclaimed Bulgarian ‘Emperor’ 
Ioannitsa between 1199 and 1202, Pope Innocent III made a number of 
references to the Roman origins of the Vlachs.9 In later centuries, 
Transylvanian Saxon historians were extremely important in perpetuating 
the theory of the Romanians’ pure Roman origins. In two works produced 
in 1541, the Saxon humanist Georg Reicherstorffer put forward the view 
that the Romanians were descended from the Romans on the basis of 
language.10 In the following century, a number of works by Saxon writers, 
most notably David Hermann in 1655 and Johann Troster in 1667, put 
forward the same argument. In addition they claimed that there had been a 
continuous Romanian presence since antiquity on the territory of the 
former province of Dacia which corresponded geographically to the 
6 Andreas Dorner, Politischer Mythos und symbolische Politik: Sinnstiftung durch 
symbolische Formen am Beispiel des Hermannsmythos, Opladen, 1995, pp. 130-5, 
213-15. 
7 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 195-208. 
8 Adolf Armbruster, Romanitatea romanilor: Istoria unei idei, Bucharest, 1993, pp. 
31 and 36. 
9 Ibid., pp. 32-4; Robert Lee Wolff, ‘The “Second Bulgarian Empire”: Its Origin and 
History to 1204’ in Wolff, Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople, London, 
1976, pp. 167-204 (190-3). This article was first published in Speculum, 27, 1952. 
10 Karl Kurt Klein, Transsylvanica: Gesammelte Abhandlungen und Aufsatze zur 
Sprach- und Siedlungsforschung der Deutschen in Siebenbiirgen, Munich, 1963, 
p. 279. 
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Romanian lands of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. It was another 
Saxon, Martin Felmer of Sibiu (1720-67), who first applied the German 
‘Romanien’ to describe ancient Dacia.11 
Neither have the Romanians’ seemingly entrenched historical myths 
been writ in stone since time immemorial. It would be easy for the outside 
observer to gain the impression, for instance, that Romanian historians had 
universally and consistently denied the Slavonic input into the Romanians’ 
ethnic and cultural identity. This impression is a distortion, however, 
created by the Ceau§escu regime’s obsession with the Daco-Roman 
theory.12 Romania’s first major Slavicist, Bogdan P. Hasdeu (1838-1907), 
argued that the Romanians were a product of the fusion of Slavs, 
Thracians, Dacians and Romans. He further argued that the Romanians 
had developed as a people on both sides of the Danube.13 
As this example shows, prior to the Communist period Romanian 
historiographical traditions were relatively open and a number of scholars 
put forward the ‘late immigration’ theory of Romanian origins now more 
associated with Hungarian historians. According to this argument, the bulk 
of the Romanian nation developed south of the Danube and only migrated 
to the north bank several centuries after the withdrawal of the Roman 
legions. Thus, Radu Rosetti (1853-1926) argued that the Romanians were 
Romanized Slavs from the Balkan Peninsula who crossed to the northern 
side of the Danube seeking relief from Byzantine tax collectors.14 
According to Gheorghe Bratianu (1898-1953), the withdrawal of the 
Roman frontier to the Danube in AD 271 did not prevent contact, or 
population exchange, between the Romanized population left in Dacia, 
however small, and the Romanized Balkan population south of the river. 
The arrival of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula, which profoundly 
11 Armbruster, Romanitatea romanilor, pp. 193-201, 260-1. The word ‘Romania’ 
itself has a long history. It appears to have been first used in a chronicle of c. 330 
to contrast the Roman world with that of the barbarians. By the eleventh century it 
was used by the Byzantine emperors to describe Byzantium and later to describe 
the Latin Empire established after the Fourth Crusade. See Robert Lee Wolff, 
‘Romania: The Latin Empire of Constantinople’ in Wolff, Studies in the Latin 
Empire of Constantinople, pp. 1-34. This article was first published in Speculum, 
23, 1948. 
12 For the Ceau§escu regime and the Daco-Roman continuity theory, see Dennis 
Deletant, ‘The Past in Contemporary Romania: Some Reflections on Recent 
Romanian Historiograpy’ in Laszlo Peter (ed ), Historians and the History of 
Transylvania, Boulder, CO, 1992, pp 133-58. 
13 Frederick Kellogg, A History of Romanian Historical Writing, Bakersfield, CA, 
1990, p. 31. 
14 Ibid., p. 41. 
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modified the Romanian language, led to the flight of part of the Romanized 
population of the Balkans to the north of the Danube.15 
A second strand in Romania historiograpy, however, ultimately came to 
overshadow this theory. In seeking to justify the creation of the modem 
Romanian state, nationalist historians such as A. D. Xenopol and Nicolae 
Iorga argued for a continuous and substantial Romanian presence north of 
the Danube. In a major work on the subject, Xenopol (1847-1920) sought 
to refute the claims of a number of scholars, most notably the German 
Robert Rosier, who had put forward the date immigration’ theory. On the 
contrary, argued Xenopol, the Romanized peasantry of Dacia had 
remained following the withdrawal of the legions in AD 271 and only 
temporarily withdrawn to the mountains, during the period of the barbarian 
invasions.16 The numerous works of Nicolae Iorga have been perhaps even 
more influential in effacing all other theories other than the Daco-Roman 
continuity theory from respectable Romanian publications. Iorga denied 
that the Slavs had had any important influences on the development of the 
Romanians and maintained that the Romanized Thracians of Dacia had 
retained their unique, and Roman, identity throughout the period of the 
barbarian invasions.17 
15 Gheorghe Bratianu’s classic account has recently been translated into English: G. I. 
Bratianu, An Enigma and Miracle of History: The Romanian People, Bucharest, 
1996. While most Hungarian scholars have propounded the ‘late immigration’ 
theory, arguing that the Romanians only entered the Carpatho-Danubian area and 
Transylvania between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, some have been 
prepared to concede that the Romanians may have been present earlier. Istvan 
Kniesza, for instance, suggests that Romanians may have been present in Hunyad 
county as early as the eleventh century: see Istvan Kniesza, ‘Ungarns 
Volkerschaften im XI. Jahrhundert’, Archivum Europae-Centro-Orientalis, 4, 
1938, pp. 241-412 (369). The importance of the Vlachs south of the Danube has 
long been acknowledged. For their contribution to the establishment of the Second 
Bulgarian Empire, see Robert Lee Wolff, ‘The “Second Bulgarian Empire”: Its 
Origin and History to 1204’ in Wolff, Studies in the Latin Empire of 
Constantinople, pp. 167-204. 
16 A. D. Xenopol, Une enigme historique: Les roumains au moyen-age, Paris, 1885; 
for a short summary of some of Xenopol’s arguments, see also Maria Matilda 
Alexandrescu-Dersca and Valeriu Bulgaru ‘A. D. Xenopol §i continuitatea 
poporului roman in Dacia pe baza permanentei indeletnicirilor sale agricole’ in L. 
Boicu and Al. Zub (eds), A. D. Xenopol: Studii privitoare la viata yi opera sa, 
Bucharest, 1972, pp. 47-60. 
17 The English reader may also have the benefit of Iorga’s arguments, put forward in 
numerous works in Romanian, in Nicolae Iorga, A History of Roumania, London, 
1925, esp. pp. 11-40. According to Iorga, ‘the descendant of the Dacian shepherds 
and of the emigrant peasants from Italy remained a “homo romanus”: a Roman’ 
(ibid., p. 32). 
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Maurice Pearton has written elsewhere about the problems of 
reconciling the tasks of the disinterested academic historian with those of 
the political activist. In Iorga’s case, historical inquiry was undermined by 
his political objectives: the creation and maintenance of the Greater 
Romanian state. As a historian, ‘Iorga, if presented with positive 
irrefutable evidence, might have come to recognize the Hungarian thesis 
about Transylvania; Iorga [...] determined to rectify the frontiers, was 
most unlikely to have been able to do so’.18 
For the modem historian researching into the origins and early history 
of the Romanians, it is surely necessary to disassociate ourselves from the 
nineteenth-century nationalists’ conviction that the state is congruent with 
the ethnic nation. Dark-age and medieval polities were invariably ruled by 
‘foreigners’ (one need only think of the Angevin Kings of late-fourteenth- 
century Hungary or the Normans in England), while their subjects were 
ethnically diverse. The Kingdom of Hungary, wrote Miklos Olah in 1536, 
‘includes peoples of various kinds, there being, apart from the Hungarians, 
Germans, Czechs, Slavs, Croats, Saxons, Seklers, Romanians, Serbs, 
Cumanians, Jazygians, Ruthenians [...] all of whom speak different 
languages’. As Jeno Szucs concludes in his study of the ethnic diversity of 
the Hungarian kingdom, ‘in the medieval view the entirety of these dozen 
or so “nationes” made up the “people” of Hungary (“gens Hungariae”)’.19 
Modem historians would do well to keep this in mind. 
Nevertheless, as Ungureanu points out in this volume, Romanian 
historical myths continue to be highly potent and politically charged, 
especially owing to their proliferation during the 1980s. Paradoxically, the 
result has been to obscure the very history Romanian historians have 
claimed to be most concerned about: that of the ordinary Romanian 
people. As Martyn Rady points out in his contribution, Romanian 
historians have established a congruence between the modem Romanian 
state and the historic Romanian nation. In so doing, historians have 
overlooked the history of those Romanians who lived or moved beyond 
the boundaries of the modem Romanian state. Rady goes on to explain 
that Romanian shepherds from Transylvania may well have been tending 
their flocks on the Great Hungarian Plain as early as the Middle Ages. 
Historical justification of the modem Romanian state, as Rady points out, 
has led to an incomplete history of the Romanian people. 
18 Maurice Pearton, ‘Nicolae Iorga as Historian and Politician’ in Dennis Deletant and 
Harry Hanak (eds), Historians as Nation Builders: Central and South-East 
Europe, Basingstoke and London, 1988, pp. 157-73 (169-70). 
19 Jeno Szucs, ‘The Peoples of Medieval Hungary’ in Ferenc Glatz (ed ). Ethnicity 
and Society in Hungary, Etudes historiques hongroises, 2, 1990, pp. 11-20 (11 
and 20). 
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The ‘historical justification’ of the modem Romanian state to which 
Rady refers could also be described as a ‘myth of territory’, in which a 
nation’s right to its present territory is justified by ancestral occupancy of 
the same land. In his recent taxonomy of myths, George Schopflin has 
referred to a number of myths, including the ‘myth of territory’, which can 
be found alive and well in Central and Eastern Europe. I would like to 
refer here, however, to another myth to which Ungureanu alludes and 
which Schopflin refers to as the ‘myth of unjust treatment’. According to 
this myth, history has singled out a specific community for negative 
treatment. ‘Implicit in this myth’, according to Schopflin, ‘is that [...] 
Europe owes those who have suffered a special debt, that the victims of 
the suffering [...] suffered for the wider world and the wider world should 
recognize this’.20 
This myth of unjust treatment and victimhood is very clear in Romanian 
historiographical writing. As a recent pamphlet published by the Romanian 
government states, ‘The history of the Romanians is perhaps one of the 
most tormented in European history’.21 This outlook is no less apparent in 
the historiography of inter-war foreign policy. In accounts of the 
diplomatic events leading up to the Second World War, Romania is 
traditionally portrayed as loyal to the Western powers. Only Western 
perfidy and appeasement of Germany finally forced Romania into the Axis 
camp in 1940. Such a view of Romania as the victim of outside forces 
casts Romania and her governments as passive and helpless. As Schopflin 
points out, within the myth of unjust treatment, suffering is seen as the fate 
of the group and ‘the motif of helplessness tends to be strong’.22 This view 
of Romania’s foreign relations was especially prevalent in the Communist 
period, during Romania’s enforced isolation, but it is no less apparent in 
works produced since the fall of Communism during a period of strong 
expectations of Western help for Romania.23 
20 Schopflin, ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’ (see note 1 above), 
pp. 19-35 (31). 
21 Romania: History, Bucharest, undated, p. 1. 
22 Schopflin, ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’, p 30. 
23 An interesting case in point are the works of the prolific historian, Viorica Moisuc. 
See, for instance, her articles produced in the Communist period, such as ‘Ofensiva 
Germaniei hitleriste pentru acapararea economiei Romaniei in perioada ianuarie 
1938-mai 1940’, Revista romana de studii internaponale, 4, 1971, 14, pp. 113- 
35. In 1991 she produced a book in which the blame for Romania’s pre-war 
isolation is placed squarely on the West. Indeed, the reader is left with the 
impression that the West, owing to its appeasement policy, was a greater evil than 
Nazi Germany: Moisuc, Premisele izolnrii pohtice a Romaniei, 1919-1940, 
Bucharest, 1991, esp. pp. 331-72. 
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A similar myth of unjust treatment surrounds the notorious ‘percentages 
agreement’. According to this ‘myth’, Churchill’s agreement with Stalin of 
October 1944 to accord the Soviet Union 90 per cent influence in Romania 
in return for Britain having a 90 per cent interest in Greece led directly to 
Romania’s incorporation into the Soviet-controlled Eastern Bloc. While 
Western Europe remained (or, indeed, in order that it could remain) free, 
Romania suffered Soviet domination. The corollary once again is that the 
West should bear the responsibility for Romania’s present condition.24 
Yet this view of Romania’s relationship with the former ‘Great Powers’ 
is far from accurate. As the paper in this volume by Rebecca Haynes point 
out, Romania was far from being a passive victim of the Great Powers in 
the 1930s. Romanian diplomats skilfully sought economic and diplomatic 
advantages in their dealings with the Powers. Foreign Minister Grigore 
Gafencu’s pursuit of economic benefits and a territorial guarantee from 
Germany led him to reject British overtures to create an anti-German 
alliance in Eastern Europe in 1939. As D. C. Watt has pointed out 
elsewhere, far from being a ‘victim’ of the West’s unwilligness to assist 
South-East Europe, Romanian foreign-policy initiatives were a major 
factor in thwarting Britain’s attempts to create an anti-Nazi bloc in the 
area.25 
Likewise, in his paper in the first volume in this series, Maurice Pearton 
has discussed the infamous percentages agreement in the context of 
Britain’s increasingly difficult relations with the US in 1944 and the 
realities of the growth of Soviet power in Eastern Europe.26 The Romanian 
sense of victimization over the agreement also conveniently ignores 
Romania’s active participation in the war against the Soviet Union from 
1941 to 1944 and the decision taken by her own leaders, albeit probably 
unavoidable, to come to terms with the Red Army in August 1944. It was 
this decision to allow the Red Army into Romania (rather than to resist it) 
24 See, for example, Traian Golea, Romania Beyond the Limits of Endurance — A 
Desperate Appeal to the Free World, Miami Beach, FL, 1988, p. 8. This ‘myth’ 
has, if anything, become more powerful since the collapse of Communism. See, 
thus, loan Scurtu, Tnstaurarea regimurilor Democrat-Populare in statele din 
Europa Centrala §i de Sud-Est: O analiza comparative’ in Venera Achim (ed), 6 
Martie 1945: Inceputurile comunizarii Romaniei, Bucharest, 1995, pp. 215-36. 
25 D. Cameron Watt, ‘Misinformation, Misconception, Mistrust: Episodes in British 
Policy and the Approach of War, 1938-1939’ in Michael Bentley and John 
Stevenson (eds), High and Low Politics in Modem Britain: Ten Studies, Oxford, 
1983, pp. 214-55. 
26 Maurice Pearton, ‘Puzzles about the Percentages’ in Dennis Deletant (ed ), 
Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies, No. 1, London, 1995, pp.7-14. See also 
Dennis Deletant, ‘British Policy towards Romania: 23 August 1944 - 6 March 
1945’ in Achim (ed ), 6Martie 1945 (see note 24 above), pp 102-14. 
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which speeded up the imposition of Soviet rule in the Balkans and Central 
Europe and helped seal the fate of Eastern Europe as a whole. 
The ‘myth of unjust treatment’ has also attached itself to the events 
surrounding the revolution of 1989. According to this version of the myth, 
the people of Romania threw out the dictator in 1989 in the expectation of 
freedom and democracy, only to discover that the revolution had been 
‘hijacked’ by a group of former party functionaries. As Peter Siani-Davies 
point out in his analysis of the 1996 elections, the victory of Emil 
Constantinescu and the PNT-CD was seen as the ‘real’ Romanian 
revolution, which swept away Iliescu and his cronies who had ‘betrayed’ 
and ‘stolen’ the 1989 revolution. In reality, however, all revolutions are 
inevitably ‘stolen’ as idealism and popular participation give way to the 
realities of power politics, and as ‘mystique’ gives way to ‘politique’. 
Moreover, Iliescu and his companions in the Central Committee building 
in late December 1989 were just as crucial to the overthrow of Ceau§escu 
as the demonstrators outside on the streets, regardless of their ultimate 
objectives. A recent commentator has noted the unrealistic expectations 
which surrounded the events of December 1989.27 The current emphasis 
on Romania’s ‘stolen revolution’ is simply another aspect of the myth of 
unjust treatment, the corollary of which is that Europe (that is, the West) 
owes Romania a particular debt. As the above commentator has stated: 
‘Everybody hoped for a fast economic recovery, the more so as the 
developed West, too, was expected to support it [...] the Romanians 
expected a special prize, given that they made a revolution’.28 
Another myth deserving scrutiny, and closely related to the myth of 
unjust treatment, concerns the solidly anti-Communist credentials of the 
Romanians. In his contribution here, Ungureanu points out the strength of 
armed resistance to the imposition of Communism after August 1944. This 
is borne out by Dennis Deletant in his discussion of repression during the 
Gheorghiu-Dej era.29 Nevertheless, the Communists succeeded in polling 
some 20 per cent of the vote in the November 1946 election.30 Mark 
Percival’s contribution to this volume suggests that Soviet backing for 
Romanian claims to Transylvania may have been an important factor in 
this show of support for the Communists. Moreover, as R. V. Burks 
27 ‘What did people expect and hope from the revolution? Almost everything’: 
Vladimir Pasti, The Challenges of Transition: Romania in Transition, Boulder, 
CO, 1997, p. 85. 
28 Ibid., p. 88. 
29 See also Dennis Deletant, Romania sub regimul comunist, Bucharest, 1997, 
pp. 78-85. 
30 Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History, London, 1992, 
pp. 32-6. 
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pointed out as early as 1966, the Romanian Communist Party’s policy of 
independence from Moscow, especially with regard to industrialization, 
rejection of Soviet cultural models and cultivation of national traditions, 
must surely have raised the popularity of the party and its leaders.31 It is 
also clear that Ceau$escu was popular during the early years of his regime. 
Following his decision to speak out about the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, millions of Romanians joined the newly formed 
worker-guards organization. 
Although the imposition of Russian-backed Communism was 
undoubtedly unpopular, 1940s Romania was surely ripe for social 
revolution.32 The Romanians’ relationship to Communism is a complex 
issue requiring careful scrutiny. The Communist myth of the Romanian 
people’s revolutionary tradition should not give way to an equally 
unchallengeable anti-Communist myth which will prevent open discussion 
of this vital historical issue. 
Nevertheless, as Ungureanu’s contribution itself indicates, Romanian 
scholars are in the process of coming to terms with their national 
mythologies. A work recently produced by Lucian Boia scrutinizes the 
Communist regime’s construction of Romanian history through the 
manipulation of myth and legend and examines how this distorted 
interpretation of Romanian history was used for political ends.33 
But scrutiny of myths regarding Romania need by no means be 
confined only to Romanian scholars. Western researchers also have a rich 
mythology, or series of misunderstandings, with regard to Romania. In 
1837, following visits to Paris and Berlin, the Romanian historian and 
future foreign minister Mihail Kogalniceanu wrote: ‘Everywhere I have 
found that no one has the slightest true idea about Wallachia and Moldavia 
[...]. The smallest countries of Africa and America are better known than 
these two Principalities’.34 It is a comment that is probably equally true 
today. This ignorance has, of course, been compounded by Romania’s 
isolation during the Communist period. Even before the Communist era, 
however, Romania was a relatively little-known country for most other 
31 R. V. Burks, ‘The Rumanian National Deviation: An Accounting’ in Kurt London 
(ed.), Eastern Europe in Transition, Baltimore, MD, 1966, pp. 93-113. 
32 Henry L. Roberts’s classic work, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian 
State, New Haven, CT, 1951, gives a vivid account of the grinding agrarian 
poverty, political violence and corrupt government of Romania in the decades 
preceding the imposition of Communism. 
33 Lucian Boia, Istorie p mit in conpiinta romaneasca, Bucharest, 1997. 
34 Barbara Jelavich, ‘Mihail Kogalniceanu: Historian as Foreign Minister, 1876-8’ 
in Deletant and Hanak (eds), Historians as Nation Builders (see note 18 above), 
pp. 87-105 (89). 
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Europeans. As Maurice Pearton points out in his contribution to this 
volume, Romania was beyond the scope of Britain’s immediate foreign 
policy and economic interests in the inter-war period. Britain, as a colonial 
power, had only limited diplomatic interest in Romania until the growth of 
German influence in Eastern Europe forced her to review her attitude 
towards Romania in 1939. 
This relative lack of interest and knowledge with regard to Romania 
has at times led to some quite dramatic misunderstandings. In the 1970s, 
the British Government and Foreign Office fully accepted Ceau§escu’s 
self-perpetuated myth of independence from the Soviet Union. Ceau§escu 
was feted accordingly, culminating in his visit to London in 1978 and his 
award of an honorary knighthood. Faith in Romania’s independence from 
the Soviet Union even led General Sir John Hackett to envisage anti-Soviet 
partisan activity in a number of East European countries, including Romania, 
bringing down the Soviet Bloc in a future war.35 Be that as it may, the 
reality in the 1970s, as Mark Percival has pointed out elsewhere, was that 
Romania was playing a full part in the activities of the Warsaw Pact.36 
Another Western myth pertaining to Eastern Europe in general, and 
Romania in particular, is that the area is fundamentally unstable, conflict- 
ridden and a threat to Western security. As Hugh Seton-Watson once put 
it, ‘There is a belief, rather widespread in English-speaking countries, that 
the eastern half of Europe is inhabited by a number of endlessly quarrelling 
small nations whose conflicts keep endangering the quiet and comfort of 
Anglophones’.37 Following the 1989 revolution, a number of books were 
published which perpetuated this image of a politically unstable Romania 
in which ethnic unrest and a cycle of military coups and weak 
parliamentary government were probably the best that could be 
expected.38 A similar attitude is apparent in Paul Hockenos’s work 
analysing the re-emergence of the right-wing in Eastern Europe since 
1989. According to his melodramatic account of the political scene in 
Romania, ‘post-communist Romanian nationalism has already shown a 
face far more menacing than that which underpinned Ceau§escu’s 
particular brand of “national communism”’ during the ethnic unrest in 
35 General Sir John Hackett et al., The Third World War: A Future History, London, 
1978, p. 243. 
36 Mark Percival ‘Britain’s “Political Romance” with Romania in the 1970s’, 
Contemporary European History, 4, 1994, 1, pp. 67-87 (81-2). 
37 Hugh Seton-Watson, ‘On Trying to be a Historian of Eastern Europe’ in Deletant 
and Hanak (eds), Historians as Nation Builders, pp. 1-15 (9). 
38 See, for instance, the otherwise extremely useful works by Martyn Rady, Romania 
in Turmoil (see note 30 above), and by Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceau§escu: 
The Politics of Intolerance, Edinburgh, 1995. 
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Targu-Mure§ in 1990.39 Meanwhile, Hockenos claims that the short¬ 
comings of the 1989 revolution ‘cast a black cloud over the flickering hope 
that finally, this time, Romania might wrest itself from its centuries-long 
history of despotism and ethnic strife’.40 Hockenos gives the reader no 
illumination regarding the exact course of Romania’s history of despotism, 
or how this might compare with the despotic histories of other European 
countries, let alone the ‘centuries-long [...] ethnic strife’, which this 
historian is hard-pressed to recount. Certainly, with the exception of the 
Targu-Mure§ violence in March 1990 and isolated incidents against 
members of the Roma minority, Romania’s record in ethnic conflict 
compares extremely favourably with that of Northern Ireland or the 
activities of Basque separatists.41 
Edward Said has argued in his book Orientalism that during the 
Western imperial period the Orient, especially the Islamic Middle East, 
came to be regarded as a barbarous, inferior area, to be contrasted with the 
civilization of the Occident.42 In a similar fashion, Maria Todorova has 
argued that within Europe itself ‘the Balkans have served as a repository 
of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory 
image of the “European” and the “West” has been constructed’.43 If, for 
the sake of argument, we regard Romania as part of the Balkans, the image 
of Romania often perpetuated by Western commentators both before and 
after 1989 would seem to justify Todorova’s assertion.44 
Connected to the above image of an unstable, somewhat ‘barbarous’, 
Romania is the Western ‘myth’ regarding Romania’s apparent failure to 
‘modernize’ and ‘develop’ her economic, political and social structures in 
line with Western institutions. In other words, there is a widely held 
‘myth’ that Romania is a ‘backward’ country. Originally a 1960s social 
39 Paul Hockenos, Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe, London, 1993, pp. 167-209 (169). 
40 Ibid., p 170. 
41 As Martyn Rady has pointed out with regard to ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe 
outside former Yugoslavia, ‘Even in Transylvania, one of the region’s greatest 
ethnic hotch-potches, communal violence has accounted so far for fewer lives then 
a bad day in Belfast’: Rady, ‘History and Eastern Europe’, Contemporary 
European History, 1, 1992, 2, pp. 199-202 (202). 
42 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, New York, 1979. 
43 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, Oxford, 1997, p. 188. 
44 According to the French secretary to the Prince of Moldavia, based at Ia§i in 1785— 
87, the inhabitants of Moldavia ‘at first seemed to me barbarous, the costume 
absurd, the uniforms ragged, the houses holes of mud, the priests beggarly and 
hypocritical riff-raff, and the language frightful’: Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern 
Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford, CA, 
1994, pp. 293-4. 
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science concept, used to analyse Third-World societies and their 
relationship to the world’s economically powerful nations, modernization 
theory has subsequently influenced, consciously or otherwise, many works 
dealing with the countries of the former Communist Bloc. 
Modernization theorists have been greatly influenced by earlier liberal 
economic theorists, in particular Adam Smith, who held that peoples and 
societies had a natural propensity towards economic growth, political and 
social ‘development’, and ‘progress’ in general. Contact with Western 
‘modernized’ societies would thus produce similarly ‘progressive’ systems 
throughout the world. Although various internal ‘institutional perversions’ 
might block this natural development, elimination of these factors, so the 
theory ran, would restore the conditions for natural growth and 
development. According to this version of the modernization theory, 
therefore, the world’s modernized and economic ‘core’ acts as an 
incentive to change in the rest of the world.45 This theory has also been 
greatly influenced by the Darwinian theory of evolution. Just as mankind 
developed from primitive ape to complex (and supposedly rational) 
modem man, human societies are regarded as naturally progressing from 
the primitive to the more complex and rational. 
According to Immanual Wallerstein’s ‘world-system theory’, however, 
the ‘core’ of modernized, industrial Western nations has had the effect of 
suppressing the ‘periphery’ of undeveloped, agricultural countries. 
Through unequal trading relations which exploit the poorer countries as a 
source of cheap agricultural products and raw materials, the ‘periphery’ 
has become a ‘neo-colony’ of the West. According to this theory, 
therefore, the modernized ‘core’ acts as an impediment to growth on the 
‘periphery’. The fate of Eastern Europe from the late Middle Ages 
onwards in relation to Western Europe is held to be analagous to that of 
today’s so-called ‘Third World’ in relation to the industrialized 
countries.46 
Clearly, the concepts of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ are useful 
and important. Debates about whether Romania should follow the West’s 
path of industrialization or retain her more traditionally based agricultural 
45 Important exponents of this theory in relation to Eastern Europe are Ivan T. 
Berend and Gyorgy Ranki. See, for instance, their The European Periphery and 
Industrialization 1780-1914, Cambridge, 1982, esp. pp. 21-7. 
46 For a discussion of Wallerstein’s theory and its shortfalls, see Martyn Rady, ‘Core 
and Periphery: Eastern Europe’ in Mary Fulbrook (ed ). National Histories and 
European History, London, 1993, pp. 163-82. For a discussion of Wallerstein’s 
theory with regard to Wallachia, see Daniel Chirot, Social Change in a Peripheral 
Society: The Creation of a Balkan Colony, New York, 1976. 
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social structures have occupied Romanian intellectuals throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.47 
There are a number of criticisms of modernization theory, however, 
made even as early as the 1970s. First, there is no consensus over the 
precise meaning of the term ‘modernization’, and hence of its opposite, 
‘backwardness’. For some, ‘modernization’ is equated with 
industrialization and man’s technological control over his environment. For 
others it is a ‘total transformation of all aspects of human existence, 
ranging from individual personality to international relations’: a definition 
surely so broad as to be almost meaningless.48 Secondly, proponents of 
modernization theory evaluate the progress of nations according to how 
closely this corresponds to the norms of the West. In other words, the 
Western experience of ‘modernity’ is held to have universal applicability. 
Little attempt is normally made to define or specifically describe the 
course of Western modernization. ‘Modernization’ hence appears as a 
vague and unspecified process taking place over several centuries. It is 
usually not clarified which countries make up the modernized ‘West’ to 
which Romania is being contrasted; still less is any attempt made to 
differentiate between the experiences of modernization in the various 
Western countries. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the timing and 
stages of development in the West are repeatable in other ‘developing’ 
nations. Critics of modernization theory have also argued that the role of 
traditional institutions in modernizing societies has been misunderstood. 
Rather than disappearing as modernization marches forward, ‘traditional 
institutions have proved durable, flexible, and long lasting, adapting to 
change rather than being overwhelmed by it. They have served as filters of 
modernization and even as agents of modernization’.49 More specifically, 
proponents of modernization theory have failed to take into account Otto 
Hintze’s paradox. As Hintze points out, it was the states which failed to 
succumb to the ‘modernizing’ and ‘progressive’ forces of absolutism in the 
47 For the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates on this topic, see Keith 
Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947, Oxford, 1994, pp. 55-90 and 292-335. The 
Communist period witnessed a concerted attempt to ‘catch-up’ with the West in 
terms of industrialization and ‘modernization’. For an analysis of this, see Trond 
Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of 
Ceau§escu ’s Personal Dictatorship, Boulder, CO, 1990. 
48 Dean C. Tipps, ‘Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: 
A Critical Perspective’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15, 1973, 
pp. 199-226 (203). 
49 Howard J. Wiarda, ‘Concepts and Models in Comparative Politics: Political 
Development Reconsidered - and Its Alternatives’ in Dankwart A. Rustow and 
Kenneth Paul Erickson (eds), Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research 
Perspectives, New York, 1991, pp. 32-53 (37). 
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eighteenth century, such as Britain, and which preserved their antique 
representative institutions, which provided the breakthrough to 
parliamentary democracy in the nineteenth century.50 
Some crucial aspects of modernization theory have simply proved, over 
time, and with the application of some sorely needed empirical research, to 
have been plain wrong! In 1959, Martin Lipset proposed that democracy 
appears as countries develop economically. A recent study, however, has 
concluded that ‘there are no grounds to believe that economic 
development breeds democracy’. Democracy may, or indeed may not, 
emerge at any level of a country’s economic development.51 
Yet despite the many criticisms levelled against modernization and 
development theory, the modernization ‘imperative’ has crept into 
numerous Western works on Romanian society and indeed many other 
societies. Such works are very often marred by a naive teleological 
determinism which frequently succumbs to the worst excesses of Marxist 
vocabulary. Individuals, classes and institutions which are not expected to 
be present at any given moment in the process of modernization can thus 
be branded as ‘unhistorical’ or as ‘forces of reaction’ in the best traditions 
of a Ceau§escu speech. As Tony Judt has pointed out in his critique of 
modem social history, instead of the Whig idea of history as progress, ‘we 
are offered “the modem world”; and all incidents along the line are either 
causally linked to some stage in the process or, where this is wholly 
implausible, declared to be “atavistic”’.52 
Yet, in reality, it is surely non-development and lack of ‘modernization’ 
which has been the global norm until very recently. What requires 
explanation is not the failure of Eastern Europe to ‘develop’ but the 
economic breakthrough to a capitalist system within specific areas of 
50 Otto Hintze, ‘Typologie der standischen Verfassungen des Abendlandes’ in Hintze, 
Staat und Verfassung, 3rd edn, Gottingen, 1970, pp. 120-39 (136-7). 
51 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, ‘Modernization Theories and Facts’, 
World Politics, 49, 1997 (January), pp. 155-83 (167). 
52 Tony Judt, ‘A Clown in Regal Purple: Social History and the Historians’, History 
Workshop, 7, 1979 (Spring), pp. 66-94 (68). For additional examples of 
modernization theory as applied, consciously or unconsciously, to Romania and 
Eastern Europe, see Andrew C. Janos, ‘Modernization and Decay in Historical 
Perspective: The Case of Romania’ in Keith Jowitt (ed.), Social Change in 
Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation, Berkeley, 
CA, 1978, pp. 72-117; Paul E. Michelson, Conflict and Crisis: Romanian 
Political Development, 1861-1871, New York and London, 1987; David Turnock, 
The Romanian Economy in the Twentieth Century, London and Sydney, 1986; 
Daniel Chirot (ed ), The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics 
and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century, Berkeley 
CA, 1989. 
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Western Europe. As Robert Brenner has pointed out, it was England and 
the Netherlands alone which underwent a capitalist breakthrough in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.53 Even in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, industrial development has been more marked in some areas of 
Western Europe than in others. Large areas of France, surely a ‘core’ 
Western country, have continued to retain a largely ‘pre-modem’ agrarian 
character well into the present century. 
Political, social and economic ‘modernization’ on the Western model, 
however, remains something of a moral imperative within the literature 
concerning Romania. The supposed failures of successive Romanian 
governments to achieve these ‘standards’ has resulted in continual censure 
by Western commentators.54 
Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that increasing access to resources both 
in and about Romania will lead to a growing understanding of Romania’s 
history and of her contemporary situation by Western scholars. This volume 
is a start in this direction. The School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, to which all the contributors to this volume are connected, is an 
important component in the attempt to increase public awareness of this 
hitherto poorly understood and under-researched country. 
The study of the Romanian language, history and society has been built 
up over the decades since the School’s foundation in 1915 by a number of 
distinguished scholars. R. W. Seton-Watson, one of the School’s founders, 
produced his classic History of the Roumanians in 1934. In 1945, 
Professor Grigore Nandri§ produced the first substantial manual for 
learning Romanian, Colloquial Romanian, recently updated by Professor 
Dennis Deletant in 1983 and again in 1995. In the post-war decades, 
Romanian studies at the School have gained an international reputation 
under Professor Eric Tappe and Dennis Deletant, the current Professor of 
Romanian Studies.55 It is to be hoped that the School will continue to 
provide a focus and meeting-place for Romanian studies within Britain and 
Europe in the decades to come. 
53 Robert Brenner, ‘Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe in the Light of 
Developments in the West’ in Chirot (ed), The Origins of Backwardness in 
Eastern Europe (see note 52 above), pp. 15-52 (50). 
54 This underlies much of the otherwise useful literature produced since 1989. See, 
for instance, Tom Gallagher’s Romania after Ceau§escu (see note 38 above), p. 
233: ‘Clearly, Romania is not moving in the direction of the West European 
political systems’. 
55 For the School’s contribution to the study of Romania and other countries of 
Eastern Europe, see I. W. Roberts, History of the School of Slavonic and Exist 
European Studies: 1915-J990, London, 1991. 

The Fate of Romanians’ Contemporary 
Historical Myths: Do They Have a Future? 
A Historiographical Review 
Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu 
History is like a little girl, for people to dress up as they fancy. 
(Hu Shi) 
There are no inventories of Romanian historical myths, unless one wishes 
to include the textbooks used by Romanian pupils in school. This lack is a 
major blow to the credibility of Romanian historiography, since describing 
and analysing historical myths implies a degree of awareness as to what 
the more accurate representations of the national history might be. The 
changes in the Romanian political system in 1989 should have cleared the 
way for an unbiased discussion of historical myths, but unfortunately this 
has not occurred. Answers to certain important historical questions and 
corrections of misinterpretations of Romania’s past are still awaited. For 
the time being, therefore, it appears that Romanian historiography has not 
fully delivered itself of the burden of myths. As well as their use in 
justifying a particular interpretation of the past, historical myths also have 
a role in shaping and explaining the present. Historical ‘explanations’ 
continue to be frequently employed in contemporary Romanian political 
discourse, thus demonstrating the mobilizing appeal of myth within 
Romanian society. 
Historical myths perform a definite historiographical role by re-shaping 
history into a comfortable and bearable past. Through myths, a nation can 
come to terms with its guilt and sins of omission. Pointing them out and 
analysing such myths, therefore, is an important exercise for the historian. 
The contemporary Romanian philosopher, Andrei Ple§u, has described this 
process as ‘a matter of national maturity’, which may eventually foster the 
transformation of Romanian culture into ‘a culture of truth’.1 Ple§u thus 
1 Andrei Ple§u, ‘Rigorile ideii nationale §i legitimitatea universalului’ in Ple§u, 
Chipuri p masti ale tranzipei, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 217-26. 
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alludes to the link between national consciousness and the understanding 
of history. When the former is ‘ripe’, Ple§u believes, a nation will accept 
its own history for what it is. At this point, myths will cease to have an 
appeal. Such a step may appear difficult, since accepting the past for what 
it is eventually ends in shattering entrenched opinions and mentalities. It 
also engenders historical relativism, since if there are no secure 
interpretations, past events seem to dissolve into a mass of uncertainties. 
*** 
In defining historical myths I am indebted to William McNeill’s 
interpretations published in 1986.2 In their archaic meaning, ‘myths’ are 
stories or narratives which confer meaning and moral value to the lives of 
individuals or social groups. Myths codify belief and provide prototypes 
for individual and group behaviour. Indeed, McNeill points out that 
political culture cannot function in the absence of myths, which represent 
‘an instrument for piloting human groups in their encounters with one 
another and with the natural environment’. As these sorts of myths are 
usually transposed in a narrative, they become ‘mythistories’ — 
transhistorical constructs providing collective identity, vision and 
coherence to a human group. Greco-Roman myths and Der 
Niebelungenlied would fall into this category, as described by McNeill. 
There is, however, a second group of narrativistic explanations of the 
past which all historians have to deal with, that is, historical myths. 
McNeill describes these as ‘allegedly empirical generalizations that either 
have not been or cannot be supported by the evidence’. They represent re¬ 
creations of the past ‘as we want it to be’ instead of a Rankean reading of 
the past, that is, me es eigentlich gewesen. Imagination colours the past, 
theory takes the place of explanation, presumption becomes evidence and 
replaces logic. According to McNeill, historical myths result from ‘the 
efforts to provide “factual” underpinning for metahistorical theories, 
disguised as explanations of the historical’, or from loose and fallacious 
historical reasoning, and are deliberate attempts to deceive. 
Historical reality, by contrast, provides an analysis of the past, 
supporting generalizations with empirical evidence. Historical reality 
avoids camouflaging metaphysical hypotheses as propositions of fact and 
adheres to the canons of logical argumentation. 
*** 
2 For what follows, see William McNeill, Mythistory and Other Essays, Chicago, IL, 
1986; some of his conclusions have been published in McNeill, ‘Mythistory or 
Truth: Myth, History, and Historians’, American Historical Review, 91, 1986, 1, 
pp. 1-10. 
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Romanian historical myths are impressive in number and in their narrative 
quality. Yet almost all the historical myths one can come across when 
browsing through a high school textbook are relatively new: they date from 
the mid-nineteenth century. These myths reflect the vision of the past held 
by the 1848 revolutionary generation and are intimately linked to their 
political ideals. Most of these myths were handed down into the 
Communist era without substantial change. They were simply remodelled 
to support a totalitarian ideology and to provide arguments to justify the 
political beliefs and aims of the Communist regime. 
The most interesting and reliable accounts on the subject of Romanian 
historical myths are written by Anglo-Saxon and German historians, rather 
than by Romanians. This is by no means a paradox, since it seems likely 
that those bom and raised in a different political and cultural tradition to 
that of the Romanians would develop a more objective approach to the 
question of Romanian historical myths. Geographical and cultural distance 
may well help to nurture objectivity. 
Klaus P. Beer3 and Manfred Stoy,4 for instance, have shown interest in 
the relationship between Romanian historiography and ideology over the 
past fifty years. Stephen Fischer-Galati5 and Paul Michelson6 reacted 
promptly to the proliferation of historical myths in 1980s Romania and 
tried to detect their ideological roots and possible consequences. 
Fischer-Galati has pointed out the ideological role which myths played 
under the Communists to legitimize their rule. None of these myths had 
been invented by the Communists themselves, however; they had a history 
of their own. According to Fischer-Galati, ‘the historical mythology is 
ultimately rooted in the search for legitimacy by Romanian rulers of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries’.7 Fischer-Galati singles out two main 
aspects of this family of myths as inherited from Romanian nineteenth 
century historians: an external aspect, designed to justify Romanian 
historical rights to possession of Bessarabia, the Bucovina, Transylvania, 
the whole of the Banat and the Dobrudja; and an internal aspect, in which 
3 Klaus P. Beer, ‘Die Interdependenz von Geschichtswissenschaft und Politik in 
Rumanien von 1945 bis 1980’, Jahrbiicher fiir Geschichte Osteuropas, 32, 1984, 
2, pp. 241-74. 
4 Manfred Stoy, ‘Politik und Geschichtswissenschaft in Rumanien, 1965-1980: Die 
Historiographie tiber den Zeitraum von der Griindung der Fiirstenthumer Moldau 
und Walachei bis 1859’, Sudostforschungen, 41, 1982, pp. 219-59. 
5 Stephen Fischer-Galati, ‘Myths in Romanian History’, East European Quarterly, 
15, 1981, 3, pp. 327-34. 
6 Paul Michelson, ‘Myth and Reality in Rumanian National Development’, 
International Journal of Rumanian Studies, 5, 1987, 2, pp. 5-33. 
7 Fischer-Galati, ‘Myths in Romanian History’, p. 328. 
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the argumentation of current policies are justified in terms of their 
relationship to the so-called ‘national and revolutionary traditions’ of the 
Romanian nation. Romanian historical rights were derived thus from the 
ancestral Romanians, be they Thracians, Dacians, Romans, Daco-Romans 
— that is, Proto-Romanians. Since they had continuously ruled over 
territories which later proved to be inhabited by Romanians, modem 
Romania’s borders should be extended to include them also. Greater 
Romania, created at the end of the First World War, was subsequently 
justified by this unsubstantiated argument. This historical mythology was 
also meant to represent the highest peak of Romanian history itself, an 
accomplishment of historic struggles against malevolent neighbours and 
the fulfilment of a historical task. The history of the Romanians would 
therefore appear to be the embodiment of the Romanians’ efforts to secure 
their territorial rights while facing fierce opposition from external and 
internal enemies. 
One of the most widespread mythic narrations pertaining to this family 
of myths which Fischer-Galati singles out runs as follows: the Romanians, 
‘History’s Cinderellas’, were prevented from attaining national liberation, 
political unification and social justice by wicked neighbours who either 
tried to dominate them or conquer the Principalities. The Habsburg Empire 
(including Hungary, or Austro-Hungary), the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
(either tsarist Russia or the Soviets) represent perfect examples of what the 
Romanians can expect from their neighbours. Since the Romanians were 
absorbed in fighting against enemies who surrounded them on all sides, 
they were unable to develop a national culture simultaneously with their 
Western peers. Their neighbours’ territorial greed, therefore, determined 
the Romanians’ cultural backwardness, severed Romanian culture from 
that of the West and consequently forced the Romanians to rely only on 
eastern, that is. Orthodox, cultural values. As a result of having to fight for 
their own political existence, the Romanians were denied the opportunity 
to make major cultural advances.8 
The history of Romanian nationalism and national consiousness, as it 
has been written thus far, has engendered a host of historical myths. Let us 
browse through some of those which seem to enjoy nationwide 
acceptance: the claim that modem Romanian nationalism is rooted in the 
Daco-Roman experience; that Michael the Brave possessed a developed 
sense of national awareness which guided his policy of unifying the 
Principalities with Transylvania, and which in turn led to the inevitable 
formation of Greater Romania after the First World War; and that the goal 
of a Greater Romania has been the essential part of the programme and 
8 Ibid. 
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aspirations of Romanian intellectuals and political leaders since the early 
years of the nineteenth century, to name but a few. Romanian historians 
become very emotional when discussing national heroes, for a great 
number of them regard Romania’s past as a series of overlapping heroic 
biographies. According to such a version of events, Romanian history can 
be construed as a succession of personal stories, deeply embedded with an 
acute sense of ‘Romanian awareness’. It is questionable, however, 
whether one can depict medieval Romanian rulers and subsequent political 
or social leaders as national heroes by virtue of their commitment to a 
presumed national or nationalist struggle. Vlad the Impaler has been 
portrayed as a national hero committed to law and order, not to mention 
the defense of the national patrimony against Ottoman and Hungarian 
‘imperialism’. Stephan the Great has been pictured as a defender of 
Romanian rights against Ottoman and Polish expansionism. Tudor 
Vladimirescu has been transformed into the leader of a Romanian 
revolution, both preceding and contemporary to the Greek revolution. 
Outstanding figures of 1848 such as Nicolae Balcescu, Avram Iancu, 
Mihail Kogalniceanu and C. A. Rosetti are marked as people obsessed 
with the accomplishment of the national unification of all Romanians into 
an independent state. 
There is, therefore, much truth in Dennis Deletant’s observation that 
‘Official post-1960s Romanian historiography regards the achievement of 
the “national unitary state” in 1919 as historically inevitable and every step 
in its realization is interpreted as preordained’.9 Romanian historiography 
conceives of the formation of Greater Romania as a single, pre-determined 
process spanning several centuries, and posits that, simultaneously, the 
Romanians’ conflicts with their neighbours fostered the development of a 
Romanian national consciousness. 
Paul E. Michelson has pointed out the methodological fallacies which 
lead Romanian historians to assert the existence of a detenninist process 
which finally engendered both state and nation. According to Romanian 
historians, this process took place over the previous two centuries, and 
they define the Romanian state in Rankean terms, that is, they represent 
the state as the primary vehicle of historical change. But, as Michelson 
points out, the primacy of the state ‘places the cart before the horse’, as 
there was no Romanian state as such before 1866, namely for half the 
period in question. On the contrary, the successful creation of a Romanian 
national state should rather be ascribed to the action of individuals and to 
9 Dennis Deletant, ‘The Past in Contemporary Romania: Some Reflections on 
Current Romanian Historiography’, Slovo, 1, 1988, 2, pp. 77-91 (78). 
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specific political circumstances. These factors brought the Romanian state 
into being, and not vice versa.10 
Thus, one of the most all-pervasive accounts of Romanian history is to 
regard ‘Romanian development as part of a relentless movement towards 
national state unity’. This ‘relentless movement’, however, is nothing but a 
metaphysical construction used to justify a historical argument. This 
teleological approach to Romanian development cannot stand as an 
accurate explanation.* 11 
Another persistent obsession amongst Romanian historians is the so- 
called ‘process of national renaissance and/or awakening’, which falls, 
according to Michelson, who bases his account on Mircea Eliade’s 
taxonomy of myths, into the category of myths of rebirth.12 As a precursor 
to the century of national awakening, the eighteenth century has been 
universally depicted by Romanian historians as an era of unmitigated 
decline and decay. Interestingly enough, the Romanian eighteenth century 
never figured among the four national ‘golden epochs’ which Ceau§escu 
believed Romanian modernity to consist of: 1859-66 (the reign of Prince 
Alexandru I. Cuza), 1881-1916 (the Kingdom of Romania under King 
Charles I), the inter-war period (1918-39) and the Communist epoch itself. 
Romanian historians generally regard the era of the Romanian ‘national 
renaissance’ to be closely connected with national revolutions. Ever since 
Romanian nineteenth-century politicians and historians began to regard the 
1848 revolution as paving the way for Romanian national development, 
thus apparently breaking with the traditions of the past, Romanian 
historiography has shown an increasing tendency to interpret modem 
history as an uninterrupted chain of revolutions, whether political, social, 
or economic.13 When the Communist regime began to seek historical 
legitimacy, historians were set to work seeking ‘evidence’ of the 
continuous socialist and revolutionary commitment of the masses. Such 
historians had only to trim the nineteenth-century Romantic vision of 
history, according to which modernization and state-formation were 
brought to fruition by means of successive revolutions (1848, 1859, 1866, 
1918 and so on). As a result of this interpretation, Romanian modem 
history appears fragmented, the natural flow of events shattered by sudden 
changes which profoundly affected social structures and collective 
10 Michelson, ‘Myth and Reality in Rumanian National Development’, p. 12. 
11 Ibid., p. 13. 
12 Ibid., pp. 14-17. 
13 For a comprehensive review on nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalist 
historiography, see Al. Zub, ‘Istorie §i mit in epoca moderna’ in Zub, Istorie $i 
finalitate, Bucharest, 1991, pp. 36-53 (English version in International Journal of 
Rumanian Studies, 5, 1987, 2, pp. 35-58). 
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mentalities. Instead of reading the past as it appears to have been — that 
is, rarely interrupted by riots, uprisings or court-plots — Communist 
historians strove to invent a revolutionary past which broke with historical 
tradition. According to this view, the element of continuity was the 
revolutionary consciousness itself, or as Ceau§escu put it, ‘a dialectical 
comprehension of Romanian history’. 
Let us not debate the ontological basis of the so-called ‘revolutionary 
consciousness’. It is extremely difficult to find examples of such an 
awareness, since Romanians rarely seem to have been revolutionary by 
nature. ‘The Romanian component of the East European revolutionary 
tradition is remarkably small’, as Fischer-Galati asserts.14 By definition, 
national revolutions should have been instigated by the whole of the 
Romanian nation: peasants, workers, intellectuals, the middle class and 
representatives of the Orthodox clergy. Contemporary documents, 
however, demonstrate that this was far from being the case. The Romanian 
peasantry, the presumed agent of revolution, has generally been 
unsupportive of any revolution, either in 1848 or thereafter. The 
peasantry’s adherence and support for the national goals of leaders such as 
Balcescu or Rosetti depended on the quality of the relationship between 
peasants and landlords, or their agents, and between the peasantry and the 
foreigners enjoying economic and social privileges in their midst. ‘It was 
seldom pro anything’, writes Fischer-Galati, referring to the ambiguity of 
the peasantry’s commitment to the national cause.15 An identification by 
the peasantry of their specific socio-economic aspirations with their rulers’ 
political projects cannot be historically demonstrated. On the contrary, the 
peasants regarded such projects, and modernization in general, with 
growing hostility, since modernization was perceived as leading to 
economic and social changes at the expense of more traditional ways of 
life. 
This lack of a social and revolutionary tradition among the peasantry is 
also fundamentally true of the workers. Working-class movements were 
largely apolitical and tended to take the form of trade unions rather than 
class parties. In the few instances when workers’ organizations adopted a 
clear political stance, their character was hardly militantly left-wing 
revolutionary. Some workers joined the Social Democratic Party before 
the First World War. During the inter-war period, however, a large number 
of workers registered with different right-wing parties, such as the League 
of National Christian Defence or the Iron Guard. Together with students 
and members of the middle class, many industrial workers joined the latter, 
14 Fischer-Galati, ‘Myths in Romanian History’, p. 330. 
15 Ibid., p. 331.’ 
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and espoused a xenophobic anti-Communism as their expression of 
Romanian patriotism. Hence one can argue that the Romanian workers had 
no clear orientation towards a specific ‘working-class movement’. Indeed, 
even the historical existence of a working class cannot be traced back 
much further than the last decade of the nineteenth century. Hence, the 
1848 revolution cannot be ascribed to their political activities. Indeed, the 
more one studies the social status of participants in the nineteenth-century 
revolutions, the more the complete lack of broadly based national 
participation has to be acknowledged.16 
I have already mentioned the reasons why the Communists formulated 
a mythic history of the Romanians. The Romanian peasantry, workers and 
intellectuals were seldom responsive to Communism. Their attitude, as the 
history of Communist repression clearly demonstrates, did not change 
significantly after the Communist Party seized power after the Second 
World War. The Romanians’ resistance to Communist rule gave birth to 
the longest armed insurgency in the Eastern Bloc, from 1945 to around 
1964. A large number of people withstood and fought back against the 
Securitate and the military. They paid for their struggle with thousands of 
lives. This widespread resistance to the imposition of Communism forced 
the Communist Party to reinvent the Party’s history. In other words, in 
order to overcome their unpopularity, Communist ideologues resorted to 
finding allies in the past. By so doing, the regime sought to claim 
legitimacy as the inheritors of Romania’s historical traditions. The history 
of the Romanians thus became the prehistory of the Romanian Communist 
Party. 
In an effort to secure popular support for the ‘socialist transformation 
of Romania’, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceau§escu sought to 
identify their rule with that of well-known figures from Romania’s past. 
This process later became essential for them in the face of growing Soviet 
enmity. Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceau§escu identified themselves with 
Romania’s ‘national heroes’, who had, allegedly, stood for social justice 
and the preservation of the Romanian patrimony against hostile foreign 
forces. They adopted for themselves spurious titles such as ‘heirs of the 
patriotic leaders’. Past events were distorted in order to back up, explain 
and justify the realities of contemporary Communism. Once political 
friendship with the USSR was replaced, from 1964, by ‘national 
Communism’, justification of Communist rule came to form the very core 
of Romanian official historiography. This Communist version of history 
filtered throughout society by way of the history textbooks used in schools 
during the Communist period. Consequently, this interpretation of 
16 Ibid. 
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Romanian history is still very much apparent today. Just as the Communist 
leader was regarded as the embodiment of the nation state, so the 
Romanian Communist Party and its leaders assumed the role of executors 
of the historic legacy and presumed aims of the Romanian nation. Hence 
the past had to be adapted to contemporary ideological needs, and later to 
the political whims of Communist leaders. The only scholars available to 
meet the demands of the Communist Party were historians, who were 
ready and indeed sometimes even eager to produce a new and 
ideologically relevant reading of the past.17 
Understanding the reasons for the survival of historical myths in 
Romania can perhaps provide an answer to the question posed in the title 
of this chapter. Paul Michelson has listed the following as the most 
important reasons for the continuation of these myths: 
The precariousness of the Romanian state's existence. This precari¬ 
ousness is beyond doubt given that during the nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries, the Romanians have been surrounded by potentially hostile 
neighbours. This ‘destiny’, as some contemporary historians like to put it, 
has nourished an acute sense of political and cultural uncertainty. This 
uncertainty has led to what might be called today ‘the national identity 
complex’. This complex is revealed in public discourse in rhetorical 
questions, such as ‘Are the Romanians Europeans, or not?’. The search for 
an answer to this question has stirred up a fashionable intellectual debate 
in the 1990s. 
The relatively late entry of Romania into the mainstream of European 
modernization, and consequently into the common consciousness of other 
European peoples. As Romanian scholars began to acknowledge that there 
were significant cultural differences between Romania and the ‘core’ 
Western countries, they also became aware of the effects which these 
differences had on the image of Romania in the rest of Europe. The 
widespread feeling among Romanian intellectuals that Romanian culture 
would have to ‘catch up’ with that of the West added to their sense of 
deep political and cultural insecurity. 
The extreme intellectualization of Romanian politics is closely related 
to the above phenomena. The process of cultural modernization, and its 
consequent problems, led many intellectuals to consider the adaptation to 
Western cultural standards either as dangerous to the so-called ‘national 
spiritual core’, or as very necessary for the allegedly non-European 
Romanian culture. Disputes regarding Romanian culture very quickly 
17 For a general analysis on the role played by the Romanian intelligentsia, see 
Katherine Verdery’s National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural 
Politics in Ceau$escu ’s Romania, Berkeley, CA, 1991. 
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moved from the intellectual domain into the political arena. For more than 
a century of parliamentary life, from the mid-nineteenth to the late 
twentieth century, Romanian politics has been marked by discussions 
regarding major cultural directions. 
The complete political involvement of Romanian intellectuals. 
Intellectuals appealed to history as the ultimate argument in their 
assertions. Recourse to history became a rhetorical weapon and a 
behavioural stereotype of Romanian intellectuals after 1848. This could be 
accomplished only by resorting to historical myths in order to strengthen 
the arguments. Nationalist ideology in the inter-war period, as well as 
under the Communists, tended to further amplify the creation of historical 
myths.18 
The cultural shock of fast and incomplete modernization and the 
intellectualization of Romanian politics remain important cultural issues. 
After 1948, the Communist regime continued the thorough politicization of 
national history and historiography, which eventually produced an almost 
complete distortion of the past. As Dennis Deletant has pointed out, the 
Communist regime’s ‘manipulation of the past was so blatant in much of 
what poses as Romanian historiography that young Romanians have 
remained largely ignorant of the historical basis of their national 
identity’.19 Furthermore, none of the factors which have caused Romanian 
historical myths to survive have vanished. On the contrary, their number 
has increased because of their extensive use as justification in 
contemporary political debates. 
I therefore suspect Romanian myths to be perennial. The current status 
of Romanian historiography supports my scepticism. This, however, 
should not deter scholars from undertaking basic historical research, in 
order to attempt to prevent the spread of historical myths. 
As Frederick Kellogg pointed out in 1990, in spite of a rich treasury of 
outstanding national histories, by Nicolae Iorga or C. C. Giurescu, for 
example, there is ‘no pivotal survey of the Romanians from earliest times 
to the present’.20 
Reference tools of all sorts are still missing, thus rendering the task of 
writing a national compendium of Romanian history well-nigh impossible. 
A series of documentary collections and updated critical editions of 
medieval and early modem sources are yet to be published. Financial 
18 Michelson, ‘Myth and Reality in Rumanian National Development’, pp. 5—8. 
19 Dennis Deletant, ‘The Past in Contemporary Romania: Some Reflections on 
Recent Romanian Historiography’, in Laszlo Peter (ed), Historians and the 
History of Transylvania, Boulder, CO, 1992, pp. 133-58 (156). 
20 Frederick Kellogg, A History of Romanian Historical Writing, Bakersfield, CA, 
1990, pp. 106ff. 
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constraints are little excuse for not accomplishing these elementary 
methodological tasks. 
Many regional and national aspects of Romanian modem history, 
whence most historical myths stem, merit closer scrutiny. An institutional 
history (modem bureaucratic systems, communications, banking, 
administrative bodies and so on), including both formal and informal types 
of social association, also need to be studied. The few histories currently 
available are out of date or coloured by Marxist interpretations. A 
reassessment of modem social history is also essential. The history of 
social and political categories, urban and rural history and demographic 
history are areas Romanian historians need to explore. Despite the focus 
on peasants’ and workers’ history in the past fifty years, their role in 
Romania’s modem development has yet to be disclosed. In Paul 
Michelson’s words, ‘because of the too-frequent need to force the peasant 
into the Procrustean bed of Marxist analysis’, the peasantry’s true role in 
Romanian history has not been fully explored. Meanwhile, the same holds 
true for the history of the Romanian working class.21 
Historical myths also prevent historians from pursuing unbiased 
research into the scope and degree of external influences on Romania’s 
modem development. Even today, ‘the tendency of Romanian historians to 
concentrate mainly on outstanding accomplishments of Romanians and to 
mention foreigners only in passing or as challenges to Romanian continuity 
and ethnic unity’ remains widespread.22 Original research into the nature 
of Romanian intellectual and cultural history and the relationship between 
culture and modem politics would therefore be most appropriate. Social 
and cultural history are closely related to the study of collective 
mentalities, ranging from the analysis of the so-called esprit publique to 
attitudes towards marriage, sex and children. 
One of the forms the ‘national identity complex’ takes within the realm 
of historiography is the emphasis on national histories and the consequent 
lack of substantial regional histories. The same complex can be blamed for 
delaying an accurate assessment of the role which ethnic and cultural 
minorities have played in the recent past of the Romanian Principalities 
and of the modem Romanian state. The writing of impartial biographies of 
medieval and modem political and cultural personalities is also long 
overdue. 
Interdisciplinary methods of research will surely help scholars disclose 
more of the cultural roots of historical myths, thus providing the means to 
understand them properly. Indeed, the whole methodological core of 
21 Michelson, ‘Myth and Reality in Rumanian National Development’, p. 31. 
22 Kellogg, A History of Romanian Historical Writing, p. 108. 
30 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
Romanian historical research needs to undergo major structural changes. 
As long as historical researchers only seek to expose facts, regardless of 
their context, and pay no attention to methodologies and the results of 
research from the social sciences, modernizing an ailing historiography 
will remain a dream. Interdisciplinary research may help to change the 
atrophied landscape of Romanian historiograpy into a more realistic image 
of the past. These new methodological approaches could, for instance, be 
used in conjunction with fresh historical research into the much-neglected 
‘black centuries’ of Romanian history: the seventeenth, eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, which received inadequate scrutiny during the 
Communist era. The ‘historiographical haze’, as Michelson has defined the 
current condition of Romanian historical writing, is due to the lack of 
regard for the benefits of interdisciplinarity, together with the continued 
respect paid to the Marxist conceptual framework.23 
This is only a minor part of what Romanian historians will have to 
confront when struggling against the symbolic power of historical myths 
and aiming to accurately research a misty past. For ‘mist’ is what most 
historical myths have produced since the end of the nineteenth century. I 
am, therefore, unsure as to whether Romanian historiography will be able 
to dismantle its historical myths, given how painful this process may be, or 
whether these myths will continue to have a secure cultural future. I can as 
yet, therefore, offer no definite answer to the question posed by the title of 
this chapter. 
23 Michelson, ‘Myth and Reality in Rumanian National Development’, p. 31. 
Romanian Shepherds on the Great Hungarian Plain 
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
Martyn Rady 
There can scarcely be subjects more given to historical and political 
controversy than the ethnogenesis and settlement of the Romanian people. 
To begin with, there is the familiar debate over whether the modem 
Romanians are the descendants of migrants coming from south of the 
Danube or whether they represent an autochthonous population group. 
Within the autochthony school itself, however, two historiographical 
trends are evident. The first of these lays emphasis upon the Roman origin 
of the Romanians; the second stresses the pure Getic element in, as it 
were, the collective Romanian gene pool. According to this second school, 
which acquired prominence in Romanian historiography during the 1980s, 
the Romanians are the direct descendants of the Geto-Dacians, who 
acquired the language but never interbred with the Roman conquerors.1 
Nevertheless, two contrasting opinions are evident even within the 
Getic school concerning the early history of the Romanian people. On the 
one hand it is alleged that, following the evacuation of the legions in AD 
271, the Romance-speaking population took refuge in the fastnesses of 
Transylvania. Only much later, in a process lasting from roughly the 
thirteenth to the eighteenth century, did they ‘dismount’ on the plains of 
Wallachia and Moldavia.2 On the other hand, it is claimed that substantial 
pockets of Romance-speaking Getes survived for most of the Dark Ages in 
the lowlands north of the Danube and in the Dobruja. The Romanian 
princes from Transylvania who entered Moldavia and Wallachia in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries erected their states, therefore, on top of 
an already existing Romanian population.3 
1 Dennis Deletant, ‘The Past in Contemporary Romania: Some Reflections on 
Recent Romanian Historiography’ in Laszlo Peter (ed), Historians and the History 
of Transylvania, Boulder, CO and New York, 1992, pp. 133-58. 
2 This approach is typified by Constantin C. Giurescu, Transylvania in the History of 
Romania: An Historical Outline, London, undated, esp. chapter 5. 
3 See thus §erban Papacostea, Romanii in secolul al XIII-lea, Bucharest, 1993, 
pp. 56-8; Stefan Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, 4 vols, Bucharest, 1972-89, III, 
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All the theories outlined above argue an ancient and intimate historical 
relationship between the lands and populations of Transylvania, Wallachia 
and Moldavia. In this respect, they all perform a discrete political purpose 
by vindicating the construction of the modem Romanian state out of the 
fusion in 1918 of Transylvania with the Regat. Nevertheless, the partisan 
history of a state often has as its consequence the partial history of a 
nation. This is particularly the case with regard to Romanian 
historiography. By seeking to establish a congruence between state and 
nation, Romanian historians have tended to overlook those of their 
countrymen who have in the past lived or moved beyond the political 
boundaries of Romania. 
The Romanian shepherds of the Great Hungarian Plain represent a 
population group which, although small, dwelled for part of the year 
outside the border of modem Romania. Moreover, by traversing east to 
west in the search for pastures, these shepherds migrated in an opposite 
direction to that which has always been politically and historiographically 
fashionable. For these reasons, both in Romanian and Hungarian 
scholarship, the story of the Romanian shepherds of the Plain has been 
hitherto largely confined to ethnographic studies. 
It would be entirely reasonable to suppose that even as early as the 
Middle Ages Romanian shepherds brought their flocks down from 
Transylvania’s Bihor Mountains (Erdelyi Szigethegyseg) to winter on the 
Gieat Hungarian Plain. The Plain was traditionally the homeland of semi- 
nomadic tribes, such as Pechenegs and Cumans, and until the fourteenth 
century nomadism may, along with transhumance, have also been a 
characteristic of Romanian sheep-fanning.* * 4 Moreover, the Plain’s 
population was sparse, thus pennitting opportunities for unimpeded 
grazing. Nevertheless, neither place-name evidence nor the surviving 
documentary record attest to the presence of Romanian shepherds on the 
Plain before the sixteenth century.5 Although arguments ex silentio are not 
altogether convincing in the context of the Hungarian Middle Ages, we 
should probably reckon that the valleys and heaths of Transylvania 
pp. 382-3; see also the important new work of Gheorghe Postica, Romanii din 
codrii Moldovei in evul mediu timpuriu, Chisinau, 1994, pp. 105-23. 
4 Istvan Gyorfly, Magyar falu magyar haz, Budapest, 1943, p. 162; Laszlo Makkai, 
Magyar-Roman kozos nmIt, 2nd edn, Budapest, 1989, p. 57. 
5 Karoly Mezosi, Bihar varmegye a torok uralom megszunese idejen (1692), 
Budapest, 1943, p. 11. On Anonymus’s pastores Romanorum, see Dennis 
Deletant, ‘Ethnos and Mythos in the History of Transylvania’ in Peter, Historians 
and the History of Transylvania, pp. 67-85 (75-7) and Adolf Armbruster, 
Romanitatea romanilor: Istoria unei idei, Bucharest, 1993, pp. 36^41 
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provided at this time sufficient winter-grazing for those flocks which were 
not wintered in Moldavia or Wallachia.6 
It is only really from the eighteenth century that we have firm evidence 
pointing to a substantial Romanian presence on the Great Hungarian Plain. 
With the reconquest of Hungary from the Turks, not only was the Plain 
safe as pastureland but also landowners and the agencies of royal 
government were anxious to populate the region and to renovate its 
economy. Fixed Romanian settlements were thus founded during the 
course of the century on the edge of the Plain, most notably between the 
Fekete Korbs (Cri§u Negru) and Sebes Koros (Cri§u Repede) rivers.7 
According to an account written in the mid-eighteenth century by a priest 
in Bekes county, Romanians were also employed in large numbers as 
casual labourers for ploughing and gathering in the harvest.8 
During the same period, Romanian herdsmen with flocks of sheep 
became a feature of the Plain. The depopulation of the Plain during the 
Turkish period made it an attractive location for winter grazing. In 
addition, since labour was short, landowners had little alternative but to 
use their estates for pasture rather than for agriculture. A letter sent in 
1754 from the Transylvanian gubemium to Szabolcs county noted, 
therefore, the frequency with which shepherds drove their flocks from the 
defiles of Transylvania to winter in Hungary, and went on to complain that 
they were being unfairly taxed by the county.9 
No clear indication exists of the number of shepherds wintering on the 
Plain. Figures for the number of sheep grazing in Bekes county suggest, 
however, a rapid growth and quite substantial number. Whereas in 1717 
there had only been 455 sheep recorded in the county, by 1773 there were 
almost 61,000.10 This number of sheep would require the ministration of at 
least several hundred shepherds.* 11 One account deriving from the middle 
of the eighteenth century noted that it was possible ‘all the time to see 
Wallachians spread out everywhere in great numbers on the plains and in 
the towns and villages’ of Bekes county.12 In addition to Bekes, Romanian 
6 See generally in this context Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, III, pp 106-7. 
7 Mezosi, Bihar varmegye, end maps. 
8 Jozsef Implom, Olvasdkonyv Bekes megye tortenetehez, II (1694-1848), 
Bekescsaba, 1971, p. 65. 
9 Istvan Balogh, ‘Adatok a roman pasztorok XVIII. szazadi alfoldi legeltetesehez’, 
Muveltseg es Hagyomany, 3 (Studia Ethnologica Hungariae et Centralis ac 
Orientalis Europae), 1961, pp. 213-17 (214). 
10 Implom, Olvasdkonyv Bekes, p. 185. 
11 A tentative ratio of sheep to shepherds may be established by reference to Bela 
Gunda, ‘Organisation sociale des patres dans la Grande Plaine Hongroise’ in 
Gunda, Ethnographica Carpatho-Balcanica, Budapest, 1979, pp. 199-211 (204). 
12 Implom, Olvasdkonyv Bekes, p. 65. 
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shepherds wintered in Szabolcs and Bihar counties, more particularly on 
the Hortobagy and Nyirseg. Fragmentary figures from the mid-eighteenth 
century record flocks in a dozen separate locations on the Nyirseg alone.13 
Although Romanian shepherds are simply described in the extant 
sources as coming from Transylvania, some more precise information 
survives as to their place of origin. Most of those so recorded appear to 
have come from Szeben county, although even this century shepherds from 
as far afield as Fogaras (Fagara§) are reported.14 Their routes from the 
Transylvanian interior to the Plain most probably followed the valleys of 
the Szamos (Some§) and Koros (Cri§u) rivers. Many would appear to be 
driving their own flocks, customarily appearing on the Plain in late 
September, on St Michael’s Day, and then returning to the hills on St 
George’s Day in April once lambing was over. During the winter the 
flocks frequently grazed on common pastures owned by the local towns. 
The shepherds had to pay for this right, according to the number of sheep 
in each flock, and they normally negotiated the terms of the lease several 
months in advance with the municipal authorities. This arrangement was 
clearly profitable to the towns of the Plain, which often forbade private 
landowners from leasing out their own pastures.15 
A large number of shepherds were, however, employed by other 
leaseholders to care for flocks. A significant proportion of the animal-trade 
in the Balkans lay in the hands of Greek, Armenian and Bulgarian 
merchants. They frequently used the pastures of the Great Plain to winter 
sheep and cattle previously bought in Transylvania, Moldavia and 
Wallachia.16 Armenians, possibly from Szamosujvar (Gherla), appear to 
have been predominant in this activity. In the 1760s, Armenian 
leaseholders had over 12,000 sheep grazing in Bekes county. In 1799 the 
pastures around Balmazujvaros were leased out by twenty-four Armenian 
merchants who were accompanied by shepherds coming from Szilagy, 
Szolnok-Doboka, Szatmar and Kolozs counties. 
There are also scattered references to Romanian shepherds being taken 
on as labour after the flocks had returned to the hills in April. In 
Magyarpecska (Rovine) in Arad county, a Romanian labour market was 
held annually on St George’s Day. Landowners and peasants from upto 
twenty miles away would attend the market and bid for the shepherds. 
Elsewhere we learn of shepherds being employed on a permanent basis by 
13 Balogh, ‘Adatok a roman pasztorok’, p. 215. 
14 Bela Gunda, ‘Rumanische Wanderhirten in der grossen ungarischen Tiefebene’, 
Ethnographica Carpatho-Balcanica, Budapest, 1979, pp. 213-14 (219). 
15 Ibid., p. 216. 
16 For this and much of what follows, see Balogh, ‘Adatok a roman pasztorok’, 
pp. 214-15. 
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local landowners. Some of these evidently stayed on the Plain for long 
periods, even up to twenty or thirty years. 
It is unlikely that the sheep on the Great Plain were used primarily for 
their wool. Transylvania and Hungary imported most of their wool, mainly 
from the Balkans.17 It is more likely that the sheep were sold off as 
livestock for the meat trade. At the end of winter, consignments of sheep 
were thus driven westwards from the Plain to the markets in Vienna and 
Buda. Most of these would appear to have followed the wide cattle routes 
to the west, with the shepherds paying for fodder and passage along the 
way. One arrangement followed was for the shepherd to present a village 
with a ewe, in return for which the flock was allowed to graze overnight 
beside the road.18 
Sheep were also sold off after winter at local markets. Cattle and sheep 
markets were held at Vilagos (§iria), Simand and Zarand in Arad county, 
and at Mateszalka, Csenger and Erdod (Ardud) in Szatmar county. The 
Szatmar markets appear to have attracted purchasers from as far afield as 
Upper Hungary.19 A major cattle market was also held every spring at 
Debrecen.20 It is probable, however, that a substantial quantity of sheep 
returned to Transylvania, where they were eventually purchased by Greek 
merchants. The sheep would then have been driven southwards in order to 
feed Constantinople’s enormous demand for meat. As early as the second 
half of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman capital was annually receiving 
for slaughter almost four million sheep and three million lambs.21 A letter 
sent by the Sultan in 1621 required the citizens of Beszterce (Bistrita) in 
Transylvania to provide the Porte with cattle and sheep and advised them 
to entrust their deliveries to Greek merchants.22 Trade with the south is 
likely to have been facilitated by the presence on the Plain of resident 
commercial agents working for merchant companies in the Ottoman 
Balkans.23 
17 Marta Bur, ‘Das Raumgreifen Balkanischer Kaufleute im Wirtschaftsleben der 
ostmitteleuropaischen Lander im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert’ in Vera Bacskai (ed ), 
Burgertum imd biirgerliche Entwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa, 2 vols, 
Budapest, 1986, I, pp. 1-88 (30-1, 39, 44). 
18 Balogh, ‘Adatok a roman pasztorok’, p. 220. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Gunda, ‘Rumanische Wanderhirten’, p. 217. 
21 Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City 1400-1900, Seattle, WA and London, 1983, 
p. 100; see also Adrian Radulescu and Ion Bitoleanu, A Concise History of 
Dobruja, Bucharest, 1984, p. 155. 
22 Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, Documente privitore la Istoria Romani lor, 15, 1913, 2, 
pp. 912-13. 
23 Bur, ‘Das Raumgreifen Balkanischer Kaufleute’, pp. 47, 66. 
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Relations between the Romanian shepherds and the Hungarian 
population and authorities were frequently strained. As one Scottish visitor 
to the Great Plain in the 1830s noted, the shepherd ‘has a system of 
morality peculiar to himself. I know not why, but nomadic habits seem to 
confuse ideas of property most strangely in the heads of those accustomed 
to them; nomadic nations are always thieves’.24 In addition, the Romanians 
as a national group were closely associated in the popular imagination with 
robbery. As the town council of Nagybanya (Baia Mare) put it in the 
1660s, ‘the Wallach always steals and thieves’.25 
A principal source of complaint was that Romanian shepherds went off 
with sheep which did not belong to them. For this reason, it was required 
that they retain proper paperwork so that ownership of their sheep could 
be promptly established in the event of a dispute. In the case of unfamiliar 
‘wandering shepherds’ and newcomers, permits of passage and letters 
from previous employers might also be required. Without the proper 
documentation, shepherds faced the prospect of summary arrest.26 A 
further cause of friction was that Romanian shepherds released their flocks 
on pastureland without permission, thus jeopardizing the livelihood of 
local shepherds. In 1823 fighting broke out between Romanian and 
Hungarian shepherds over pasturing rights in Bihar county.27 
Women were a further point of contention between the pastoral and 
settled populations of the Plain. The persistent harassment of womenfolk 
by shepherds contributed to local legislation limiting the length of time 
shepherds might stay in settlements. As it was, the sexual mores of 
shepherds aroused concern. Although Slovak prostitutes were available, 
certainly at Kecskemet, and there were plenty of ‘loose women’ 
(.szomelyek) employed in the inns of the Plain,28 many shepherds engaged 
in homosexual relations. Indeed, among the Hungarian shepherds of the 
Plain, homosexuality was sufficiently commonplace to be ritualized in 
dress and facial appearance. When male partners were unavailable among 
24 John Paget, Hungary and Transylvania; with Remarks on their Condition, Social, 
Political and Economical, 2 vols, London, 1850, I, p. 499. Paget is here talking 
specifically of Hungarian shepherds; Romanian shepherds do not enter into his 
account. 
25 Sandor Kolozsvari and Kelemen Ovari, Corpus Statutorum, 5 vols, Budapest, 
1885-1904, III, p. 658. 
26 Corpus Statutorum, III, pp. 79, 399; Implom, Olvasokonyv Bekes, pp. 295-95. 
27 Gunda, ‘Rumanische Wanderhirten’, p. 218. Shepherding remains a dangerous 
activity. In 1997 two shepherds from the Sibiu area were killed on the road in a 
clash with other shepherds. (I owe this information to the kindness of Michael 
Stewart.) 
28 Bela Gunda, ‘Sex and Semiotics’ in Gunda, Ethnographica Carpatho-Balcanica, 
pp. 371-80 (379). 
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the shepherd community, recourse might be had to Gypsies or to the flock 
itself. The latter was clearly a desperate remedy which, if detected, could 
lead to the execution both of the offender and of his dumb victim.29 
Although travelling Gypsies appear to have retained corporate 
institutions for the adjudication of offences, presumably wherein they were 
the defendants, no such separate jurisdiction applied to shepherds.30 
Although minor disputes between shepherds might doubtless be resolved 
by a local ‘strongman’, as was the case with Hungarian herdsmen, most 
cases passed to the jurisdiction of landowners and municipal courts.31 
These were adjudicated according to local custom, the ms valachorum 
having long passed into desuetude.32 The frequency with which Romanian 
shepherds passing through Veszprem county fled upon charge from one 
jurisdiction to another prompted the decision in 1730 to present all actions 
involving shepherds and wanderers before the county courts. In order to 
prevent shepherds absconding, it was laid down that half of their flock 
should upon indictment be taken as surety.33 
Nevertheless, cultural interchange as much as conflict distinguished 
relations between the Romanian shepherds and their host communities. 
First, the shepherds provided income, labour, commodities and a ready 
market for hay and agricultural produce in an otherwise desolate part of 
Hungary. Secondly, Romanian varieties of sheep (in particular the ovis 
strepsiceros dacicus), as well as sheep-rearing techniques, were adopted 
by Hungarian shepherds. In much the same way, Romanian shepherds 
themselves began herding traditional Hungarian breeds (most notably, the 
ovis strepsiceros hortobagyensis).34 Thirdly, Romanian and Hungarian 
methods of herding may be considered complementary. Hungarian 
shepherds largely left their flocks to roam on the Plain, providing them 
only with open pens and windbreaks and with a ratio of shepherd to sheep 
of 1:500. Romanian herding was much more labour-intensive and often 
involved the construction of roofed pens. Although it would be unwise to 
make too great a distinction between the two types of herding, the 
29 Gunda, ‘Organisation sociale’, p. 203. 
30 Implom, Olvasokonyv Bekes, p. 66. The institutions of the ciganyvajda and Gypsy 
council were eventually abolished in 1767. 
31 Paget, Hungary and Transylvania, I, p. 500 
32 Makkai, Magyar-Roman kozos mult, p. 66, see also in this context Walter Kuhn, 
‘Flamische und frankische Hufe als Leitformen der mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlung’ in 
Kuhn, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlung, Cologne 
and Vienna, 1973, pp. 1-51 (30); Frigyes Pesty, A szorenyi varmegyei hajdani 
olah keruletek, Budapest, 1876, p. 25. 
33 Corpus Statutorum, V, Budapest, 1902, p. 464. 
34 Gunda, ‘Rumanische Wanderhirten’, p. 221. 
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Romanian technique was clearly more suitable for the less hardy varieties 
of merino sheep which made their advent on the Plain during the 
nineteenth century.35 Exchange may also be demonstrated with regard to 
vocabulary. As was noted earlier on this century, technical terms used in 
Hungary with regard to sheep-farming frequently derived from Romanian, 
while for their part Romanians borrowed their vocabulary of cattle and 
horse-breeding from Hungarian.36 
During the nineteenth century large parts of the Plain were drained and 
converted to agricultural use. Pastureland was divided up into plots which 
were then planted with varieties of wheat. By the end of the century, the 
Plain was providing the bulk of the agricultural produce which would 
make Budapest the world’s second largest milling centre.37 The 
corresponding decline in the area of common land available for grazing on 
the Plain obliged shepherds to winter their flocks instead in Transylvania, 
or to drive them to the Lower Danube or Bessarabia, or even as far as the 
Crimea. Numbers settled for good in the Dobruja. Over the course of the 
century, the rearing of sheep in Transylvania was increasingly undertaken 
by peasant proprietors rather than transhumand shepherds.38 
Many years ago, Nicolae lorga suggested that the shepherd was ‘the 
key representative of Romanian unity’.39 Iorga’s opinion may now be 
unfashionable in a historiography which endeavours to give the Romanian 
people a more illustrious ancestry than mere shepherding. Nevertheless, if 
the complete history of the Romanians is to be written, rather than just a 
history of the Romanian state, attention will need to be paid to those 
fragments of the population which for several centuries wintered across the 
contemporary political frontier. 
35 Gyorffy, Magyar falu, pp. 175-86; Janos Poor, A hajduvarosok gazdasagi es 
tarsadalmi helyzete (1607-1720), Debrecen, 1967, pp. 32-33. 
36 Lajos Loczy, A magyar Szent Korona orszcigainak foldrajzi, 
tarsadalomtudomanyi, kdzmu\>elodesi es kozgazdasagi leirasa, Budapest, 1918, 
p. 157, noted by Mariann Nagy, ‘Nineteenth Century Hungarian Authors on 
Hungary’s Ethnic Minorities’ in Laszlo Kontler (ed.), Pride and Prejudice: 
National Stereotypes in 19th and 20th Century Europe East to West, Budapest, 
1995, pp. 29-51 (41). 
37 Ivan T. Berend, The Crisis Zone of Europe: An Interpretation of East-Central 
European History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 1986, 
p. 10. 
38 BelaKopeczi (ed.), Erdely tortenete, 3 vols, Budapest, 1986, III, pp. 1537-8. 
39 Cited in Nicolae Stoiescu, Age-Old Factors of Romanian Unity, Bucharest, 1986, 
p. 65. 
Grigore Gafencu and Romanian Policy towards 
Germany, December 1938 to June 1940 
Rebecca Haynes 
The aim of Romanian foreign policy in the inter-war period was to retain 
the territorial integrity of the Greater Romanian state created after the First 
World War. In the 1920s and early 1930s this was achieved through 
adherence to the French-backed collective security system and the League 
of Nations. By the mid-1930s, however, French power was waning fast 
and revisionist Germany and the Soviet Union were re-emerging in 
European power politics. Responding to this potential threat, the 
Romanian Foreign Ministry, directed by King Carol II, moved in the inid- 
to late 1930s towards a policy of ‘appeasement’. The aim of Carol’s 
‘appeasement’ policy was to avoid, where possible, tight commitments to 
Romania’s allies and any extension of alliances. Carol also sought to retain 
flexibility towards, and to achieve balance between, the Great Powers in 
order to be free to negotiate his country out of danger. By so doing, Carol 
hoped to avoid his country’s involvement in any war and to preserve its 
territorial integrity. It was with these aims in mind that Carol appointed 
Grigore Gafencu as Foreign Minister in December 1938, a post he held 
until June 1940. King Carol and Gafencu’s policy bears comparison with 
that pursued by Neville Chamberlain in Britain. In similar fashion to 
Chamberlain’s, the Romanian government’s ‘appeasement’ policy 
unravelled by degrees by 1939-40 as opportunities for striking balances 
and bargains with the Great Powers shrank. In this sense, the history of 
Romanian appeasement bears resemblance to the larger history of 
appeasement policy in the late 1930s. 
*** 
Although by 1939 the term ‘appeasement’ had already assumed the 
pejorative meaning of ‘peace at any price’, the original policy had arisen 
from specific military and strategic considerations. In the inter-war period, 
Britain was a satiated power with no new territorial ambitions. Her vast 
global commitments were such as to stretch her limited military resources. 
39 
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A Chiefs of Staff report of late 1937 revealed that Britain would be unable 
to defend her vital global interests against Germany, Italy and Japan. 
Neither was it clear that the Dominions, the United States, or even France 
would have any determination to help fight for the status quo in Europe.1 
Until rearmament was completed, the British government felt it necessary 
to seek ways of reducing the potential number of Britain’s enemies.2 
‘Appeasement’ therefore implied the avoidance of tight alliances, which 
were held to have led to the First World War. This dislike of tight alliances 
coincided with an increasing lack of faith in the ability of the collective 
security system and the League of Nations, an alliance system writ large, 
to keep the peace.3 By the same token, ‘appeasement’ also implied a 
flexibility of approach in dealing with foreign governments, involving 
direct negotiations, untrammelled by treaty obligations, between leaders of 
state, together with a willingness to offer reasonable concessions in the 
face of valid grievances so as to avoid recourse to war.4 
More specifically with regard to Germany, Chamberlain’s 
‘appeasement’ policy was motivated by a number of important additional 
factors. A prosperous Germany was the basis for Britain’s economic 
recovery following the Depression.5 Many in the British government also 
believed that Germany had natural and legitimate interests in Eastern 
Europe and were thus prepared to accept some peaceful changes to the 
Versailles settlement in her favour. ‘Appeasement’ was also partially 
motivated by the fear of Bolshevism prevalent amongst members of the 
British Conservative Party. Chamberlain himself believed that war was not 
only wasteful in itself but foresaw (accurately as it turned out) that it 
would lead to the destruction of Europe and its Bolshevization by the 
1 R. J. Q. Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 
1935-39, Basingstoke and London, 1993, p. 156; William R Rock, British 
Appeasement in the 1930s, London, 1977, pp. 44-6; Keith Robbins, Munich 1938, 
London, 1968, pp. 156-7. 
2 In their 1937 report, the Chiefs of Staff concluded that ‘we cannot [...] exaggerate 
the importance [...] of any political or international action that can be taken to 
reduce the number or our potential enemies and to gain the support of potential 
allies’: Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s, p 46. R. A. C. Parker has 
recently stressed that the main purpose of British ‘appeasement’ was to persuade 
Germany to begin a policy of arms limitation: see Parker, Chamberlain and 
Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, 
Basingstoke and London, 1993, pp. 20, 23, 42, 307. 
3 Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s, p. 47; Robbins, Munich 1938, p. 159. 
4 Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s, pp. 26-30. 
5 Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, pp. 14-15; 
P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, London, 1986, 
pp. 178-9; Robbins, Munich 1938, pp. 165-6. 
Rebecca Haynes 41 
Soviet Union. Any alliance with the Soviets would not only provoke 
Germany by reviving memories of pre-1914 ‘encirclement’, but was also 
ideologically repugnant.6 
Romanian ‘appeasement’ of Germany also arose from similar 
considerations. Like Britain, Romania was a satiated country with no new 
territorial ambitions. Nevertheless, she was militarily weak and surrounded 
by the revisionist Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria, who coveted 
Bessarabia, Transylvania and southern Dobruja respectively. A study 
undertaken in 1933 by General Ion Antonescu as Chief of Staff revealed 
that, in the event of war, Romania could only mobilize ten equipped 
divisions. The government launched a ten-year rearmament programme in 
1935, but since Romania lacked a well-developed industrial sector she was 
dependent on arms supplies from Czechoslovakia and France.7 Romania’s 
military problems were compounded by the relative weakness of her 
alliances. By the mid-1930s disunity was appearing within the Little and 
Balkan Ententes. Czechoslovakia’s entry into the Franco-Soviet security 
system in 1935 aroused fears among her Romanian and Yugoslav Little 
Entente allies. The value of the Balkan Entente as a bulwark against 
Bulgarian revisionism was undermined by Yugoslavia’s rapprochement 
with Bulgaria and Italy in early 1937.8 
The West, although regarded as vital by the Romanian government for 
Romania’s defence, had limited obligations towards Romania and was 
geographically distant. Britain’s obligations towards Romania were limited 
to her role as a guarantor of the League of Nations. No specific political or 
military alliance existed. Romania had a treaty of friendship (1926) with 
France, the country which the Romanians regarded as the chief pillar of the 
Paris peace settlement and the League of Nations’ collective security 
system. The treaty, however, did not oblige France to come to Romania’s 
military aid in the event of aggression. The suspicion that France would be 
unlikely to defend Romania in the event of an attack seemed confirmed by 
France’s failure to respond adequately to Hitler’s re-militarization of the 
6 Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s, pp 43, 50-1. 
7 Mark Axworthy, Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the 
European War, 1941-1945, London, 1995, pp. 27-40. 
8 For the growing disunity of the Little and Balkan Ententes, see Nicolae Titulescu, 
Politica externa a Romaniei (1937), Bucharest, 1994, pp 69-86. For a full 
account of Romania’s alliances during the inter-war period, see Keith Hitchins, 
Rumania 1866-1947, Oxford, 1994, pp. 426-37. The Little Entente was a 
defensive alliance against Hungarian revisionism; the Balkan Entente obliged its 
members (Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey) to defend each other against 
Bulgarian revisionism; the Romanian treaty with Poland provided for mutual 
defence against any Soviet aggression. 
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Rhineland in March 1936. The Rhineland crisis led to a decline in French 
prestige in Romania.9 
Since the Romanian ruling class shared, together with many British 
Conservatives, a profound distrust of the Soviet Union, France’s 1935 
alliance with the Soviet Union did little to endear her to Romanian hearts. 
Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu’s attempts to incorporate Romania into 
the Franco-Soviet security system during 1936 were a major factor in his 
fall from power in August of that year. In particular, Titulescu had failed to 
secure Soviet recognition of Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. Many 
Romanian politicians now began to see in Germany a possible 
counterweight to the Soviet threat and to the traditional French alliance.10 
Courting Germany was also seen as necessary in order to prevent her 
backing Hungarian revisionist claims on Transylvania. 
In late 1936, a number of foreign policy debates took place in the 
Romanian parliament and press. Many politicians took the opportunity to 
advocate rapprochement with the Reich, stressing as justification the 
Soviet threat and the need to neutralize Hungarian revisionism. Such 
debates reflected, as in Britain, a growing distrust of tight alliances and of 
the collective security system which curtailed the government’s freedom of 
action in foreign policy. The debates revealed a consensus in favour of 
more flexibility for Romania vis-a-vis her allies and a desire for effective, 
but unofficial, neutrality towards all the Great Powers.* 11 
In addition to these strategic interests, Romania shared with Britain an 
interest in Germany as an economic partner. By the mid-1930s Germany 
was fast re-emerging as Romania’s main trading partner, a position she 
had held, together with Austria-Hungary, prior to 1914. The March 1935 
economic accord between Germany and Romania was the first in a number 
9 I. M. Oprea, Nicolae Titulescu’s Diplomatic Activity, Bucharest, 1968, pp. 138-9. 
10 Ibid., pp. 155-70; Dov B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers 1933-1940, 
Durham, NC and London, 1989, pp. 53, 34-6, 60. King Carol seems to have 
favoured a degree of rapprochement with Germany from as early as 1934, against 
Titulescu’s programme of collaboration with the Soviets. See, I. Chiper and FI. 
Constantiniu, ‘Din nou despre cauzele Inlaturarii din guvern a lui Nicolae Titulescu 
(29 august 1936)’, Revista Romana de Studii Internationale, 2, 1969, 6, pp. 37-53 
(40-2). 
11 See, for example, the foreign-policy debate on 15 December 1936, Arhivele 
Statului, Bucharest, Statele Unite ale Americii (hereafter SUA), roll 297, frames 
433618-433625, German Legation in Bucharest to the Foreign Ministry, Daily 
Report no. 3168/36, 15 December 1936, signed Fabricius, and Georges I. 
Bratianu, ‘La Politique exterieure de la roumanie’ (short pamphlet), Bucharest, 
1937 In his concept of ‘neutrality’, Bratianu was influenced by Belgium’s 
declaration of‘independence’ in October 1936, whereby she claimed neutral status 
but not the full juridical neutrality of pre-1914. 
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of important barter agreements in which Germany absorbed Romania’s 
agricultural produce and raw materials in exchange for industrial goods. 
Such barter arrangements were particularly important following the 
Depression, when Romanian agricultural produce became largely 
unsellable on the world market. From 1936 Germany also became an 
important supplier of arms to Romania, as deliveries from Czechoslovakia 
and France ran into difficulties.12 
Following the fall of the pro-French Titulescu in August 1936, King 
Carol, like the British government, attempted to steer Romania into a 
position of greater flexibility in her dealings with Germany and into a less 
rigid adherence to the Western-based collective security system. It was a 
policy which the politician Constantin Argetoianu described as ca policy to 
allow [Carol] a free hand for tomorrow’.13 
The Foreign Ministry, directed by Carol, sought to avoid any actions or 
extension of foreign-policy commitments which could be construed as anti- 
German. Carol was encouraged in this policy by the declarations of 
German leaders to the effect that if Romania maintained neutrality towards 
Germany, entered no combinations against her and avoided any alliance or 
military agreement with the Soviet Union, then the Reich would guarantee 
Romania’s territorial integrity against revisionist attacks by Hungary or 
Bulgaria. During talks with the Romanian Minister in Berlin, Petrescu- 
Comnen, on 4 December 1936, Field Marshal Goering offered Romania a 
territorial guarantee against Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism if the 
Romanian government agreed not to enter any political or military 
combinations against Germany. In addition, Goering expected the 
Romanian government to prevent the passage of Soviet troops through 
Romania.14 On 20 March 1937, Petrescu-Comnen confirmed to Goering, 
12 Romania’s growing economic dependence on Germany is discussed in William S. 
Grenzebach’s Germany's Informal Empire in East-Central Europe: German 
Economic Policy Toward Yugoslavia and Rumania, 1933-1939, Stuttgart, 1988, 
esp. pp. 69-95 and 173-220. 
13 Arhivele Statului, Bucharest, Fondul Constantin Argetoianu, Insemnari Zilnice, 
Dosar no. 72, vol. 3, 1937, p. 9, 26 July 1937. See also Lungu, Romania and the 
Great Powers, p. 96, for a description of Carol’s foreign policy after the fall of 
Titulescu. 
14 Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Bucharest (hereafter MAE), Fondul 71/Germania, 
vol. 75, pp. 178-83, Legation in Berlin, only for HM the King, the President of the 
Council, the Foreign Minister and the Subsecretary of State, Telegram no. 3698, 4 
December 1936, Comnen. Goering repeated his offer of a frontier guarantee during 
the Munich crisis in return for Romanian neutrality towards Germany and her 
promise not to allow Soviet troops to pass through Romania to help the Czechs. 
See N. P. Comnene, Preludi Del Grande Dramma (Ricordi e documente di un 
diplomatico), Rome, 1947, p 138. In April 1938, Hitler authorized the Romanian 
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in the name of his government, that Romania would not enter any 
combination directed against Germany.15 
Concrete evidence of the Romanian government’s determination to 
retain flexibility towards Germany was not slow in coming. In early April 
1937, Romanian and Yugoslav delegates at the Little Entente conference 
ensured the postponement and ultimate failure of the proposed Franco- 
Little Entente mutual assistance pact. This pact would have obliged 
Romania and Yugoslavia to defend Czechoslovakia in the event of a 
German attack upon her. As the then Foreign Minister, Victor Antonescu, 
declared to the German Minister on 6 April, the pact had been laid to rest 
‘because it would interfere with the more favourable development of links 
with Germany’, particularly in the economic sphere.16 The 1938 Sudeten 
crisis also saw Romania exerting pressure on Czechoslovakia to offer 
concessions which conformed to German demands.17 
The Munich agreement made a Romanian policy of ‘appeasement’ 
even more necessary, since it gave Germany a dominating strategic and 
economic position in Central Europe. Munich seemed proof that European 
affairs would no longer be based on the collective security system but on 
decisions reached by the four Great Powers.18 This made it essential for 
the Romanian government to retain flexibility in her dealings with the 
Great Powers (and especially Germany, in view of her geographic and 
economic importance) and to make contact with the leaders of state of the 
respective powers.19 To this end Carol undertook visits to Britain, France 
and Germany in November 1938. 
Minister in Berlin to inform Carol that he was prepared to guarantee Romania’s 
frontiers. See, MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 76, pp. 56-8, Legation in Berlin to 
the Foreign Ministry, Telegram no. 3888, 22 April 1938. 
15 MAE, Fondul 71 /Germania, vol. 75, pp. 264-79, Absolutely Secret. Comnen to 
the Foreign Minister, Telegram no. 37056, 25 March 1937. 
16 Arhivele Statului, SUA, roll 297, frames 433672-433676, German Legation in 
Bucharest to the Foreign Ministry, 6 April 1937, Daily Report no. 899/37, signed 
Fabricius. 
17 William O. Oldson, ‘Romania and the Munich Crisis August-September 1938’, 
East European Quarterly, 11, 1977, 2, pp. 177-90. 
18 Argetoianu noted that Munich heralded ‘the end of the utopianism and the folly of 
Geneva. The tribunal of the Great Powers is re-established as in the time before the 
war’: Arhivele Statului, Fondul Constantin Argetoianu, Insemnari Zilnice, Dosar 
no. 73, vol. 3, 1938, p. 33, 1 October 1938. 
19 According to a Romanian commentator, the period of collective security had come 
to an end following the Munich agreement, giving way to bilateral relations 
between nations. Romania sought a free hand in foreign policy which also provided 
the opportunity for stronger collaboration with Germany: N. N. Petra§cu, Evolutia 
politics a Romaniei in ultimii douazeci de ani (1918-1939), Bucharest, 1939, 
pp. 129-37. 
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*** 
Such, then, was Romania’s foreign policy position on the eve of Grigore 
Gafencu’s appointment as Foreign Minister on 21 December 1938. In 
particular, relations between Germany and Romania were now highly 
charged. Comeliu Codreanu, the pro-German leader of the Romanian 
Legionary movement, had been murdered at the command of Carol’s 
government only days after the King’s meeting with Hitler in late 
November 1938. This had particularly angered the Fuhrer since it 
suggested his own complicity in the murder.20 Gafencu’s immediate task 
on appointment was to rebuild Romanian links with Germany while 
maintaining Romania’s traditional alliances.21 Gafencu put forward a 
number of measures in early 1939 in an attempt to ‘appease’ the Reich by 
offering concessions. These included the incorporation of the German 
Volksdeutsche minority into the Romanian government party; admittance 
of Germany into the European Danube Commission; and, most 
importantly, economic concessions. 
German leaders had often hinted that the German attitude towards a 
country was influenced by how well that country treated its German 
minority. Most recently this had been pointed out to Carol by Goering 
during their meeting in Germany on 26 November 1938.22 The minority of 
some 700,000 were duly incorporated into the government party, the 
National Renaissance Front, in January 1939. Under the terms of its entry, 
the minority had the right to create their own economic, social and cultural 
organizations. This represented an important departure from the attempts 
by the Romanian government throughout the 1920s and 1930s to 
‘Romanianize’ the German minority.23 In early March, in an 
acknowledgement of the Reich’s role as the most important trading power 
on the Danube, Germany was admitted to the European Danube 
20 MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 76 bis, p. 56, Meeting between Marcovici and 
Atta Constantinescu, Berlin, 20 January 1939. 
21 Grigore Gafencu, The Last Days of Europe: A Diplomatic Journey in 1939, 
London, 1947, p. 25. 
22 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (hereafter DGFP), Series D, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, HMSO, London, and Open Door 
Press, Arlington, IL, 14 volumes, 1949-76, V, Doc. no. 257, 30 November 1938, 
Minute on the conversation between the Field Marshal and King Carol of Romania 
on Saturday 26 November 1938 in Leipzig. 
23 MAE, Fondul 71/Romania, vol. 383, p. 6, ‘TimpuF, 12 January 1939, ‘German 
minority incorporated into the National Renaissance Front’. For government 
policies towards the minorities during the inter-war period, see C. A. Macartney, 
Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919- 
1937, Oxford, 1937, and Elemer Illyes, National Minorities in Romania: Change 
in Transylvania, Boulder, CO, 1982, pp. 86-94. 
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Commission, which had policing and administrative powers over the 
Lower and Maritime Danube.24 
It was through economic gestures, however, that Foreign Minister 
Gafencu best hoped to reforge friendly links with Germany. Gafencu was 
keen to realize the long-term economic plans discussed by Carol and 
Goering at their meeting in November 1938, during which Carol had 
expressed his wish for a new trade and clearing agreement with Germany 
and for a five- to ten-year economic plan.25 Gafencu’s aim was to link a 
new economic agreement to a political guarantee by Germany of 
Romania’s territorial integrity and to make concrete the many verbal 
promises of a guarantee made by German leaders to Romanian officials 
over the previous years. Such a guarantee would have the effect of 
reducing the threat of Hungarian, Bulgarian and Soviet revisionism and 
would give Romania the protection of a continental, land-based Great 
Power which was now the major arbitrator of the fate of Central Europe. 
Following the arrival in February 1939 of Hermann Wohlthat, 
Goering’s chief economic negotiator, Gafencu held several discussions 
with him in an attempt to ensure the incorporation of a political agreement 
into the final economic accord.26 Although Gafencu failed in his attempt to 
have a guarantee incorporated into the final economic treaty, pursuit of a 
German guarantee continued to be part of his policy towards Germany.27 
Notwithstanding the conventional view that the Wohlthat economic 
treaty was foisted on an unwilling Romania as the price of placating 
Germany, it should be noted that there was extensive support for increased 
economic links with Germany in all political circles.28 The economic treaty 
24 Germany joined France, Britain, Italy and Romania as members of the Commission. 
MAE, Fondul 71/Romania, vol. 6, p. Ill, ‘Universul’, 3 March 1939, ‘Germany 
enters into the European Danube Commission’. 
25 DGFP, D, V, Doc no. 257 
26 MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 97, pp. 126-9, Note on a conversation of 14 
February 1939 between Minister Gafencu and Wohlthat at the Foreign Ministry, 
and pp. 130-2, Note on a conversation of 22 February 1939 between Minister 
Gafencu and Wohlthat at the Foreign Ministry. 
27 The treaty, signed on 23 March, referred only to the ‘peaceful aims’ of the two 
countries. The German Foreign Office had authorized its negotiators to conduct 
negotiations without giving any political commitments. See, DGFP, D, V, Doc no. 
298, Director of Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Romania, Berlin, 
18 February 1939, Wiehl 
28 The Romanian literature to this effect is vast. See, for example, V. Moisuc, 
‘Tratatul economic romano-german din 23 martie 1939 §i semnificatia sa’, Analele 
Institutului de Studii Istorice fi Social-Politice De Pe Linga C.C. a!PCR, Anul 13, 
no. 4, 1967, pp. 130-46; Gheorghe Zaharia and Ion Calafeteanu, ‘The 
International Situation and Romania’s Foreign Policy between 1938 and 1940’, 
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was seen not only as a way of ‘buying time’ in the tense diplomatic 
situation which had developed with Germany, but as a necessity for 
Romania’s industrial and agricultural development. In January 1939 the 
High Command of the Army undertook a study as to how to ameliorate the 
strained relations which existed between Romania and Germany following 
the murder of Codreanu. The study recommended economic collaboration 
with Germany, not only as a form of conciliation, but also because it 
‘would bring about a blossoming of our state’.29 Even staunchly pro- 
French politicians such as Ion Mihalache, one of the leaders of the 
National Peasant Party, had long advocated strong economic links with the 
Reich.30 
A blueprint for an economic treaty, which included large-scale German 
support to build up the Romanian economy, had already been drawn up by 
the Romanian government in December 1937.31 In February 1939, it was 
members of the Romanian government who drew up the initial terms of 
economic collaboration upon which Wohlthat then based his proposals. 
The Romanian government was apparently aware that its programme 
would give Germany predominance in the Romanian economy and 
considered this to be in the country’s interests. Indeed, it had been decided 
that ‘Germany generally shall regain the position of economic 
predominance in Romania which she had before 1914’.32 During the 
negotiations in February and March 1939, Gafencu turned down British 
and French offers of economic collaboration in order to ‘give expression to 
the earnest desire of the Romanian government to reach an understanding 
with Germany first of all’.33 The final treaty outlined plans for co¬ 
operation with Germany in the development of all branches of agriculture, 
industry, banking and communications and the joint exploitation of raw 
Revue Roumaine d'Histoire, 18, 1, pp. 83-105 (91-4). D C. Watt has also 
claimed that the treaty was forced on Romania, in How War Came: The Immediate 
Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, London, 1989, p. 175. 
29 Gheorghe Zaharia and Constantin Botoran, Politica de Aparare Nationals a 
Romaniei in contextul european interbelic 1919-1939, Bucharest, 1981, 
pp. 275-9 (279). 
30 See his speech at the 15 December 1936 foreign policy debate: Arhivele Statului, 
Casa Regala, Dosar no. 44/1939, pp. 3-27, Foreign Policy Declarations made by 
Ion Mihalache to the Parliamentary Commission on 15 December 1936. 
31 DGFP, D, V, Doc. no. 155, Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Minister President 
General Goering, Berlin, 14 December 1937. 
32 Ibid., Doc. no. 293, Legation in Romania to the Foreign Ministry, Bucharest, 14 
February 1939. 
33 Ibid., Doc. no. 306, Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, 
Berlin, 27 February 1939. 
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materials and petroleum, as well as delivery of anus to Romania and 
German help to build up the Romanian air force.34 
Nevertheless, it was clear during the negotiations that Gafencu and 
King Carol had no wish for Germany to have an exclusive economic or 
political monopoly in Romania. This issue became particularly acute 
following the German invasion of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939, 
which tilted the balance of power in Central Europe overwhelmingly in 
Germany’s favour. In keeping with the policy of maintaining flexibility and 
balance between all the Powers, Gafencu ordered the Romanian minister 
in London, Viorel Tilea, and Gheorghe Tatarescu, the ambassador in Paris, 
to notify the British and French governments of the danger of having ‘only 
one arbiter left in Europe who decides upon the security, the independence 
and the peace of nations’.35 Although Gafencu denied Tilea’s story of a 
German ‘ultimatum’ to Romania, the Western governments remained 
suspicious.36 Considerable British pressure was placed on Gafencu to 
prevent him signing the economic treaty with Germany.37 
As British diplomacy began to move away from its policy of 
‘appeasement’ in the wake of the ‘Tilea affair’ towards a more alliance- 
based ‘French’ system, the Romanian government was determined to 
continue its policy of ‘balanced neutrality’. Gafencu did not wish his 
country to be brought into any Western-led combination which could be 
construed as anti-German.38 On 20 March Gafencu informed the British 
34 For the full terms of the German-Romanian Economic Treaty, see DGFP, D, VI, 
Doc. no. 78, 23 March 1939. 
35 Quoted by Dov B. Lungu in ‘The European Crisis of March-April 1939: The 
Romanian Dimension’, International History Review, 7, 1985, pp. 390-414 (392). 
36 MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 76 bis, p. 212, To all Legations from Foreign 
Minister Gafencu, Telegram no. 17798 of 19 March 1939. There is a vast literature 
discussing the ‘Tilea affair’. See, for instance, David Britton Funderburk, Politico 
Marii Britanii fata de Romania 1938-1940. Studiu asupra stratagiei economice p 
politice, Bucharest, 1983, pp. 95-103; Gheorghe Buzatu, Dosare ale razboiului 
mondial, Ia§i, 1979, pp. 11-43; Paul D Quinlan, ‘The Tilea Affair: A Further 
Inquiry’, Balkan Studies, 19, 1978, pp. 147-57; Sidney Aster, 1939: The Making 
of the Second World War, London, 1973, pp. 61-78. 
37 DGFP, D, VI, Doc. no. 80, Minister in Romania to the Foreign Ministry, 
Bucharest, 24 March 1939. 
38 In fact, British policy was already moving away from ‘appeasement’ in the months 
preceding the ‘Tilea Affair’: see, for instance, Bell, The Origins of the Second 
World War in Europe (see note 5 above), pp. 247-8, and Funderburk, Politico 
Marii Britanii fata de Romania, pp. 61-92. For the effects of Romanian foreign 
policy in thwarting British attempts to create an anti-German bloc in South-East 
Europe following the ‘Tilea affair’, see D. Cameron Watt, ‘Misinformation, 
Misconception, Mistrust: Episodes in British Policy and the Approach of War, 
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that he was not interested in any bilateral arrangements, since these could 
be construed as provocative to Germany. Gafencu suggested instead that 
the West should give Romania a unilateral guarantee to protect her borders 
which would not involve Romania in any obligation to help the West fight 
Germany. On 31 March, following their guarantee to Poland, the Western 
governments informed Gafencu that they would defend Romania if the 
Polish-Romanian alliance, directed solely against the threat of attack by 
the Soviet Union, was transformed into an erga omnes agreement against 
any aggressor.39 Gafencu was unwilling to transform the alliance because 
this would be ‘aimed against Germany and gives the whole agreement the 
character of a new attempt to encircle Germany’.40 In early April, Gafencu 
suggested to the Western powers a ‘northern system’, linking Poland and 
the West, and a ‘southern system’ linking Romania to the West through a 
unilateral declaration. Gafencu was still hoping for a German guarantee, 
since he argued that ‘this system would have the advantage that it could be 
extended, Germany participating in the ranks of the guaranteeing states, 
while Yugoslavia could enter that of the guaranteed states’.41 
The Anglo-French guarantee of 13 April 1939 was, as the Romanian 
government had wished, a unilateral guarantee by the West to defend 
Romania’s borders against attack. Romania was not bound by any 
reciprocal pledges to help either Britain or her allies. In this way, the 
Romanian government could retain its links with Germany and use the 
Western guarantee as a bargaining tool for requesting a similar guarantee 
from Germany. Prior to Gafencu’s visit to Berlin in mid-April, King Carol 
instructed him ‘not to make commitments to anybody, but if we can obtain 
from the Germans a guarantee like the Anglo-French, it would be very 
good’.42 Although no German guarantee was forthcoming during 
Gafencu’s meetings with German leaders, he pleaded with his government 
to avoid any expansion of the Western guarantee which could compromise 
1938-1939’ in Michael Bentley and John Stevenson (eds), High and Low Politics 
in Modern Britain: Ten Studies, Oxford, 1983, pp 214-55. 
39 MAE, Fondul 71/1920-1944, Dosare Speciale, vol 398, pp. 209-33, 
Memorandum put together by Grigore Gafencu, 15 April 1939. 
40 MAE, Fondul 71/Romania, vol. 503, pp. 37-8, Note by Minister Gafencu, 31 
March 1939. 
41 MAE, Fondul 71/Romania, vol. 503, pp. 86-7, Instructions given by Gafencu to 
Al. Cretzianu on 7 April in view of his mission to London and Paris. Lungu has 
also stressed Gafencu’s wish to avoid being drawn into an anti-German coalition 
during discussions with the West in March and April 1939: Lungu, ‘The European 
Crisis of March-April 1939’ (see note 35 above). 
42 Arhivele Statului, Portugalia 1-021-85-21, roll 21, Academia Portugheza De 
a. 
Istorie, Donatia Monique Urdareanu, Insemnari Zilnice, Carol II, 1937-1951, vol. 
8, Monday 13 March 1939-Sunday 2 July 1939, 15 April 1939, p. 453. 
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Romania’s relations with Germany.43 Consequently, Gafencu sought to 
avoid any mention of Romania or the Balkan Entente in the negotiations 
which took place between the West and Turkey for a mutual assistance 
pact during the summer and autumn of 1939. According to article three of 
the Anglo-Turkish Declaration, published on 12 May, if Britain and France 
were to aid Romania or Greece in accordance with the 13 April Guarantee, 
Turkey was to help make this aid effective. Under paragraph six, Turkey 
and Britain agreed to consult together To ensure the establishment of 
security in the Balkans’.44 Turkey’s pledge to help Britain in enforcing the 
April guarantees and the reference to establishing Balkan security 
threatened to destroy attempts by Romania and the Balkan Entente, of 
which Romania was currently President, to retain flexibility towards all the 
Great Powers, by attaching her to the Western security system which 
sought to ‘encircle’ Germany in South-East Europe. In late May, Gafencu 
informed the Western governments that relations between the Balkan 
Entente countries and the West should not be deepened beyond the 
unilateral April guarantees and the proposed bilateral Anglo-Turkish 
pact.4S During his visit tc Ankara in June, Gafencu sought to persuade the 
Turkish Foreign Minister to ensure the exclusion of paragraph six of the 
Anglo-Turkish Declaration from the final accord. This would ensure that 
there was no reference to the countries of the Balkan Entente or of the 
need to secure Balkan security. Gafencu also endeavoured to get 
paragraph six deleted from the forthcoming Franco-Turkish Declaration.46 
The final treaty between Britain, France and Turkey was signed on 19 
October 1939. The treaty included article three, which related to Turkish 
help in the event of the West fulfilling its guarantees to Romania and 
Greece, but excluded paragraph six.47 Technically, therefore, Romania had 
received no new guarantees. The German Minister in Bucharest, Wilhelm 
43 MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 77, pp. 29-33, From the Legation in Berlin 
(Minister Gafencu) to the Foreign Ministry, Telegram no. 39227, 19 April 1939. 
44 David Britton Funderburk, Politica Marii Bntiami fata de Romania, p. 147. 
45 MAE, Fondul Intelegere Balcanica, vol. 7, pp. 168-73, 20 May 1939, Instructions 
given by Minister Gafencu to Alexandru Cretzianu, Secretary General at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affaris, regarding conversations to take place in Geneva with 
Lord Halifax and Mr Bonnet during the May session of the Council. 
46 Ibid., pp. 265-8, From Minister Gafencu in Istanbul to the Foreign Ministry, 
Telegram, no number, 14 June 1939; Biblioteca Academiei Romane, Bucharest, 
Arhiva Istorica, Fond no. 13, Dosar no. 1313, 5-6, pp. 111-12, Telegram no. 189 
of 12 June 1939, Ankara to the Foreign Ministry, von Papen. The German Minister 
in Ankara, von Papen, believed That Gafencu has conducted himself here in 
accordance with our expectations’. 
47 DGFP, D, VIII, Doc no. 296, Memorandum by the Director of the Political Dept, 
Berlin, 24 October 1939. 
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Fabricius, nevertheless pointed out that the Reich feared the creation, with 
Romanian help, of an anti-German front.48 The treaty thus increased 
tension between Romania and Germany at the very time when German 
support was being seen as essential against the Soviets. 
On 6 September 1939, three days after the outbreak of war, Romania 
announced her formal neutrality. With the Western powers distant, 
however, and increasing Soviet sabre-rattling against Romanian 
‘occupation’ of Bessarabia, Germany was increasingly regarded as 
Romania’s only potential ‘Fairy Godmother’ who could save her from the 
Soviet threat.49 The need to come to terms with Germany was therefore 
greater than ever. Despite the 23 August Nazi-Soviet Pact, and Romanian 
fears that German agreement to an annexation of Bessarabia was the price 
of Soviet friendship, the Romanians hoped that German leaders would still 
wish to prevent Soviet encroachments into the Balkans. Gafencu reminded 
German officials that Romania had complied with their demands not to 
enter the Soviet security system or enter any combination against 
Germany. He hoped that the German government would find a way to help 
Romania come to terms with Germany’s new Soviet ally, without any 
territorial losses to Romania.50 
Fears of Soviet intervention in Romania were increased by the Soviet 
entry into Poland on 19 September and the subsequent massing of Soviet 
troops on the Romanian border.51 There was now a generally held belief 
that the Soviets had become more of a threat to Romanian security than the 
Germans. Even Interior Minister Calinescu, who had long regarded the 
Reich as at least as much of a danger as the Soviets, noted in his diary for 
19 September that ‘the march forward of the Russians changes the 
situation. The German danger is fading. We must turn around our military 
positions and concentrate our troops in the Siret valley’.52 
The Foreign Ministry under Gafencu now became involved in plans for 
the creation of a bloc of neutral states in South-East Europe which would 
48 MAE, Fondul 71/1939 E9, vol. 92 (-71/1939 E9 II 1-), pp. 52-5, To the Legation 
in Berlin, Telegram no. 66022, 20 October 1939, Gafencu. 
49 Despite Gafencu’s post-war claims that Britain abandoned the Balkans to 
Germany, ‘he himself was evidently prepared to stage-manage the transformation- 
scene that thus so swiftly changed the German Demon King into a Fairy 
Godmother’: C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe, 
London, 1962, p 421. 
50 See, for instance, MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 77, pp. 307-9, Note on a 
conversation of 29 August 1939 between Minister Gafencu and Colonel 
Gerstenberg, German Military Attache, at the Foreign Ministry. 
51 Florin Constantiniu, Intre Hitler §i Stalin. Romania §i pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov, 
Bucharest, 1991, p. 88. 
52 Armand Calinescu, Insemnaripolitice, 1916-1939, Bucharest, 1990, p. 432. 
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act not only as a dam against possible German expansion but also as a 
deterrent against the Soviet Union. The Romanian government hoped that 
the Soviets would not be disposed to attack a Romania at peace with her 
revisionist neighbours and protected by a bloc which had Axis backing.53 
Gafencu’s plan, drawn up in late October, was for an Italian-led bloc, 
which was to comprise the Balkan Entente as well as Hungary and 
Bulgaria.54 It was the negative German reaction to the publication of the 
Anglo-Turkish Treaty on 19 October which provided the initial motivation 
for Gafencu’s plan. Gafencu subsequently informed the German Foreign 
Ministry that his government intended to create an independent, neutral 
bloc in South-East Europe. The bloc was to include Turkey in order to 
reassure Germany of Turkey’s neutrality and that of the Balkan Entente, to 
which both Turkey and Romania belonged.55 The proposed plan failed, 
due primarily to lack of interest on the part of Italy and the revisionist 
Hungary and Bulgaria. Romania thus remained still exposed to the Soviet 
threat. 
In December 1939, Molotov proclaimed that Soviet foreign policy aims 
lay in South-East Europe and the Black Sea.56 By now it was also clear to 
the Romanian government that the West’s obligations to Romania under 
the Anglo-French Guarantee and the Anglo-Turkish Treaty did not include 
help against possible Soviet aggression.57 Consequently, Gafencu now 
renewed his efforts to win German support to help Romania in her 
problems with the Soviets by stressing the Reich and Romania’s common 
opposition to the spread of Bolshevism and pan-Slavism in the Danube 
53 Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers, pp. 202-5. Lungu points out that although 
the bloc was to provide a bulwark against German and Soviet expansionism, in 
reality the Soviets were more feared. While Germany could be ‘appeased’ by 
economic measures, the Soviets sought the return of Bessarabia (ibid., p. 205). 
54 For full details of the ‘bloc of neutrals’, and the preceding plan for a ‘Balkan bloc’, 
see Frank Marzari, ‘Projects for an Italian-Led Balkan Bloc of Neutrals, 
September-December 1939’, Historical Journal, 13, 1970, 4, pp. 767-88. 
55 MAE, Fondul 71/1939 E9, vol. 92 (-71/1939 E9 II 1-), pp. 52-5, To the Legation 
in Berlin, Telegram no. 66022, 20 October 1939, Gafencu. 
56 H. W. Koch, ‘Hitler’s Programme and the Genesis of Operation Barbarossa’ in H. 
W. Koch (ed ). Aspects of the Third Reich, Basingstoke and London, 1985, 
pp. 285-322 (293). 
57 On 2 November 1939, Sir Reginald Hoare, the British Minister in Bucharest, 
informed Gafencu that ‘when we gave you the [Anglo-French] guarantee, no one 
could foresee an aggression on the part of the Soviet Union and today we can see 
no material possibility of fulfilling our guarantees against Russian aggression’: 
MAE, 71/1939 E9 I General, vol. 2, p. 46, To the Romanian Legation in London, 
Telegram no. 68914, 3 November 1939, signed Gafencu. 
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Basin. Gafencu frequently reminded German officials of talks to this effect 
which he had had in the past with German leaders.58 
Gafencu5 s stress on common ideological aims coincided with massive 
economic concessions to Germany by the Romanian government in the 
winter and spring of 1939-40. Romanian economic relations with 
Germany, however, were complicated by Western attempts to prevent 
petroleum deliveries reaching the Reich. Since some three-quarters of 
Romanian petroleum production was controlled by Anglo-French capital, 
German imports were particularly vulnerable to Western obstruction and 
sabotage.59 By November, Germany was receiving only 60,000 tons of 
petroleum, while 100,000 tons per month were required for the war 
effort.60 On 6 December 1939, Gheorghe Tatarescu, now Minister 
President, guaranteed the Reich petroleum purchases of 130,000 tons per 
annum in exchange for armaments as an attempt to offset such Western 
tactics.61 In the same month, the Romanian government imposed a quota 
system for petroleum sales to all countries. Through this measure the 
government prevented the West buying up huge quantities of petroleum to 
forestall its sale to Germany 62 
From the autumn of 1939, the Romanian military secret service 
(Serviciului Special de Informatii) under General Moruzov began to 
collaborate with its German counterpart, the Abwehr. The two 
organizations sought to counteract British sabotage of the oilfields and the 
petroleum deliveries bound for Germany. An organization was created 
from amongst Romanian-speaking members of the ethnic German 
community to secure the Prahova valley and the course of the Danube. 
King Carol allowed German agents to enter the country freely.63 In 
keeping with the policy of balance between the Great Powers, however. 
General Moruzov also co-operated with Western secret services. British 
secret agents operated from within Romania. It was partly as a result of 
successful British sabotage that the Reich’s petroleum deliveries fell 
58 See, for instance, MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 78, pp. 196-9, Note on a 
conversation of 4 December 1939 between Minister Gafencu and Fabricius, 
German Minister, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
59 Elisabeth Barker, British Policy m South-East Europe in the Second World War, 
London, 1976, pp. 32-3. 
60 DGFP, D, VIII, no. 402, Director of the Economic Policy Department to the 
Legation in Romania, Berlin, 30 November 1939, Wiehl. 
61 DGFP, D, VIII, Doc. no. 422, Legation in Romania to the Foreign Ministry, 
Bucharest, 6 December 1939. 
62 Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, p. 33. 
63 For the story of SSI links with the Abwehr, see Eugen Cristescu, Asul Serviciilor 
Secrete Romanetfi, Bucharest, 1994, pp. 139-47. Cristescu was Moruzov’s 
successor as head of the SSI. 
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sharply during the autumn of 1939.64 Thus the winter and spring of 1939- 
40 witnessed something of a ‘tug of war’ between Western and German 
agents operating in Romania, with the Romanians attempting to balance 
between the two. The ‘Oil for Anns’ pact of 6 March 1940, however, 
represented an important victory for the Germans. Under the provisions of 
the pact, Romania bartered 200,000 tons of oil for weapons from Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. More importantly, the pact shattered the higher prices 
for petroleum which had been set by Britain in the autumn of 1939 to 
prevent Gennany, whose foreign currency reserves were low, from buying 
more petroleum. The agreement ensured that the price for both petroleum 
and war materials would be calculated at pre-war prices.65 
With the ending of the Soviet-Finnish war on 12 March 1940, the 
Soviet Union was able to renew its pressure on Romania. Molotov’s 
speech to the Supreme Soviet on 29 March reopened the question of 
Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia.66 On 30 March, Minister 
President Tatarescu informed German officials that it was his 
government’s fear of the Soviets and determination to keep German 
friendship which had ‘caused Romania to go to the utmost limits to 
accommodate us in economic matters’. Tatarescu pledged to the German 
officials that he would compel British and French companies to supply 
more petroleum to Gennany and had, indeed, already secured the full 
quotas for April and May.67 
Thus, despite the fact that Gafencu’s policy of balance between the 
Powers was, theoretically, being maintained, the spring of 1940 saw the 
economic balance shifting towards Gennany. Romanian-Gennan anti¬ 
sabotage measures were strengthened by the appointment of Manfred von 
Killinger as ‘Inspector of Gennan Diplomatic Missions in the Balkans’ in 
December 1939. His real purpose was to impede the work of ‘secret 
enemy organizations, operating in South-East Europe’. A major success in 
Romanian-German counteraction of British sabotage on the Danube came 
on 1 April 1940, when the Romanian Secret Service and Abwehr 
64 British sabotage included the chartering of Danube oil barges to take them out of 
German hands. For British sabotage activities in Romania, see Ivor Porter, 
Operation Autonomous: With the S.O.E. in Wartime Romania, London, 1989, pp. 
39-47, and Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, pp. 28-43. 
65 Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers, p. 217. Lungu states that while the 
appearance of neutrality was maintained by similar concessions to France, the pact 
represented ‘a disguised retreat from neutrality’ (ibid., p. 200). 
66 Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatics pentru Basarabia, 1918-1940, 
Ia§i, 1991, p. 139. 
67 DGFP, D, IX, Doc. no. 27, Legation in Romania to the Foreign Ministry, 
Bucharest, 30 March 1940, Clodius, Fabricius. 
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prevented a British attempt to blow up the Iron Gates. The British had 
hoped thereby to make the river unnavigable to German petroleum 
barges.68 The execution of economic agreements between the two 
countries was facilitated by the appointment of Hermann Neubacher to 
Bucharest as Special Representative for Economic Questions, in January 
1940. It was he who successfully negotiated the ‘Anns for Oil’ pact of 6 
March.69 
Throughout the winter and early spring of 1940, King Carol had 
continued to support Gafencu’s policy of flexibility towards the Great 
Powers and appeasement of Gennany.70 In a document drawn up in late 
March, Gafencu proposed that, while the government should maintain a 
friendly attitude to the West, it should avoid what he called ‘the sometimes 
unscrupulous machinations of Anglo-French diplomacy’ which was unable 
to give Romania effective support. At the same time, while resisting any 
German moves which could threaten Romania’s political or economic 
independence, Romania should seek not to provoke Gennany. 
Unconvinced of an ultimate Gennan victory, Gafencu believed Romanian 
neutrality was to be maintained in case the war was won by the West or 
resulted in a compromise peace. To have been seen to maintain strict 
neutrality7 would give the Romanian government a stronger hand at the 
post-war negotiating table.71 Despite Gafencu’s hopes, however, fear of 
the Soviet Union had created the momentum for a clear economic drift 
towards Germany by March 1940. 
German military successes in the West in the spring of 1940 speeded 
up the pace of economic collaboration still further. On 9 April, Gennany 
occupied Denmark and Norway. On 10 May, she began her offensive in 
Western Europe. On 27 May, the ‘Oil Pact’ was signed, which finalized 
the preliminary arrangements of the 6 March pact and ensured that 
German armaments and Romanian petroleum were to be exchanged at pre¬ 
war prices.72 The following day, neutral Belgium, who had been the mode! 
68 DGFP, D, IX, Doc. no. 166, Minister Kiliinger to the Foreign Minister, Bucharest, 
14 April 1940. An early friend of Hitler, von Kiliinger became Minister to Slovakia 
in 1940 and Minister in Romania from January 1941, when he replaced Fabricius. 
69 Former Mayor of Vienna, Neubacher had been the underground leader of the 
NSDAP in Austria from 1933-38. 
70 Arhivele Statului, Portugaiia 1-021-85-21, roll 22, Academia Portugheza De 
Istorie, Donatia Monique Urdareanu, Insemnari Zilnice, Carol II, 1937-1951, vol. 
11, Friday 15 December 1939-Tuesday 9 April 1940, Wednesday 20 March, 
pp. 180-1. 
71 MAE, Fondul 71/Romania, vol. 275, pp. 436-43, Note following a conversation 
with Clodius, signed Gafencu, 26 March 1940. 
72 Neubacher observed that the pact ‘frustrated the attempts of the enemy powers to 
throttle German petroleum purchases by extraordinary price increases’: DGFP, D, 
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for the Romanian attempt to sustain neutrality between the Great Powers, 
capitulated to Germany. 
It was the capitulation of Belgium which sounded the death-knell of 
Gafencu’s ‘appeasement’ policy. On the night of 27 May, Gafencu had a 
discussion with Minister President Tatarescu and the Court Minister, 
Urdareanu, who sought to convince Gafencu that Romanian foreign policy 
should ‘be adapted to realities’. Owing to the threat of Soviet aggression, 
both Tatarescu and Urdareanu believed Romania should ask for concrete 
political support in Berlin. Carol, who had supported Gafencu’s flexible 
policy upto now, was in agreement.73 Consequently, on 28 May Minister 
President Tatarescu made an official declaration to the German Minister in 
Bucharest on behalf of the Romanian government, in which he pointed out 
Romania’s wish for closer collaboration with Germany ‘in all domains’.74 
Feeling unable to pursue a policy of unconditional rapprochement with the 
Reich, Gafencu resigned as Foreign Minister on 1 June.75 
*** 
With the capitulation of Belgium, Gafencu’s policy finally crumbled, but it 
had long been in difficulties. As British policy moved away from one of 
‘appeasement’ to ‘encirclement’ of Germany in 1939, Gafencu had found 
it increasingly difficult to maintain a balance between the Great Powers; 
with the onset of the Second World War and Romania’s subsequent 
geographic isolation from the West, it became ever more difficult to retain 
a free hand in dealing with them. Romania now lay isolated between the 
pincers of the economic and military German colossus and a Bolshevik, 
expansionist Russia. In this situation, an increasing reliance on Germany, 
and willingness to grant economic concessions in return for potential 
support, became inevitable. With the fall of France on 22 June 1940, the 
West was apparently defeated. The Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in late 
June left Germany as the sole Great Power who could possibly protect 
Romania from further territorial truncation, either by the Soviet Union or 
IX, Doc. no. 338, The Special Representative for Economic Questions at the 
Legation in Romania to the Foreign Ministry, Bucharest, 28 May 1940. 
73 Ion Ardeleanu and Vasile Arimia (eds), Grigore Gafencu: Jurnal iunie 1940-iulie 
1942, Bucharest, undated, p. 18. 
74 MAE, Fondul 71/Germania, vol. 78, pp. 466-7, Communication made by 
Tatarescu, President of the Council of Ministers, to Fabricius, German Minister, on 
28 May 1940, in the presence of Foreign Minister Gafencu and Ernest Urdareanu, 
Minister of the Palace 
75 Ion Ardeleanu and Vasile Arimia (eds), Grigore Gafencu: Jurnal nmie 1940-iulie 
1942, pp. 18-19; Stelian Neagoe, (ed.) Raoul Bossy: Aminitiri din viata 
diplomatics (1918-1940), 2 vols, Bucharest, 1993, II, p. 268 
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Hungary. On 1 July King Carol, who had once said that he would ‘rather 
see the Germans as enemies in his country, than the Russians as friends’, 
informed the German Minister of his wish for a political alliance with the 
Reich because ‘lacking such protection, Romania [...] is subject to Soviet 
Russian influence’. Carol also announced his government’s intention to 
abrogate the Anglo-French Guarantee.76 On the following day, Carol made 
the first of several requests that a German military mission be sent to 
Romania to train the army and air force77 In the ever more tense 
diplomatic situation of 1939-40, Gafencu’s attempts to ‘appease’ 
Germany had failed to preserve Romania’s territorial integrity. It remained 
for General Antonescu, in full alliance with the Reich, to pledge 
Romania’s support for the German war against the Soviet Union, in the 
vain hope of restoring Romania to her pre-1940 borders. 
76 Arhivele Statului, SUA, roll 298, frames 435507-435510 (435509), German 
Legation, Bucharest, Daily Report no. 3380/38 to the Foreign Ministry, 30 
September 1938, Fabricius; DGFP, D, X, Doc. no. 68, Minister in Romania to the 
Foreign Ministry, Bucharest, 1 July 1940. 
77 Ibid., Doc. no. 80, Minister in Romania to the Foreign Ministry, Bucharest, 2 July 
1940. 

British Policy towards Romania 1939-41 
Maurice Pearton 
Academic analysis of the Guarantee of 13 April 1939 has dwelt almost 
exclusively on questions of ‘haute politique’. In maintaining this emphasis, 
historians have faithfully followed those in Whitehall who took the 
decision: ministers and officials discussed the problem in no other terms. 
They were, after all, concerned to put the German Government on notice 
that certain kinds of action which had been successful in Central Europe 
would not go unchallenged in the South-East. No one paid much attention 
to the instruments of policy and how they were to be used. I wish to make 
a belated enquiry into this aspect of British policy towards Romania from 
1939 until 1941. 
The Guarantee had been solicited by the Romanians, but was made to 
look like a British initiative to which Romania had responded so as not to 
affront the Germans too obviously. (Gafencu, the Foreign Minister, 
remarked that he would be happy to accept guarantees from any quarter.) 
In itself, the Guarantee was a minor ‘diplomatic revolution’ in that, 
historically, Britain’s relations with Romania had never been so direct but 
had been a function of relations with some other power: Ottoman Turkey, 
Austria-Hungary and, in particular, Russia. This was a matter not just of 
‘haute politique’ but of practical necessity. British power was sea-borne: 
where ships could go, British governments, if they wished, could exercise 
power and influence. Projecting power into the Black Sea depended 
entirely on the state of relations between Russia and Ottoman Turkey, 
especially over access to the Bosporus. Britain tried to influence such 
decisions but, as the record shows, was far from uniformly successful. The 
one major success, giving direct access to Romania — the Crimea in 
1854-56 — was for the Romanians a precedent, for the British an 
exception. 
Additionally, in terms of strategy, Britain approached Balkan questions 
from the south. The dominant preoccupation was to ensure that no major 
power controlled Salonika and the Greek islands, in order to protect not 
only imperial comunications but also the supply of wheat from southern 
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Russia. On this reasoning, the practical question was how far up the 
Balkan peninsula one had to exert influence to secure that objective. 
Romania was at the ‘wrong’ end. The alternative approaches by land were 
controlled by Austria and Germany. 
Furthermore, in an age when British liberalism was enthusiastically 
supporting every emergent nationalism in sight, Britain played no role in 
the creation of the Romanian nation-state comparable with, for example, 
its role in the unity of Italy during much the same period. Ancient Rome 
resonated in the educational system, but the texts — one recalls — dealt 
with the exploits of Caesar in Gaul, not Trajan in Dacia. Contemporarily, 
the British flocked to Florence and Venice and, at Ruskin’s behest, 
celebrated the Renaissance in art and literature. No such interest can be 
observed regarding Romania, which remained, at best, the preserve of 
individual romantic travellers and collectors of folklore. Hence, the British 
interest in Romania was specialized rather than general and tended to be 
narrowly defined in terms of trade and investments; that is, it was ‘normal’ 
for a state devoted to Free Trade. One result of this concentration was that 
Romania’s main export items, grains and, later, oil, became much more 
important to the Romanian balance of payments than they were to Britain’s 
import patterns for these products. This imbalance caused endless 
difficulty. 
On this reading, Britain’s direct political or strategic relations with 
Romania, notably in 1917, were atypical responses to an emergency and, 
to that extent, improvisations. 
The converse was, broadly, true of Romanian relations with France. 
When the Romanian elites talked about ‘the West’, they meant France — 
and with very good reason. French governments and intellectuals had 
supported the creation of Romania; their pervading cultural and 
educational influence thereafter is well documented and a shared Latinity 
implied a bond which was, in some mystic way, held to be superior to that 
with other nations. On a less metaphysical plane, France was the external 
guarantor of Romania Mare, in consequence of which Romania was an 
important element in the structure of French alliances in Central and 
Eastern Europe and in French strategic planning. Britain, however 
admirable, stood in the penumbra of la ville lumiere. The British, 
deliberately eschewing alliances in the area and with strategic ideas 
focused elsewhere, were content to accept this position. 
The Guarantee upset this pattern of expectations and responses. On the 
record, one could have expected it to have been presented as a French 
initiative, the logical outcome of acknowledged French interest in 
Romania. In fact, it was launched as a British move, though made with full 
French concurrence. Britain had been induced to assert a direct concern in 
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Romania’s security, but, due to the circumscribed definition of British 
interests, the announcement in April 1939 was more hope than substance. 
In seeking to remedy this, Britain had two traditional instruments on 
which to rely; diplomatic representation and commercial accommodation. 
The strength of the first depended not just on the character and ability of 
the Minister, Sir Reginald Hoare, and his staff, but on what he had to offer. 
On the whole, it was not what the Romanians wanted. The second 
instrument was, at the time, even less promising. The British once again 
observed that, in economics as well as politics, the brutal fact of Anglo- 
Romanian relations is that Germany is inconveniently in the way: 
opportunity, proximity of manufacture and the logistics of supply all told in 
favour of the Third Reich. Commercial relations with Romania, therefore, 
could involve little more than tidying up debt and Clearing problems. 
Romanian spokesmen, for their part, urged their British counterparts to 
take the big, broad, generous view about outstanding liabilities, and 
concentrate instead on strengthening the Romanian economy so as to 
underwrite Britain’s position in the Balkans and the Near East. This in 
practical terms meant preferential treatment for oil and wheat in the 
markets of the sterling area. Thus, on the morrow of the Guarantee, the 
prospects of translating it into anything other than diplomatic manoeuvres 
were not rosy. To underpin the new relationship, attitudes and 
expectations on both sides had to be brought into line. 
Reconciliation was the more difficult in that, thanks to the activities of 
Dr Schacht and Herr Wohlthat, a significant proportion of Romania’s 
economic needs was being met by Germany or was under agreement to 
that end. British governments during the immediately preceding years had 
conceded this priority to the Germans on the unimpeachable grounds of 
economic rationality already mentioned. In British strategic planning, oil 
— of which so much was to be heard — featured only to the extent that 
Romania was considered a source or replacement for supplies from the 
Persian Gulf needed further east for a war against Japan. The Romanian 
Government, for its part, was well aware that its collaborative 
arrangements with Germany might be used to turn Romania into ‘a 
dependency of the Reich’, as the Foreign Minister, Grigore Gafencu, put 
it, and therefore sought to establish more comprehensive economic 
relations with Britain not just for their own sake but to put demonstrable 
limits on German activity. At every level, Anglo-Romanian relations were 
not primarily bilateral but tended to be a reflex of the two states’ attitudes 
towards Germany. In this respect, as in the details of their mutual 
exchanges, Britain and Romania were not seeing the problems in the same 
perspective. Nevertheless, it was clear that if the Guarantee was to be 
anything but a polite warning notice, it had to be given some economic and 
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— albeit remotely — military substance. Ten days after Mr Chamberlain’s 
announcement. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the Treasury’s Chief Economic 
Adviser, arrived with a mission in Bucharest. 
The British Government had not reacted that quickly; a mission had 
been mooted by, among others, Gheorghe Tatarescu, former Minister 
President on his visit to London in June 1938. Then, the official reaction 
had been cool. The Guarantee, however, changed the context in which 
British policy had to be considered and gave a stronger argument to those 
who, like Leith-Ross, advocated a more positive policy. So he went. En 
route, he met Gafencu, who recorded that Leith-Ross was going to 
Bucharest: ‘afin d’etudier les moyens par lesquels la Roumanie pouvait 
etre aidee a se maintenir sur le marche mondial et ne pas disparaitre dans 
l’espace economique ferme du Reich allemand’.1 
That outcome Leith-Ross knew could not be achieved overnight: he 
had far less to offer than the Romanians wanted, but, through tackling the 
short-term problems, he wished to establish a basis for collaboration which 
went some way towards meeting their requirements. Essential to that was 
the generation of confidence, hitherto notably lacking.2 
There was at the time an additional source of misunderstanding in that 
proposals made from the Romanian side, by the King during his visit to 
London in November 1938 or subsequently by his ministers, were put 
forward not simply to improve economic exchanges but were designedly 
tests of the British commitment to Romania. In Romanian thinking, the 
British Government’s willingness to buy the wheat crop would indicate its 
broader intentions towards Romania in a political sense. In this context it 
was natural to introduce schemes for a comprehensive economic pact 
rather than deal with individual and mundane matters of trade and 
accounting. Such overtures the British received with scepticism, or with 
the suspicion that German pressures were being used to renew attempts to 
secure Romanian products a preferential position in British markets.3 
1 Grigore Gafencu, Derniers jours de Veurope, Paris, 1947, p. 145. 
2 Leith-Ross told Max Au§nit (who wished him to intervene with Lord McGowan of 
ICI) that ‘our investments in Romania had been more fruitful of difficulties than of 
repayment and [...] this had made the investment concers rather shy’: Note of 
Conversation, 13 December 1938, T188-297. [All file references are to archives in 
the Public Record Office, unless otherwise stated ] 
3 The basic problems in current Anglo-Romanian trade relationships were (i) that the 
Romanian demand for UK goods was running in excess of the allocation of sterling 
in the financial agreements, and (ii) that the ruling export prices of the two main 
Romanian products, oil and wheat, were above world levels, since the Romanian 
Government looked to them to maximize the return in hard currencies. This 
reduced their competitiveness and set limits to the number of possible destinations. 
There were, additionally, continuing problems about the discriminatory affect and 
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In Bucharest, the range of Romanian requirements appears from Leith- 
Ross’s record4 of his conversations with leading personalities, including 
Calinescu, the Prime Minister, Bujoiu, Minister of National Economy, and 
Constantinescu, Governor of the National Bank. Their respective 
emphases varied in detail but, collectively, they put forward a programme 
of purchases, in which armaments and credits to allow the building of 
stocks against deprivation in war were the dominant items. The Romanians 
also proposed more wide-ranging collaboration, particularly in the form of 
a special British bank, a shipping line and a trading corporation or, 
alternately, special product-based exporting companies such as the 
Germans had set up. These measures would entail a complete overhaul of 
the Clearing system in vogue. 
Negotiations were concluded on 11 May, when a Protocol5 listed the 
arrangements on which the two governments had agreed. From our present 
point of view, the important features were paragraph five, promising 
guarantees by the British Government of a line of credit of £5 million ‘in 
respect of the purchase of United Kingdom goods or for the purpose of 
other agreed expenditure in the United Kingdom’6 and at interest of 5 per 
cent, and Annex 1 paragraph two, by which the British Government 
undertook to buy 200,000 tons of wheat for its own stocks from the next 
harvest ‘if available at world prices’. The remaining items either concerned 
technical matters for the Clearing or indicated lines of future joint action. 
This outcome was severely criticized in London and Bucharest, broadly 
for being a palliative when the situation clearly demanded a more 
operational irrationality of current oil legislation and the treatment of oil products 
in the Clearing. On these latter issues, see M. Pearton, Oil and the Romanian 
State, Oxford, 1971, ch. 8. 
4 T188-231, 25 April 1939. 
5 Protocol between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Roumanian 
Government regarding Commercial and Economic Relations with Roumania, 
Bucharest, 11 May 1939, Treaty Series no. 25 (1939), Cmd 6018. The Protocol 
was complemented by a Trade Agreement in July. 
6 In conversation with Leith-Ross, Bujoiu identified the allocation of the loan as 
follows: 
£2,400,000 army equipment 
100,000 motorcycles 
500,000 aircraft 
1,000,000 ambulances, medical equipment 
450,000 equipment silos 
200,000 road building 
350,000 various materials, including copper; refined zinc; 
rubber; tin; special steels; quebracho; glycerine 
£5,000,000 
Leith Ross’s note, 11 May 1939, T188-244. 
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thoroughgoing re-evaluation of policy.7 Leith-Ross was aware that all he 
could do was to conduct ‘a holding operation’, while opinion changed in 
Whitehall. The Government had not been fully converted to the idea of 
reaping political benefits by economic means; indeed, in April 1939, it was 
only edging reluctantly towards the idea.8 An inter-departmental 
committee had been exploring the possibilities since the previous June but 
had not ended its search by the time the Guarantee precipitated action at 
the level of ‘high policy’. 
There remained, additionally, two related problems: that, if the 
Government was going to invest from its restricted resources to get a 
political return, then Romania was not necessarily the most obvious 
candidate, and that regardless of the intended ‘market’ the British 
Government did not have at its disposal the specialized mechanisms for 
such a policy. This vital point was ignored by contemporary critics in their 
legitimate desire to halt the spread of German influence. 
Leith-Ross himself was fully convinced of the need for new principles. 
Writing at the close of the negotiations from Bucharest, he argued: 
The Roumanians are making great efforts to put themselves into a state of 
readiness for war and if we are urging on them an active policy of resistance to 
German demands, it is not unreasonable of them to expect that we shall go as 
far as possible to help them in the matter of financial credits. I have the feeling 
that Departments tend to treat these political credits too much on the basis of 
the ordinary rules applying to commercial credits. This attitude is compared 
unfavourably with that of the Germans, who are tumbling over themselves to 
get control of the resources of Roumania and I think that if we insist on being 
meticulous, we shall lose a great deal of credit without really assuring ourselves 
of getting much cash. In fact, if we are to succeed in our policy here, the 
Government ought to make up its mind that these credits must be administered 
on different lines to those on which purely commercial business has been 
done.9 
7 The German Government did not take the same view as Leith-Ross’s domestic and 
Romanian critics. The Volkischer Beobachter (no. 119, 29 April 1939, p. 13) 
reported the Mission as showing ‘eine lebhafte Geschaftigkeit’ in solving not 
merely immediate problems but also setting up an anti-Axis framework at 
Romanian expense. ‘Offenbar kommt es den Englandern weniger darauf an, wie sie 
vorbeben, wirtschaflliche Aufbauarbeit in Rumanien zu leisten und Rumanien 
wirtschaftliche Hilfe zu bringen, als vielmehr Rohstoffquellen fur Deutschland 
nach Moglichkeit zu verstopfen’ (italics in original). 
8 The reluctance, as far as Mr Chamberlain was concerned, stemmed ultimately from 
the apprehension that any war with Germany would make Britain dependent on an 
unsympathetic, when not totally hostile. United States. In this particular, the Prime 
Minister was proved percipient, but the argument was not one which could be 
advanced in public at the time. 
9 T188-244, Leith-Ross (Bucharest) to Sir William Brown (Treasury), 1 May 1939. 
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The denouement of the wheat deal showed how far attitudes and 
practices had to change. The Protocol provided for the bulk purchase of 
wheat on Government account. The Government had in being an agency 
— the Food (Defence Plans) Department of the Board of Trade, set up in 
November 1936 ‘to formulate plans for the supply, control, distribution 
and movement of food [...] during a major war’10 — but it had no 
facilities of its own; it was indeed not authorized to have them, and 
therefore had to work through the trade. As regards wheat, this constraint 
brought it into conflict with millers and grain importers, whose relationship 
was one of mutual acrimony and who, additionally, were divided among 
themselves.* 11 Progress, accordingly, was neither smooth nor rapid. The 
trade was given a formidable argument in its representations to the Board 
of Trade by the Romanian Government’s pricing policy: it demanded 
seventy-four shillings per metric tonne f.o.b. Braila, approximately 14 per 
cent above world market levels, which were then falling. The transaction 
was eventually concluded at 62.5 shillings. Shipments began in October, 
but the grains, found unsuitable for long-term storage, had to be milled as 
part of the current supply. Even to achieve this, the Board of Trade found 
itself having to back the millers against the grain importers. Mr Hammond 
concludes: 
The diplomatic merits of the Roumanian purchase cannot be discussed here. 
But it not only risked the goodwill of the millers by dictating the composition 
of their grist; it roused all the antagonisms latent among the private interests 
handling grain. To them it seemed that the Government was aiding and abetting 
a millers’ buying ring, at a time when the enormous world wheat surplus was 
causing markets to tumble.12 
The lesson, at least, was clear: pre-emptive buying operations 
demanded not only decisive action in the ‘target’ markets but also 
adequate techniques and instruments of disposal elsewhere. In the spring 
of 1939 the British Government lacked not only these but more: the 
authority to compel others to work as it desired. It was not that kind of 
system. For these reasons — with wheat as a partial exception — the 
immediate consequences of the Guarantee were negligible. The sudden 
reorientation of diplomacy had overtaken the fixed ideas about policy at 
other levels. 
10 R. J. Hammond, Food, 2 vols, London, 1951-62 (History of the Second World 
War, United Kingdom Civil Series), I, ch. 1. 
11 Ibid., p. 26. 
12 Ibid., p. 26. 
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The outbreak of war in September 1939 changed the terms of the 
relationships between the two states. Britain was a belligerent and rejected 
any accommodation with Germany; that, for Romania, was still an option. 
Further, the Soviet Union enjoyed a different status in the respective 
calculations of the two governments: for Britain it was an ally of Germany 
and as such an unstoppable leak in the blockade, but one about which little 
could be done. Romanian governments, for their part, knew that the Soviet 
Union was an adjoining state with a demonstrated interest in revising its 
frontiers: the idea of a Soviet invasion of Britain was derisory; a Soviet 
invasion of Romania was only too feasible.13 This thought added urgency 
to Romanian representations that Britain’s position in South-East Europe 
and the Near East depended on Romania and that in consequence Britain 
should help to equip its armed forces and provide credits to that end. 
To policy-makers in Whitehall and Westminster in the autumn of 1939 
that rationale was by no means self-evident. Accessibility remained the 
problem, and Greece and Turkey were better placed in that respect. 
Turkey, in particular, could provide defence in depth for the Suez Canal, 
the oil fields of Iraq and Iran and the route from Palestine to Basra. The 
Turkish army was considered capable of offering resistance to German 
invasion. If a choice had to be made between the two, then Turkey offered 
a better strategic return, particularly in view of the limited investment of 
‘material' which Britain could make.14 Later, from March 1940 onwards, 
Soviet activity on the Bessarabian frontier and in the mouths of the Danube 
reinforced these arguments: there was clearly little point in mounting a big 
13 In their negotiations for the Pact of 23 August 1939, the German Government had 
already acquiesced in its partner’s declared interest in Bessarabia (Secret 
Additional Protocol, 3). The Soviet Government was quick to draw its dividends 
from the Agreement. In the following month, Molotov indicated to Sarajoglu, the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, during his visit to Moscow, that Russia was 
interested in re-establishing the frontiers of 1914. At much the same time, the 
journal Communist International put forward the idea of a Mutual Assistance Pact 
between the Soviet Union and Romania on the lines of those recently concluded 
with the Baltic States. At the end of November, the Red Army attacked Finland. 
These indications of Soviet intentions rather offset the assurances of the charge 
d’affaires in Bucharest that the Soviet Union had no aggressive designs towards 
Bessarabia, and the dementi, published by Tass in early December, stating that the 
article in the Communist International did not represent the views of the Soviet 
Government. Thus, virtually from the outbreak of war, Romanian Governments 
could not be certain of Soviet policy and their apprehensions entered into their 
policies towards Germany and Britain. 
14 I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, 6 vols, London, 1954-88 
(History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series), I, p. 49. 
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effort in Romania if the country were going to be partitioned between 
Germany and Russia, as Poland had been.15 
The contemporary processes of government in Romania did not help to 
clarify British strategic judgements. Although the King dictated policy, he 
was not able to impose his will but could get his way only by a complex 
process of political bargaining with adherents of the former parties and 
other interests. Hence personalities were important and the identity of the 
President of the Council offered a clue as to Romania’s orientation. A 
cabinet headed by Calinescu was likely to take a tough line with Germany: 
one run by Gigurtu could safely be reckoned to do the opposite.16 The 
balance of political forces inside the country offered a constant constraint 
on what Britain could do in Romania. 
Irrespective of the personalities in office, Romania had assumed 
substantial commitments to Germany — but how far did they extend and 
how far in practice could they be modified by British action, either by 
comprehensive military support or otherwise? It was widely expected that 
British interests already long established could be used to bolster pro- 
Allied sentiments in the determination of policy in Bucharest. But these 
interests were industrial and commercial and they were ‘strong’ only if one 
looked at their formal position rather than their immediately deployable 
power.17 The so-called ‘British’ companies were legally or beneficially 
owned by British nationals and as such their managements could be 
reckoned to be responsive to British Government requirements, but the 
vital consideration was that the companies, however British in other 
respects, were Romanian-vQgistQrQd institutions subject to Romanian 
jurisdiction. This by itself gave the Romanian authorities a lien on the 
companies if they cared to exercise it. Managements were acutely aware 
of this ultimate restriction on their freedom of action. 
Additionally, it was by no means the case that managements or 
employees as a whole supported the British shareholding orientation in 
their own political preferences. Many were nationalist, hoping that 
15 In terms of the politics of the initiators, the take-over of Bessarabia (June 1940) 
and the Vienna award (August 1940) resembled the Partition of 1772, not that of 
1795 or 1939, but this thought was, in itself, hardly encouraging. 
16 Cabinets from 1939: Calinescu (till 21 September 1939), Arge§anu (till 27 
September 1939), Argetoianu (till 23 November 1939), Tatarescu (till 30 June 
1940), Gigurtu (till 4 September 1940). After September 1940, a National 
Legionary State was not going to be anything but enthusiastically pro-German, 
until that is in January 1941, when General Antonescu wound up the experiment. 
Thereafter his own regime was pro-German but from policy rather than from 
conviction. 
17 The Germans, correctly, discerned that the important thing was to tie up the 
government, then economic interests could be made to bend to policy. 
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wartime conditions would allow expropriation of the foreign interest; 
others were pro-German either from conviction or from tactical sensitivity. 
The ‘control’ freely ascribed to Britain at the time or since has to be 
interpreted with these conditions in mind. Indeed any hope of successful 
action rested not on ‘British-controlled enterprises’ but on individuals 
within them, who might be able to use the assets in a pro-British sense. 
Such individuals, however, were scattered over the country and had no 
social cohesion or organization as, for example, the French had. 
So the fact that Britain had interests in Romania did not offer a blanket 
solution to the problem of stopping the Germans. In any case it was 
pertinent to ask what, in the twilight circumstances of Romanian neutrality, 
was ‘pro-British’ policy? Did it mean action which would not offend the 
Romanian Government to the point of its succumbing to pro-German 
temptations, convictions or pressures, or did it imply action by the British 
or their Romanian sympathizers damning all the consequences? The 
answer to this question depended on the political circumstances of and in 
Romania, and especially on its attitude towards Germany, at any given 
time. Sir Reginald Hoare, in a letter to Lord Halifax, identified the crucial 
oscillations in Romanian behaviour: 
the Roumanians will make promises to us, not really believing that they can 
keep them but hoping that something will turn up to enable them to do so, 
whereas they make promises to the Germans hoping that circumstances will 
break them for them or that in a month or two they will themselves dare to 
evade or break them.18 
This remained so as long as the Romanian Government considered it had 
any effective power to manoeuvre at all. 
*** 
In view of the interacting uncertainties discussed in the preceding section, 
it is not surprising that in September 1939 Britain accorded Romania a 
minimum role in its overall strategy. Commercial operation seemed to 
offer more immediate possibilities for the time being; if Romania were not 
to be consigned straight away to the enemy, action was not to be ‘military’ 
but ‘economic’. ‘Economic warfare’ was designed ‘to disorganise the 
enemy’s economy [so] as to prevent him from carrying on the war’.19 It 
had affinities with the traditional aims of blockade but its scope was far 
wider: if war was now to be ‘total’, action would have to be taken against 
all the enemy’s actual and possible sources of supply — a category which, 
18 Halifax papers (1938-40), 26 January 1940, FO 800/322, vol. 14. 
19 W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 2 vols, London, 1952-59 (History of 
the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series), I, p. 1. 
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by definition, included ‘neutrals’. I have shown elsewhere20 that in the 
industrial age neutrality as defined by lawyers has been inadequate to 
describe what actually happens and have suggested that neutrals are to be 
functionally regarded as ‘non-belligerent participants’. But the issues 
between them and the belligerents are within the framework of 
international legal rules which attempt to discriminate between ‘neutral’ 
and ‘unneutral’ behaviour.21 So, in exercising the option of being neutral, 
the Romanian Government was adopting a policy which the German 
Government — through the Wohlthat Agreement, its effective command of 
armaments’ supply and the Volksdeutsche organizations — was already in 
a position to challenge. By the same token, that position defined in 
practice the objective of British policy. Romania became a ‘battleground’ 
for economic warfare, in which however the Romanian Government was 
no mere bystander: it was involved not in a bilateral but in a triangular 
series of relationships. 
As conceived in September 1939, such warfare proceeded on a number 
of assumptions, all of which were dubious. In a conflict between two 
heavily industrialized states, each unable to cover its own material 
requirements, that neutral sources of supply would be crucial to the 
outcome was indisputable, but the early practitioners concluded from this 
premise that there must be one vital factor — the supply bottleneck, the 
raw material or the manufacturing capacity — interruption or deprivation 
of which would bring the German war machine satisfactorily to a halt. 
That once established, what to be done at source could then be arrived at 
deductively. The relevant Ministry was appropriately housed in the 
London School of Economics. (It later moved to Berkeley Square.) 
Academic theorists, under the guidance of Leith-Ross, soon learned to 
dispense with abstraction and to regard successful policy as the outcome 
of welding together successive links in a chain, the length of which could 
not be foreseen.22 They also had to learn that in a general war, the 
20 In general terms in The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War and Technology 
since 1830, London, 1982, part 5, and with special reference to Romania in ‘The 
Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the First World War — The Romanian 
Contribution, 1914-1916’ in G. Buzatu and S. Pascu (eds), Anglo-Romanian 
Relations after 1821, Ia§i, 1983, pp. 111-25. 
21 But as one British official observed, ‘As is generally the case nowadays, the 
important question is not what the legal position is but the view the “X” are likely 
to take of the facts and the action which they are likely to take’: PRO FO 24995, p. 
177. 
22 In justice to the officials, it must be urged that they had a very narrow field of 
expertise on which to draw. As already noted, in 1939 there were few experts on 
Romania, and those who did exist tended to identify themselves with Romanian 
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traditional policies of neutral states do not just stop, they merely assume 
different modalities. In Romania, therefore, policies aiming to deprive the 
Germans of materials depended on there being a clearly demonstrable 
advantage for the Romanians. That advantage might be political, for 
example, the ability to resist German demands, or economic, for example, 
a solution to a problem of production or finance, or both, but success had 
to be bought by conferring benefits: otherwise, there was no reason why 
the Romanians should co-operate. 
These conditions dictated the measures followed in the case of the main 
commodity: oil. Before analysing them, we need to consider how oil was 
traded. The companies which were affiliates of international groups 
supplied them under long-tenn contract: such oil, either crude or products, 
never entered the Romanian market. The parent organizations, however, 
could not take all the output; hence there existed an open market for the 
exportable surplus. This market was also supplied by the companies 
operating with indigenous capital, especially those which lacked their own 
refining capacity. Both British and German agencies were anxious to 
secure that surplus, or as much of it as possible, for themselves and deny it 
to their enemies. The ultimate disposal, however, depended not just on the 
competition between the agencies but also on the Romanian Government, 
which had its own ideas about the return expected from the sale of 
Romanian output. This concern extended not only to the financial return 
but also to the precise currency in which it was to be made.23 Further, with 
the exception of supplies traded under inter-governmental arrangement, 
whether oil from Romania could be distributed to a particular available 
market depended on its being competitive and that in turn depended on 
two factors: the ruling landed price of supplies from alternative sources 
and the fiscal requirements of the Romanian Government which entered 
into the ‘f.o.b. Constanta’ quotation.24 This restricted the radius within 
which Romanian oil could be sold competitively, so that, for example, in 
Alexandria the landed price of basic products brought by sea from the US 
Gulf was lower than that for the products of the same specification from 
Constanta. 
objectives to the point of being anti-Bulgarian and anti-Hungarian. This did not 
assist policy-making. 
23 From the British point of view, the Romanian Government’s insistence, at the 
beginning of 1940, that supplies to Greece be paid for outside the Clearing and not 
in sterling but in US dollars, ruled out what would otherwise have been a most 
convenient market for oil from the export surplus. Similar Romanian tactics with 
Yugoslavia, with whom the Clearing was suspended, merely caused the Yugoslav 
Government to turn to the Italians. 
24 See Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State, p. 39. 
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Until September 1939, these circumstances were burdensome only to 
Romanian exporters; after 12 September when the British Government 
decided on an all-out effort to divert oil from Germany, they became a 
problem for British policy. 
The ‘British’ companies went into the market with large purchasing 
contracts, and by March 1940 the Treasury agreed to provide a subsidy to 
cover the difference between Gulf and Constanfa prices in Egypt and other 
markets in the Levant.25 Commercial action was successful: it removed the 
surplus from the market, enabling the Romanian Government to plead to 
the Germans that there was insufficient oil available to fulfil the inter¬ 
governmental agreement, and at the same time driving up prices to levels 
which endangered the Gennan-Romanian Clearing. It also helped to 
establish beyond doubt that the Romanian Government, its denials 
notwithstanding, had taken a firm commitment to supply Germany. That at 
once posed a problem: the commitment, which the Germans were pressing 
to be honoured against armaments, was far larger than the surplus; hence 
further Allied buying26 to reduce availability might cause the Romanian 
Government to compel Allied companies to sell to Germany — which of 
course it was legally entitled to do. They accordingly withdrew and 
straight commercial policies came to an end.27 
Deprivation measures, additionally, extended to facilities. The same 
Cabinet decision which ordered the purchase of the oil export surplus also 
authorized the chartering of barges and rail tank cars. For the Danube 
shipping, a ready though not entirely suitable instrument lay to hand in the 
form of the Anglo-Danubian Trading Corporation. Its object was to 
deprive the Germans of ‘neutral’ tugs and barges and lighters on the river. 
The latter comprised about one third of the total lighter numbers and 
represented between 330,000 tons and 470,000 tons freight capacity' in a 
25 Ibid., pp. 247, 248. 
26 It did not help at this stage that the British and French governments pursued their 
common aim by diametrically opposed methods. Britain and the ‘British’ 
companies sought to maintain the principle of‘freedom of destination’, so that the 
companies could not be forced to sell to the enemy. The French Government made 
an agreement under which participants pledged their exports to France, that is 
admitting the right of the Romanian Government to set destinations. The British 
argued that if it could order supplies to France, it could also order supplies to 
Germany. 
27 Eric (later Sir Eric) Berthoud was attached to the Legation in Bucharest to help 
resolve problems of policy locally. See his memoirs. An Unexpected Life (privately 
printed), 1980, pp. 71-84. 
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ten-month operating year.28 Anglo-Danubian went into the market, 
acquiring ships from Yugoslav and, from May 1940, French owners. By 
that time, its role had been assumed by a company founded by the British 
Government in February 1940, the Goeland Transport and Trading 
Company. Its purpose was ‘to purchase, charter and operate [...] tugs, 
tank-barges, lighters and auxiliary craft on the Danube including vessels in 
the Black Sea and Aegean as could potentially be used on the Danube’.29 
These terms make it plain that whereas Anglo-Danubian was an 
improvisation, Goeland was a considered instrument of economic warfare. 
It readily took over the existing techniques — laying up vessels, 
prolonging refits, causing congestion — all designed to cause maximum 
inconvenience to the Germans without giving the Romanian Government 
cause to scrutinize the charter party or to yield to German threats to police 
the entire river themselves. Goeland added to the repertoire by suborning 
crews on German vessels and inviting Iron Gates pilots on extended 
holidays with pay. It tried, however, to conduct a ‘normal’ commercial 
business when the opportunity occurred, with a view to entering the river 
export trade to Yugoslavia and Switzerland, thus depriving the Germans of 
both ships and cargoes.30 Goeland also toyed with the idea of investing in 
a stone quarry near Orsova, upstream of the Iron Gates, which would 
allow explosives to be stored in their proximity. This particular scheme 
collapsed when, in consequence of the exposure of the British Danube 
expedition,31 policing of crews and vessels and scrutiny of documentation 
were all tightened up. This unwelcome development prompted Goeland to 
move all its vessels downstream to Braila. Its range of effectiveness was 
thereby seriously curtailed. 
Tank cars could not be treated in similar fashion since the Romanian 
Government, through the state railway, the CFR, owned and operated a 
fleet on its own account and hired out cars to oil exporters, on contract. 
This category covered about three-fifths of the total stock. Additionally — 
and in contrast to the river — the Government controlled the number of oil 
trains per day. The ordinary traffic control exercised by any railway 
management was made more necessary in Romania till March 1940 by 
reason of the single track (Predeal-Bra§ov) common to the two main 
28 In 1939, the Danube handled only 24 per cent of Romania’s oil exports, compared 
with 59 per cent by sea and 17 per cent by rail: see La Navigation sur le Danube, 
Moniteur du Petrole Roumain, 1940, no. 29, pp. 1097-8. 
29 FO 371-24899. 
30 See Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State, pp. 248-51. 
31 See pp. 75-82 below. 
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export routes. The Government, therefore, had a far greater command over 
the day-to-day operation of the railway than it did over the river.32 
These conditions offered the ‘British’ companies little room for 
manoeuvre. Their efforts were, accordingly, directed at maintaining the 
status quo and warding off any attempts by Romanian authorities to 
impound company-owned cars under emergency regulations. The success 
of this policy depended on the oil concerns’ continuing to find use for the 
cars, and the Romanian Government’s own willingness to use conditions 
in the transport sector as reasons for not fulfilling its contractual 
obligations to Germany. Both disappeared after May-June 1940. In July, 
the companies were presented with a month’s notice of termination of all 
hiring contracts. The CFR, however, did not wait for the month to expire 
but commandeered cars as soon as they returned to Ploe§ti. In August, the 
authorities requisitioned all cars and put them into a central pool, from 
which the needs of the individual company were to be met. By that stage, 
of course, any significant economic warfare in these terms had finished. 
In the sphere of overt action, commercial operations were paralleled by- 
propaganda, in the sense that both could be undertaken immediately and 
also that their impact was overstated by their practitioners. In propaganda, 
however, Britain enjoyed two advantages: a nucleus of pro-British 
sentiment clustered round the British Institute and the initial activities of 
the British Council;33 and the fact that the Romanian desk in the Ministry 
of Information was occupied by D. J. Hall, author of Romanian Furrow,34 
These advantages were to a large extent dissipated by the in-fighting 
between the Institute and the Council and the feeble nature of the 
propaganda effort. For that, E. H. Carr, then an official in the Ministry of 
Information, blamed Sir Reginald Hoare, as ‘ein Geist der stets vemeint’, 
and wanted to send out ‘young Seton-Watson’ to ginger up the Press 
Attache, Mr Pember.35 Hall, visiting Bucharest, observed the operational 
difficulties: Pember had no office but, with his Romanian typist, occupied 
32 In the winter of 1939-40, Nature was pro-Ally. Very severe conditions closed the 
Danube for navigation for some two and a half months. The ice started to move on 
13 March 1940 but the water level obligingly flooded a large part of Giurgiu, 
making the petroleum area unusable for ten days. The river began to rise again at 
the end of March and by 9 April the petroleum area was again under water. Oil 
exports were thereupon diverted to another part of Giurgiu, but capacity was 
restricted to three trains a day. 
33 The Treasury refused funds for the construction of a British Council centre until 
reminded that King Carol had personally donated the site to that end. The Treasury 
rapidly sanctioned the expenditure. See correspondence between Sir John Simon 
and Lord Halifax, March 1940, FO 371-24995. 
34 London, 1933, re-issued 1939. 
35 Carr to Nichol (Foreign Office) 1 November 1939, FO 371-23852. 
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space in a corridor; further, due to the under-staffing of the Legation, he 
was so occupied with Legation work that he had little time for his proper 
duties. Hence it was not surprising that 
perceptive and quick-witted Romanians however much they might distrust and 
dislike the Germans [...] observe that, while the Germans always have a ready 
explanation of any and every event, we continually fail to give an adequate 
reply, let alone an explanation first. As a result Romanians [...] not infrequently 
conclude that we have nothing to say and that therefore the Germans may be 
right.36 
Hall cited four telling instances: uncorrected German reports of 
sinkings by magnetic mines suggested that Britain had suffered ‘a 
calamitous blow’; similar effects followed belatedly challenged reports of 
RAF losses in the raid on Heligoland; no reply had been given at all to 
German charges that the British agents had been responsible for an 
explosion in a chloride factory at Bra§ov; and the only articles appearing in 
the Romanian press about the destruction of the Graf Spee had been 
written by Romanian journalists basing themselves on Havas and 
Reuters.37 Of British newspapers, only The Times had a regular British 
correspondent; the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror had temporary 
ones38 and the rest were represented by Russians or Romanians. Equally 
unsatisfactory was the way British news appeared in the local journals: 
over such vital aspects of layout as size and blackness of type, the editors 
had no control; that decision rested with the typesetters. Hall could 
recommend no way of dealing with them ‘except the simple one of 
bribery’.39 
The course of events presented British propaganda with an uphill task. 
It was not lost on Romanians that Poland had also been given a Guarantee 
— a theme echoed by Polish refugees who blamed it for their downfall.40 
In the spring of 1940, the Norwegian campaign was widely considered as 
a test case of whether the Allies could seriously help a small state 
36 Visit of DJ Hall to Romania. Report part 2: Propaganda, 15 March 1940 (FO 
371-24988). 
37 Britain subsequently improved on this performance, notably in the field of ‘black’ 
propaganda. 
38 The Mirror correspondent was David Walker, who recorded his experiences in 
Lunch with a Stranger (London, 1957), p. 51. 
39 Visit of DJ Hall to Romania (see note 36 above). 
40 The idea of sending a team of experts to counter this opinion was scotched by 
Hoare: ‘This country is not ripe for such war propaganda for the excellent reason 
that the sum of success has not hitherto been greatly in evidence’, Hoare/Nichols, 
13 October 1939, FO 371-23852. 
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subjected to aggression.41 After the collapse on the Western front, 
Britain’s expressed determination to fight on recalled to one of Hoare’s 
contacts ‘les demiers jours de Byzance’ — and all Romanians knew what 
had followed that epoch. 
After June 1940, the British propaganda effort in Romania petered out, 
since the German claim that the ultimate victory of the Reich was 
inevitable was far more plausible than the British assertion that it was not. 
Britain could only seek to influence Romanian opinion through the BBC 
from London, and even there the Corporation and the Foreign Office were 
at loggerheads over what the latter rightly stigmatized as serious gaffes. By 
1941 co-ordination had improved, but in the two years covered by this 
paper, Britain failed to capitalize on evident Romanian goodwill. In fact, 
the claim to fame of this aspect of British policy rests on its having 
provided the setting and the materials for an entertaining novel — on the 
record, a not inappropriate outcome. 
*** 
From the British point of view, the declaration of war resolved a number of 
ambiguities and hesitancies, notably in finance, and allowed actions to be 
considered which ‘peace’ had previously ruled out. In particular, the range 
of covert action was extended. ‘Covert’ in this context implies not the 
usual espionage42 but secret action of which the Romanian Government 
was aware or in which it co-operated, on the grounds that such anti- 
German policies served the interests of both states. The obvious candidate 
was oil. 
The fields and installations had been partially destroyed by an ad hoc 
mission improvised in 1916, but the execution at the time had been marred 
by divergent views between the Romanian Government and the mission of 
the extent of the damage necessary to deny oil to the Germans. The latter 
had their own experience of repair and renovation in the oil fields and 
refineries on which to draw. So, in 1939, the British Government was 
determined that the Romanian Government should be fully committed in 
advance, while the Germans, knowing themselves after their Agreement of 
23 August 1939 with Russia to be in a far stronger position vis-a-vis 
Romania than in 1917, determined to save themselves the trouble of a 
second invasion and infiltrate Romania’s oil areas to the point that they 
could either forestall the British or immediately repair any damage. This 
41 Hoare/FO, no. 335, 4 May 1940, FO 371-24988 
42 Evidence for conventional intelligence activity and the kind of operations indulged 
in by what became SOE — apart from memoir literature such as David Walker’s 
Lunch with a Stranger — is only just beginning to emerge. For that reason these 
aspects of British policy are not discussed in this chapter. 
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action was to be coupled with representations stressing the need for 
Romania to protect its oil resources in order to keep oil flowing to 
Germany against the supply of arms, of which it was pointed out that 
Germany enjoyed a de facto monopoly.43 British covert policies had to be 
framed in this context. 
From its beginning, the increasing German orientation of Romanian 
exports provoked individuals, British and Romanian, to isolated acts of 
sabotage, often but not invariably assisted by British agents or their 
contacts. It was useful to obstruct deliveries by causing the failure of 
locomotives on single-track systems, but such induced breakdowns only 
strengthened the Germans’ determination to ensure that they ceased, by 
bringing pressure to bear on the Romanian Government and encouraging 
the vigilance of Volksdeutsche employees of the companies and the CFR. 
Rather more subtle in intention was the arrangement between Otto Stem, 
of Astra Romana, and his colleague Dr Kruspig, of Rhenania Ossag. 
Kruspig was a lawyer who had helped to bring about the merger of the oil 
business of Stem’s father with other interests to form Rhenania. There was 
thus personal confidence of long standing, which pennitted the two to 
work out techniques of administrative confusion designed to keep rail tank 
cars shuttling between Ploe§ti and Hamburg for long periods of time. 
Kruspig, however, was killed in a car accident at Bra§ov on his way back 
to Germany (enquiry showed that the accident was not contrived). The 
scheme therefore came to nothing, since Stem did not have the same 
relationship with Kruspig’s successor. 
Any such efforts were unsystematic and could amount to no more than 
a series of cumulative pinpricks. The larger problem, from the British point 
of view, was to stop the flow of oil to Germany completely, or at least 
inhibit it as much as possible. This was in itself a valid aim of policy, even 
though the premise on which it was erected — namely that it would curtail 
the operations of the Luftwaffe — was not.44 Since the large tonnages 
went by the Danube to Vienna and Regensburg, that was the obvious 
target for interdiction, and on the Danube itself the vulnerable section was 
43 The exchanges on this issue are to be found in the relevant section of Documents 
on German Foreign Policy, Series B, vol. 8. 
44 The Luftwaffe relied on German production and captured stocks. In 1940 Romania 
contributed only 12,600 tons of high octane aviation gasoline for the whole year. It 
was not designated a major supplier of high octane aviation fuels to the Reich until 
1942. In more general terms the argument was correct. German requirements in 
1940 were of the order of 10-12 million tons, of which 6 million tons derived from 
hydrogenation plants and stocks. Romania was looked to for about three million 
tons. Hence the ‘Oil Pact’ of May 1940; hence also the interest in the security of 
facilities. 
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the Kazan Gorge and the rapids known as the ‘Iron Gates’ where the river 
broke through the mountains. There the channel narrowed and the current 
ran at about 15 km/hour. A by-pass canal eased transit but special pilots 
were required for that stretch. It was the classic bottleneck beloved by 
theorists of economic warfare. 
The idea of impeding the flow of war materials, especially oil, to 
Germany via the Danube at the Iron Gates seems to have occurred to 
several people.45 The favoured method was either to blast the cliffs into 
the channel, or to sink blockships, but in both cases to destroy the by-pass 
canal and the associated workings. A cliff-blasting operation was 
attempted in the winter of 1940 and failed when Yugoslav police 
inconveniently discovered the tunnels.46 For our present purposes, the 
attempt by river originated in the office of the Director of Naval 
Intelligence, Rear Admiral John Godfrey, acting in liaison with the Naval 
Attache in Bucharest, Captain Max Despard. Service personnel were 
recruited from three sources: London (travelling overland as minor 
officials), Malta and Alexandria. The vessels were a motley collection, 
assembled locally by the Goeland Company, of tugs, self-propelled barges 
and dumb lighters, all flying the Red Ensign.47 The crews, equally motley, 
comprised personnel from the Royal and Royal Australian navies, and 
Greeks, Hungarians and Romanians normally engaged in Danube traffic. 
The expedition was under the command of Commander A. P. Gibson, 
RN.48 
45 Analysis of this episode poses a number of problems about sources, so far 
unresolved: the main published works by participants are Minshall, Guilt-edged, 
London, 1975, and Mason, One Man's War, London, undated. The official 
Admiralty report (ADM1-21717) and intermittent references in the correspondence 
files between the Legation and the Foreign Office (FO 371-24988) are in the Public 
Record Office. On these materials I have had the benefit of discussion with the late 
Commander C. E. T. Warren RN (retd), one of the Malta party. I have not yet 
been able to examine the files of the Abwehr; the report of the German Minister in 
Bucharest, von Killinger, is mentioned in documents but seems to have 
disappeared. Minshall and Mason to some extent complement each other but their 
accounts appear to have the most tangential of relationships with the official 
documents: this points not so much to the self-regarding nature of their 
autobiographies as to the difficulty of establishing who knew or did what at any 
given time. 
46 See B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, London, 1969, p. 22. 
47 One was Italian-owned and sailed under the Greek flag on charter to the British. 
48 Gibson lost his life at sea three days after submitting his ‘Letter of Proceedings’, 20 
August 1940 (enclosed Admiral Cunningham to Secretary of the Admiralty 22 
November 1940 ref. Med 01102/0700/32), ADM1-21717. The report covers the 
operation in Romania and its aftermath in Turkey and Greece. It is not written in 
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At the time, the Danube from the Black Sea to Braila was juridically 
Romanian — the International Danube Commission having hauled down 
its flag at Sulina in 1938. The international regime, however, continued 
upstream from Giurgiu. The initial problem for Commander Gibson was 
therefore to get the ships through the first two hundred miles of waterway 
without giving the Romanian authorities, already susceptible to German 
pressure, grounds for forbidding passage. In this regard the proclivities of 
port officials — whether their sense of Romania’s advantage led them to 
be pro-Ally or pro-German — was crucial to the outcome of the 
expedition. 
At first, all went tolerably well. The three groups assembled in Braila 
for passage through Romanian waters. The arms and explosives, sealed in 
cases by Customs as ‘oil drilling spares’ in transit to Budapest, were 
loaded into a separate lighter, Termonde, to be towed to Giurgiu. All ships 
sailed on 1 April (the date was ominous), each towing lighters. They 
arrived at their destination in the afternoon of 3 April. They were promptly 
inspected: 
The authorities duly arrived and searched the ships properly. They found 
uniforms, arms and money; the latter appeared to excite them as much as 
anything. We had about five hundred pounds in lei [. . .] which was apparently 
very wrong. They also found a tear gas pistol, which they thought fired Verey 
Lights and so did not worry about. The ship was prepared for a fairly thorough 
search but not for such a one as was given at Giurgiu On conclusion of the 
search the authorities collected the pistols etc. that they had found and threw 
them all into a suitcase; the last item which they lightly tossed into the melee 
being a cigar box with detonators.49 
Commander Gibson further relates that, on it being represented to the 
Romanians that certain items might be dangerous, they decided to leave all 
the arms on board and the matter was referred to Bucharest by telephone. 
The search had been initiated not by Customs but by the Port Captain, 
Drencianu, an official, Gibson reported, whose career in the Romanian 
Navy had abruptly terminated by reason of some peccadillo and who had 
entered his present employment through the agency of a relative, Admiral 
Pais. When Gibson wrote, Pais was Secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Air and Marine. Drencianu was pro-German. 
There began a ‘cat and mouse’ game between the Port Captain and the 
British. The immediate response to the telephone call was that the Port 
Captain was ordered to desist. The vessels, however, had to stay where 
the usual form, since it cites no instructions at the beginning; internal evidence 
suggests that Cdr Gibson burnt his, with other confidential documents on 9 April. 
49 Gibson, ‘Letter of Proceedings’, paragraphs 14 and 18. 
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they were, in part because Giurgiu was the only available store of suitable 
fuel. The Port Captain dragged out, for thirty-six hours, the process of 
giving permission to go to the oiling berth. On 5 April, while the first 
vessels were oiling, Gibson was ordered to Bucharest to see Captain 
Despard, who was ‘fairly satisfied the incident was closed’. That evening 
‘came the news that Termonde had been searched and the arms and 
explosives taken over by the Rumanians’.50 The ships were virtually under 
arrest, and it was blowing a gale. 
At this point, the politics of the episode become more complicated, just 
where the evidence becomes more tenuous. Essentially, the ships were 
stuck at Giurgiu, while the British Legation and their Romanian well- 
wishers, such as Gafencu, tried to work out a solution which would leave 
the expedition more or less intact, and with the option of proceeding up¬ 
river. Against them were the Abwehr, which had monitored the whole 
British operation from the time it left Sulma, and German diplomats, 
suggesting that if the Romanians failed to intervene, anus deliveries from 
the Reich might well fail to materialize. Ultimately, this argument was to 
prove conclusive. Further down in the hierarchy, the Port Captain and his 
well-placed relative and other local officials were manoeuvering to ensure 
that any concessions about movement of vessels or personnel gained by 
the Legation were inhibited by applying local regulations. The combination 
of pressures worked. After another search, on 9 April (which revealed 
nothing), the ships left not for the Iron Gates but for Braila, where they 
remained until the beginning of May. At that juncture, it was considered 
possible that the flotilla could retrieve its anus and explosives through 
negotiation with the Romanian General Staff and yet fulfil its mission. 
(Present evidence cannot suggest how realistic this possibility was.) At the 
same time, Gibson noted, the authorities began rigorously controlling the 
movement of foreigners and the International Commission of the Danube 
produced new regulations about vessels and navigation on the river, both 
of which left the flotilla highly vulnerable to further official intervention. 
Success depended on other than local conditions, in particular on 
Romanian belief in Britain. The expedition took place at a time of rapidly 
declining British credibility; Gibson reports that when on 10 May news 
came through of the invasion of the Low Countries, the Watson and Youell 
manager remarked, ‘now there can be no neutrals, all must make their 
choice’ — a sentiment which Gibson identified as the prevalent opinion. 
News of the surrender of Dutch forces on 14 May and of Belgian forces on 
50 Ibid., paragraphs 24-7. On this episode see also A. Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Carol 
und Marschall Antonescu, Wiesbaden, 1954, pp 68-9, and H. Neubacher 
Sonderauftrag Siidost 1940-1945, Gottingen, 1956, pp. 43-4. 
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28 May and the course of battle in France deprived Britain of all but the 
most dedicated support. The replacement of Gafencu as Foreign Minister 
by Gigurtu on 3 June was taken to measure how decisively the balance had 
turned against Britain. The hesitancies and reticencies of minor officialdom 
made that even more evident. An uncommitted official who might turn a 
blind eye in March was far less inclined to do so in May. 
German propaganda agencies in Bucharest made the most of Britain’s 
discomfiture. Mussolini, in a letter to Hitler, warned that the fact that ‘the 
Romanian authorities did not decide to detain the flotilla of the Intelligence 
Service until it had travelled 200 miles on the river’ was evidence of 
Romania’s ‘ambiguous attitude’.51 German officials drew the opposite 
conclusion: the outcome had helped towards putting an end to ambiguity. 
The Legation tried to limit the damage; summoning all its resources of 
understatement, it agreed with the Romanian authorities a covering 
explanation to the effect that they had found in Giurgiu on a vessel flying 
the British flag, certain goods — among them a few revolvers — ‘which 
did not correspond to the ship’s manifest’.52 
On 2 May, the ships were ordered by the Naval Attache to Sulina to be 
prepared for sea. That process took another month, till 19-20 June. Now 
the problem for the flotilla was not how to proceed up the Danube but how 
to avoid being trapped in it. Eventually, the vessels returned to Alexandria 
via Turkey and Greece. 
The British had acted on the belief that the Romanian Government had 
acquiesced in, if not actually supported, the idea of an expedition and were 
surprised when officials behaved otherwise. Their expectation under¬ 
estimated the capacity of the Romanian bureaucracy for procrastination 
and its divided loyalties and expectations. The expedition played into the 
hands of any ill-wishers by its blatant disregard for security and the 
indiscipline of some of the participants. One must add, however, that no 
one seriously expected the cover to be any more than that necessary to 
encourage Romanian officials to turn a blind eye. Minshall, arriving in 
Bucharest, found his cover ‘blown’ in advance, in circumstances he felt 
constrained to embrace.53 Gibson noted ‘When we were still at Braila [that 
is, at the end of March] people in the street were openly talking about the 
arms and explosives the Englishmen were bringing into the country.’54 
Admiral Cunningham retrospectively attributed the fig-leaf security to the 
‘apparent urgency of the operation at the time [...] it was hoped that 
51 Mussolini/Hitler, 11 April 1940, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, 
Document no. 92, vol. 9. 
52 Hankey/FO, 8 April 1940, FO 371-24988. 
53 Minshall, Guilt-edged, pp. 155-6. 
54 Gibson, ‘Letter of Proceedings’, paragraph 14. 
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dislike of the Germans and a little judicious bribery might cause Romanian 
officials to shut their eyes to what was going on’.55 
Romanian officials were expected to be able ‘to shut their eyes’ to 
rather a lot. Two officers ‘involved in an incident ashore’ in Braila on 28 
March were arrested by Romanian police, released on bail, summoned to 
Bucharest by Captain Despard, the Naval Attache, and quickly sent out of 
the country.56 Since the vessels were supposedly merchantmen, flying the 
Red Ensign, it was impossible to advertise their real character by posting 
sentries to prevent personnel from going ashore. The trouble in Giurgiu 
started when one crew member in a brothel found himself with insufficient 
money to pay for services rendered, and attempted to shoot his way out 
with a revolver. The madam took exception to this behaviour and, not 
unreasonably, called the police. In a somewhat different order of 
insouciance, personnel who thought that they exhibited early symptoms of 
venereal disease took themselves for treatment ashore by a German 
doctor. 
The observance of more scrupulous security might have made the 
German counter-measures more difficult, but was unlikely to have affected 
the ultimate outcome. It was subsequently considered that the expedition 
had been betrayed either in Malta or through the Romanian Legation in 
London. The suspicion can be noted but, on present evidence, not proved. 
What was undeniable was that the expedition was shadowed by the 
Abwehr from the beginning,57 and that had it reached its objective it would 
have had a stiff fight on its hands: select troops from the fifth Brandenburg 
commando, in plain clothes, monitored all movements through and 
provided a security watch over the Iron Gates.58 
The fact remained that the attempt had not only failed but failed 
ignominiously; vessels and crew were simply being deported. The failure 
might have been more resounding had not events in the West put the 
episode into a different perspective. On 10 May, the German forces broke 
into the Low Countries and France. Nevertheless, in international relations 
impotence is dissuasive. The expedition had proved several points made to 
55 Cunningham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 22 November 1940, MED 
01102/0700/32, ADM1-21717. 
56 Gibson; ‘Letter of Proceedings’, paragraph 11, and Hoare/Nichols, 30 March 
1940, FO 371-24988. 
57 Von Killinger reported that the Abwehr worked with Romanian Intelligence on 
‘discovering and preventing the act of sabotage planned by the English on the 
Danube’: Killinger/Ribbentrop, 14 April 1940, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, Series D, vol. 9, p. 165. 
58 See H. Spaetor, Die Brandeburger: Eine deutsche Kommandotruppe, Munich, 
1971, pp. 126, 127. 
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the Romanian Government over the previous months by the Germans; 
from then on, they effectively held the Danube under their control. 
Admiral Cunningham subsequently charged the participants, when they 
got back to Alexandria, with having run away in the face of the enemy. On 
the evidence, the charge was unjust, but the whole episode demonstrated a 
certain lack of determination (though knowledge of Gibson’s orders might 
modify this conclusion). The Military Attache, Lt.-Col. Geoffrey Macnab, 
attributed the failure to ‘grossest mismanagement and culpable lack of 
discipline among the crews’. The Foreign Office singled out the Naval 
Attache as ‘almost solely responsible’ for the debacle. Certainly far too 
much was taken for granted about Romanian reactions and especially the 
ability of officials in Bucharest to make their writ run elsewhere, above all 
at a time when the Germans already had an intelligence and military 
presence in the country, and superior ability to make their wishes 
respected. Perhaps the episode demonstrates confusion between action 
limited and action damning the consequences. In the prevailing conditions, 
one suspects only the latter had any chance of success. 
* 
When the Guarantee was announced, British military planners were deep 
in debate about Romania’s role in case of war with Germany. The 
dominant opinion in Whitehall advocated implicating Romania in 
hostilities as quickly as possible; she was, after all, the ally and military 
protege of France, with good infantry, capable of being brought to bear on 
Germany from the south-east. From Bucharest, Sir Reginald Hoare 
vigorously opposed this line of argument, pointing out that the 
indispensable condition of Romania’s participation was an Allied army of 
100,000 men backed by a formidable air force in Cyprus.59 
The Military Attache, Lt.-Col. Macnab, reinforced the need for the 
reployment of Allied strength in the region, after observing the army in 
Transylvania. While expressing his admiration for the qualities of the 
Romanian soldier, he considered the army’s leadership defective, lacking 
in appreciation of modem developments and bedevilled by slackness in 
administration and matters of detail. He concluded ‘In another 18 months 
the Army may well become a force to be reckoned with seriously. At 
present it has every hope of success if called to fight any of its neighbours, 
but in a conflict with a western [that is, industrialized] power its chances 
of protracted resistance are not worth betting on’.60 His arguments, taken 
with the fact that Romania, not being dependent on sea-borne trade, was 
59 HoareAngram, 15 June 1939, recapitulating a debate in train since January (FO 
371-23852). 
60 MacnabAJoare, 18 April 1939 (FO 371-23852) 
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the less open to British persuasion, were conclusive. Hence when war 
broke out British planning excluded Romania, as other states in the region, 
from military participation: 
The whole essence of this problem [that is, whether to immediately seek to 
involve the Balkans or not] is not to involve countries which can be overrun 
until the proper moment and that proper moment is when we can support them; 
otherwise they merely become a tempting invitation to the Germans and can be 
put out of action in a short time.61 
This became and remained the basic principle, but it had already been 
recognized that Romania’s oil wells offered a special kind of temptation 
and plans had been made to put them out of action in the case of a German 
coup de main. 
Plans for destroying the oil fields and installations had been agreed with 
the Romanian Government in August 193 9.62 From September onwards 
details were jointly worked out with the Romanian General Staff and a 
British Military Mission assembled from Britain under the orders of the 
Military Attache. The specific demolition plans necessarily involved 
engineering expertise provided by individuals in the ‘British’ companies, 
but the actual demolitions were to be entrusted to a special Corps of Royal 
Engineers down in from Egypt, with a detachment of troops from Syria. 
Lt.-Col. Macnab and his French counterpart were the official links with the 
Romanian Government but were to take no part in the operation. 
For seven months arrangements went smoothly, under the operational 
guidance of Commander Watson. They depended on the active co¬ 
operation of the Romanian army, although contingency plans were 
naturally made in case the army should find itself unable to hold up the 
Germans for the requisite length of time, or find itself politically committed 
to the Germans. Training went ahead, both in Romania and elsewhere.63 
Then two events compromised the Romanian Government: in France the 
Germans got hold of documentary’ evidence of the co-operation between 
the three governments,64 and locally the abject failure of the Danube 
61 Director of Military Operations and Planning: Minute, ‘Strategy IV: The Balkans’, 
23 September 1939-15 August 1941, WO 106-3130; see also ‘Strategy: 
Roumania: Appreciation in the event of attack by Germany’, WO 190-864. 
62 King Carol informed the German Air Attache, Gerstenberg, that the British and 
French had recently submitted a plan for sabotaging the oil fields in the event of 
war but that he had rejected it: seeFabriciusto Foreign Ministry, Telegram no. 373, 
28 August 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, vol. 7, no. 386 
63 See Geoffrey Household, Against the Wind, London, 1958, pp. 101-8 
64 And also the names of British participant engineers, given to the Romanian General 
Staff. 
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expedition left the Romanian Government, even if willing, less able to 
withstand German pressure. Macnab’s relations with the Romanian 
military became formal and intermittent. The Romanian co-operation 
necessary to the carrying out of the plan was no longer forthcoming; by the 
same token, the British could afford to pay less regard to Romania’s 
position. 
At that point, at the beginning of June 1940, Leslie Forster of Astra 
Roman a devised a simpler scheme whereby significant damage could be 
done in Tintea, currently the main producing field, where gas pressures 
were high enough to sustain widespread fire and the installations were all 
‘British’. They were guarded by employees. The operation was, in 
Macnab’s view, ‘risky but perfectly feasible’. Immediately before the plan 
was to be put into operation the company guards were without warning 
replaced by soldiers. The Romanian Army took control of the oil fields; 
anti-aircraft defences multiplied and the whole area was placed under 
restriction.65 
Amateurs of strategy, especially in the newspaper world, complained 
that Ploe§ti was not bombed. The reason was obvious to anyone who 
compared the distances on a map with the known range and payload of the 
aircraft then in squadron use and already in the Near East. Bristol 
Blenheims just about had the range; flying heavier Wellington bombers 
into the area — even had they been available — would have been 
impossible to conceal and would have alerted the defence. Refineries in 
fact are dispersed targets and not too difficult to repair66 unless damage is 
inflicted continuously. Isolated raids by themselves with the size of bomb 
available were inadequate. There were two vital elements in the decision 
arising from Britain’s policies towards other Balkan states. First, any 
operations required the use of landing fields in Greece 67 Some were in use 
but expressly not for offensive operations, and General Metaxas’s refusal 
to extend even that facility to the use of an airfield at Salonika showed he 
65 This brief account should dispose of the notion, which surfaces again as recently as 
1976 in M. R. D. Foot’s Resistance (London, 1976), that the oil concerns were 
half-hearted about participating in the destruction of their property on the grounds 
that it would diminish their profits. Planning would have been impossible without 
the full co-operation of directors in London and individuals in management 
positions in Romania, while the skills of engineers employed by those companies in 
the target areas were vital to identifying sensitive points in the systems of gathering 
and refining. They were not acting without the knowledge or against the will of 
their employers. 
66 Especially as the Germans included oil-field and refinery specialists among their 
‘tourists’ in Romania. 
67 In order to allow a small force of aircraft the maximum number of attacks with the 
most favourable weight ratio between bombs and fuel 
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was determined to impose limits. Secondly, any attacks would violate 
Bulgarian air space, which might well provoke a German occupation ‘to 
help Bulgaria defend her neutrality’. In sum, it was judged more 
advantageous not to tempt Germany into Bulgaria and Greece than to 
inflict temporary and inadequate damage on heavily defended oil 
refineries. That the British community in Romania were hostages did not 
lack weight in the final decision.68 The wisdom of this policy was 
demonstrated in 1943, when a heav>r raid on Ploe§ti by the USAAF 
inflicted easily reparable damage at a severe cost in aircraft. 
* 
Britain’s position in Romania might, conceivably, have survived the 
debacle on the Danube; it could not survive the debacle in France. On 29 
May the Romanian Government, feeling itself under threat from the Soviet 
Union, decided to align itself with Germany. The King reconstmcted his 
Cabinet to include members of the Iron Guard. On 1 July, immediately 
after the loss of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, Gigurtu announced 
‘the reorientation of foreign policy as determined by the European order in 
course of establishment’ — in consequence of which the Guarantee was 
renounced. The next day, Germany was asked for a military mission. 
The new alignment negated all the plans made with previous cabinets. 
Hopes of destroying the oil fields or installations were immediately dashed 
when, on 3 July, seventeen British subjects resident in Ploe§ti were 
summarily ordered to leave Ploe§ti by 9.00 a.m. on 4 July and Constanta 
by midnight the same day. The intervention of Sir Reginald Hoare could 
only produce delay. The General Staff claimed to have definite information 
of ‘a widespread plan of sabotage [...] organized by the British’.69 The 
only plan was, of course, that worked out with the General Staff under 
Calinescu. Of the seventeen expellees, eleven had been involved in the oil¬ 
field planning, so all the effort was nugatory and the oil fields could 
henceforward be operated for the benefit of the German war effort. Hoare 
summed up: ‘Avowed Axis policy of Romanian Government must mean 
that Germany and Italy will obtain all the oil they can transport, that 
transport will be reorganised in their favour and oil exports directed in 
accordance with their wishes.’70 
Britain’s policies in Romania had relied upon the maintenance at ail 
levels of reasonable working relationships with Romanian governments 
68 In 1940, the taking of hostages was not as commonplace as it has since become; 
there were moral reservations. These might conceivably have yielded to purely 
military considerations had it been possible to inflict overwhelming, decisive 
damage. As that was not the case, the issue was never fought out. 
69 Hoare, no. 645, 4 July 1940, FO 371-24988. 
70 Hoare/FO, no. 666, 7 July 1940, FO 371-24988. 
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and till now had succeeded, partly because Britain had been able to 
counterbalance the main German pressures. From June 1940 it no longer 
had the ability to do so. The Legation nevertheless still had some room for 
manoeuvre, and as long as the King was there and officials unenthusiastic 
about Germany continued in the bureaucracy, it had something to work on. 
By September, however, the King was gone and the state handed over to 
what was perhaps the only enthusiastically pro-Nazi force in Romania. 
The Iron Guard regime introduced an authority which was totally 
inaccessible to British pressures. Moreover, throughout the country the 
Guardists either had or assumed a licence to act as they pleased under the 
protection of their leaders occupying the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Security Service and the Prefecture of the Police. 
In these circumstances, what was the point of Britain’s continuing to 
have relations with Romania? The first recorded instance of doubt is 
yielded by the discussion in the Foreign Office about the agrement for 
Minister Tilea’s successor. ‘The main argument in favour of maintaining 
[relations]’, noted Sir Alexander Cadogan, ‘is that Germany seems to wish 
to see a rupture’.71 If relations were severed, then the country would be 
left in the undisputed control of Germany, but an alternative might be to 
set up a Romanian National Committee in London. The idea withered on 
consideration of the Committee’s possible leadership. Tilea was already in 
Britain but the equivocal antecedants to the Guarantee had generated a 
degree of official reserve about him; Maniu, in Romania, preferred to 
remain where he was. There were in any case those in Whitehall who 
thought it better that he should lead a coup d'etat rather than yet another 
govemment-in-exile; Titulescu was found to be in no mental condition to 
offer leadership — a consequence of his unremitting efforts to stimulate a 
degree of virility which Nature denied him. The Foreign Office also flirted 
with the notion of offering King Carol refuge, but the thought that he 
would inevitably seek to resume political leadership and that he was, 
perhaps, not quite the sort of refugee ruler Britain required, rapidly 
dispelled any sentimentality about his relationship with Queen Victoria. 
The arrest and maltreatment of British subjects focused minds on the 
possibilities of withdrawal, turning what had been a marginal comment by 
Sir Alexander Cadogan into a matter for serious consideration. The victims 
in each case were senior executives in the oil or oil supply industry and all 
except one were based in Ploe§ti, where the Iron Guard was more 
concentrated than in Bucharest and where the Germans — in contrast to 
the British — had a Consul and one who at the time was a Gestapo officer. 
There had been incidents — the throwing of incendiary bombs through 
71 ‘Note on Agrement for Stoica’, 9 September 1940, FO 371-24989. 
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windows — but the kidnapping of individuals was taken to indicate a 
concerted drive by the Guard. This remains doubtful. There was more than 
enough generalized resentment in its ranks to make life uncomfortable, if 
not actually dangerous, for British nationals, however employed, in the 
autumn of 1940. People capable of more sophisticated political thinking 
than the Iron Guard blamed the Guarantee, which had been thrust on 
Romania, for the plight of the state. (That Romania had solicited the 
Guarantee was not generally known, but such intellectual distinctions were 
not the Guardists’ metier) 
Alexander Miller, of Astra Romana, contributes an interesting analysis 
of the Guard’s outlook in his report on his own arrest and torture: 
I can only summise that the Legionaries were not satisfied with the case they 
had established against the others and thought that a corroboratory statement 
by someone else, even if unsupported by any other proofs, would be sufficiently 
damning and enquiries by them in Ploe§ti may have elicited my name and 
nothing more. 
During my captivity in the hands of the Legionaries I was able to form 
certain general impressions of them which are probably representative of the 
general mass of the movement. They seemed sincere in their mission to clean 
up the administration of the country, and were especially violent against those 
who had been responsible for the suppression of their movement. All those I 
met had been in prison, some had suffered tortures worse than anything they 
themselves administered, and they told me that 8,000 of their people had been 
killed. They were convinced that it was the British who had financed the 
Roumanians to suppress the Iron Guard, and they considered it more than 
significant that their leader Codreanu had been murdered just when King Carol 
returned from his visit to England. They were convinced that the defeat of 
England was inevitable, and I was repeatedly vilified for taking part in sabotage 
which might have brought their country into difficulties with Germany 72 
Miller points to another feature of the situation: that the regular police 
and military officials had little sympathy with the Iron Guard ‘although 
they dared not express this openly’. The Legation, for its part, noted 
fissures within the Guard itself, and further, that General Antonescu 
seemed genuinely anxious to have ‘correct’ relations with Britain, though 
how far he remained a free agent was doubtful.73 
Miller’s arrest, coming as it did after official protests about the 
detention of the others, was taken to prove that the Government could not 
make its writ run; that it was more than likely to succumb to pressure from 
the Iron Guard or the Germans, (who were pouring troops into Romania in 
September and October); and that accordingly the British needed to make 
contingency plans for withdrawal. On 3 October a meeting at the Foreign 
72 Miller’s report, ‘Maltreatment of British Nationals’, FO 371-29992. 
73 Hoare/FO, 1 October 1940, FO 371-24989. 
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Office, under Sir Orme Sargent, discussed this possible course of action 
and in doing so provided an interesting conspectus of views as to what 
Britain stood to lose. It soon appeared that the only substantial loss would 
be of ideas and information about German intentions and policies, but 
events had shown that Romanian sources of information were under threat 
and alternative arrangements could be made. Otherwise, interested 
departments such as the Ministry of Economic Warfare reported they had 
nothing to lose — a striking contrast to the expectations of only two years 
before when Romania had been identified as a crucial area. The meeting 
decided that adequate time was to be given for the quiet liquidation of 
interests such as the Goeland organization and the dispersal of personnel. 
Sir Reginald Hoare was to be given discretionary authority as to the timing 
of the withdrawal.74 This he formally received on 8 October: four days 
later, the first officials from the Legation and their families left Romania 
for Istanbul. 
Their departure coincided with the arrival of the German army in full 
force. At first Romanian officials maintained that these arrivals were 
training units, numbering 20,000, but by December it was abundantly clear 
that forces were being built up in divisional strength. Hoare reported: ‘This 
country is already an enemy protectorate and the occupation is daily more 
effective. It is an open question how long we shall be able to remain.’75 
The British were still capable of making public gestures: spectators of an 
impressive German military parade down the Chausee Kisselef were 
surprised to see it followed by Sir Reginald Hoare in his official Rolls 
Royce, flying the Union Jack. 
German troops took over vital installations such as the bridge at 
Cemavoda, Giurgiu, the oil fields, pipelines and railways and airfields. 
They also assisted Antonescu in putting down the Iron Guard in January 
1941. That action clarified in British minds ambiguities about his status, 
namely, how far he was committed to the Guard, whether he was trying to 
salvage some independent sphere of action for Romania, and whether his 
personal friendliness to Hoare could ever be translated into policies which 
allowed official British representation to continue. In fact, the grounds for 
withdrawal entirely rested on the German presence, as the note addressed 
to Antonescu on 10 February 1941 makes clear: 
It has become abundantly evident that this country’s Government which you 
have directed for six months has become entirely dependent on Germany. Not 
only actual facts but also numerous statements published by yourself confirm 
this. Some months ago you informed me that a small number of German troops 
74 ‘Minutes of Meeting’, 3 October 1940, FO 371-24989. 
75 Hoare/GFO, 4 November 1940, FO 371-24989. 
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were arriving in Roumania in order to instruct the Roumanian Army in modern 
methods of warfare and that the necessary equipment was likewise being 
despatched from Germany for the re-armament of the Roumanian troops. Some 
instruction has no doubt been imparted, but the essential development is that 
the German High Command is building up in Roumania all the elements of an 
expeditionary force, and is concentrating at various strategic points large 
supplies of munitions and oil fuel. Roumanian territory is thus being used by 
Germany as a military base in furtherance of her plans for prosecuting the war. 
These measures are being taken without one word of dissent from you. In these 
circumstances, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have decided 
to recall me and to withdraw the diplomatic Mission and the Consular Officers 
under my control. I therefore propose to leave this country on the 15th 
February or as soon after as a ship is available to convey my party to Istanbul, 
and I have been instructed by His Majesty’s Government to request that ali the 
facilities and courtesies which are customary in the circumstance may be 
accorded to my Mission and the British Consular Staffs.76 
The ‘customary courtesies’ were far from apparent; the embarkation 
area was thronged with ‘Greenshirts’ and attended by German troops. The 
former, assisted by the Director of Customs, made the departure 
formalities prolonged and designedly humiliating, shouldering aside the 
regular port and customs officials. To this was added the derision of the 
Germans. Newspaper correspondents got out on their own initiative.77 
Whether Britain could play any further part in Romania depended on the 
larger conduct of the war. ‘For the present’ remarked Sir Reginald Hoare, 
‘the game is up’.78 
In view of the nature of the materials so far available, any conclusions 
must be even more tentative than usual; nevertheless certain broad 
judgements can be attempted. 
The first must be that in the spring of 1939, the Guarantee was not the 
result of an extended process of reconsideration but was a sudden, and to 
that degree uncharacteristic, response to a Romanian initiative. Hence it 
was form without substance. Substance could only be developed with 
time: all the consequences disclosed in this chapter stem from that. Such 
time as there was before the war broke out was not put to best use, partly 
through the detritus of past problems but more for lack of suitable 
mechanisms. The war at least imparted a sense of urgency to British 
thinking, but made Romania as a ‘neutral’ a more tricky field of 
operations, since German threats about penalties for unneutral behaviour 
76 Text, FO 371-29992. 
77 See P. Maitland, European Dateline, London, 1946, pp. 139-40. 
78 Hoare (Istanbul) to Eden, no. 62, 21 February 1941 , FO 371-29975. 
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were more credible than British threats could be, and Romania’s attitude 
towards Germany was dictated by its anxieties about the Soviet Union. 
‘Nothing could put Romania on Germany’s side’, remarked a member 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Sir Reginald Hoare in March 1940, 
‘except the conviction that only Germany could keep the Soviets out of 
Romania.’79 That conviction formed rapidly after the military collapse of 
the Western allies and the astutely timed seizure of Bessarabia in June 
1940. Romanian support for the Allies disintegrated; the Guarantee was 
renounced as a necessary concomitant of declaring support for the Axis; 
and, after the expulsion of the King, Romania formally adhered to the 
Tripartite Pact on 23 November. The withdrawal of the Legation followed; 
thereafter any British policy in Romania was a matter for clandestine 
organizations. 
To the extent that Britain’s position in Romania during this 
degringolade responded to external political forces about which she could 
do little before June 1940 and nothing after, it is highly probable that had 
Britain given every type of support the Romanian Government wished, the 
ultimate outcome would have been much the same. A well-equipped 
Romanian army could have put up the costs of occupying Bessarabia (just 
as Finnish forces put up the costs of Soviet border readjustments with 
Finland) but could have done little more. The Guarantee of April 1939 had 
been trumped by the Pact of August 1939. 
The two years’ effort demonstrated the impossibility of putting together 
efficacious policies when the opponents were already in part-possession of 
the ground. To have any chance of succeeding, any challenge to Germany 
required far longer conscious preparation based on unambiguous 
conclusions about objectives. This was not the case in Whitehall before 
1940. Furthermore, the conditions on which Britain could project power 
had changed: the support or acquiescence of Italy and Turkey were vital to 
any policy in Romania. 
Those officials who accepted this premise logically advocated doing as 
little as possible: pre-war expectations had consigned Romania to 
Germany, it was too late to retrieve the situation, and any attempt to do so 
would require a misuse of resources which were, as everyone knew, very- 
limited. Their argument had, at least, the merit of coherence and simplicity 
but, as we know, international relations are rarely coherent and never 
simple. That apart, it is unwise entirely to disregard possible friends, 
especially when, as in 1940, their ranks are rapidly depleting. Such friends, 
however, included those whose entire vision of British policy in South- 
East Europe or the Near East — depending on definition — revolved 
79 Ibid. 
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round Romania. This is natural if one is Romanian, but the argument was, 
in fact, more plausible for the Germans: for them Romania, apart from any 
intrinsic value, was conveniently on the way to somewhere else — 
Istanbul and points south, or the Caucasus. Hence, in debates about policy, 
Romania reinforces the general argument. For the British, Romania lay not 
so handily for policy; it was not on the way to anywhere that could not be 
reached more easily by other routes. So in Whitehall policy debates 
Romania tended to be desirable but not essential, and advocates of 
‘strong’ action there always found themselves not in the centre of 
argument (as were their opposite numbers in Germany) but on its 
periphery. 
In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that, in 1940, the 
Germans could parade a motorized division while the British could display 
only a Rolls Royce. 

British Policy on the Hungarian-Romanian 
Frontier Settlement, 1944-47 
Mark Percival 
From 1943, when Roosevelt and Stalin vetoed Churchill’s plan for a 
Balkan invasion at the Tehran conference, Romania did not figure as a 
significant British foreign-policy interest.1 Britain’s indifference to 
Romania’s fate, which it was powerless to prevent because of the military 
balance of power, was most strikingly demonstrated by the notorious 
‘percentages agreement’ of October 1944, the importance of which has 
nevertheless been exaggerated by Romanian historians. An equally stark 
demonstration of British indifference, which has received far less attention, 
was the equivocal attitude taken by London to the post-war frontier 
settlement with Hungary. The consequence of this uncertainty, which was 
largely a result of US pressure, was a diminution in the political influence 
of the Western powers in Romania and an increase in the influence of the 
Soviet Union, the only power which from March 1945 supported the 
complete restoration of the Trianon frontier. 
Ambiguity over Romania’s frontier was evident from immediately after 
the August 1944 coup. The armistice itself stated that ‘Transylvania (or the 
greater part thereof)’ would be returned and the qualification was included 
partly at the instigation of the British.2 The statement was further qualified 
by the condition that the return of territory was subject to the decisions of 
the Peace Conference.3 In September 1944, in response to a memorandum 
from Otto von Habsburg suggesting that the ideal solution would be a 
‘union’ (a vague term) involving Hungary, Transylvania and the rest of 
Romania as member states, the Foreign Office reply involved merely a 
statement that a final conclusion on these questions could not be reached 
1 Maurice Pearton, in his article ‘Puzzles about the Percentages’ in D. Deletant (ed ), 
Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies, 1, London, 1995, p. 9, argues that ‘in 
strategic terms, Romania’s fate was sealed at Teheran’. 
2 London, Public Record Office, Foreign Office FO 371 (hereafter PRO FO 371), 
43989, R20647, Minute by Pink, 25 December 1944. 
3 PRO FO 371, 44019, R14642, Handwritten minute by Reed, 18 September 1944. 
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until the peace settlement.4 After the coup, the BBC was told to avoid 
discussing Transylvania and to avoid anti-Hungarian polemics.5 British 
Foreign Office officials regularly criticized Romanian politicians who 
assumed that the Trianon frontier would be restored. In September 1944, 
for example, Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Niculescu Buze§ti made 
a statement justifying the undeclared war on Hungary for the recovery of 
northern Transylvania and commented that the armistice terms recognized 
that it would be returned to Romania. This prompted John Reed in the 
Foreign Office to note that ‘it is to be hoped that Mr Niculescu has not 
forgotten the provision in the armistice terms that Transylvania — or the 
greater part thereof — shall be given back to Romania subject to the 
decisions taken at the Peace Conference\6 Iuliu Maniu’s statements on 
Transylvania at the National Peasant Party rally on 29 October prompted 
George Clutton, another Foreign Office official, to write that ‘these lands 
have not yet been restored to Roumania. This event, if it occurs at all 
waits for the Peace Conference.’7 In a comment on a memorandum by 
Iuliu Maniu dated 25 November 1944, in which the National Peasant Party 
leader criticized the Soviet refusal to allow Romanian officials and troops 
access to northern Transylvania, Ivor Pink, another official from the 
Southern Department, wrote that ‘there is much to be said for this [the 
Soviet policy] at least until the Hungarian-Roumanian frontiers are 
decided, as uncertainty over who is to have northern Transylvania is a 
good way of keeping both Hungary and Roumania in order’.8 Thus in the 
autumn of 1944, despite the fact that Romania was fighting on the Allied 
side while Hungary was still an enemy, the British Foreign Office was 
equivocal as to whether or not the 1940 Axis-imposed Vienna Award 
should be annulled. 
Initially, Soviet policy on the Hungarian-Romanian frontier was very 
unclear. According to reporting from the British Embassy in Moscow, 
when the Soviet and Romanian troops moved into northern Transylvania in 
1944, a local Romanian civil administration independent of Bucharest was 
set up. By January 1945, however, the Soviets had reintroduced Hungarian 
administrative units and the Hungarian currency. Public notices, which had 
been restored to the Romanian language in 1944, had been returned to 
4 PRO FO 371, 43985, R15633, Minute by Reed, 30 September 1944. 
5 PRO FO 371, 43986, R14652, Political Warfare Executive Weekly Directive to the 
BBC Romanian Service, 15-22 September 1944. 
6 PRO FO 371, 44019, R14642, Minute by Reed, 30 September 1944 [emphasis in 
the original], 
7 PRO FO 371, 43989, R18553, Minute by Clutton, 16 November 1944 [emphasis 
added], 
8 PRO FO 371, 48577, R461, Minute by Pink, 10 January 1945. 
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Hungarian by January 1945. Romanian army units had been moved out of 
the area and the Romanian University of Cluj, which had returned to the 
city after the Hungarians had been driven out in 1944, had by January 
1945 been sent back to Sibiu by the Soviets. Ostensibly, the Soviet 
motives for these actions had been complaints from Transylvanian 
Hungarians that the reintroduced Romanian administration was inefficient 
and oppressive.9 Such complaints, however, were inevitable at a time 
when the majority of northern Transylvania’s Hungarians bitterly resented 
the re-imposition of Romanian rule. It is probable that Hungarian ill-feeling 
was simply used by the Soviets to justify their policy of sowing uncertainty 
as to the future status of the region. This was a convenient tool for 
blackmailing the Romanian authorities, and in particular King Michael, 
into co-operation with Soviet policy in Romania. The threat of the 
permanent loss of Transylvania was undoubtedly a factor in persuading 
King Michael to appoint the Communist-dominated Petru Groza 
government under heavy Soviet pressure on 6 March 1945. The link 
between the two issues is graphically demonstrated by the fact that 
Romanian administration of northern Transylvania was restored by the 
Soviet occupiers on 9 March 1945, three days after the imposition of the 
Groza government.10 
From this point onwards, Soviet policy was to support the return to 
Romania of all of the territory which it had lost to Hungary in 1940, in 
other words the complete restoration of the 1920 Trianon frontier. 
Nevertheless, the attitude of Britain and the US remained uncertain. 
Although the idea of a revision of the Trianon frontier in Hungary’s favour 
was largely Washington’s, the British went along with it because they 
were keen to see a new regime for the Danube, re-establishing it as an 
international waterway. The Americans were far less interested in this 
question and so British tactics were to support the US stance on 
Transylvania in the hope of encouraging US support over the Danube. 
(Although the exact delineation of the frontier according to the US 
proposal is not given in British or Romanian documents, the British papers 
suggest that the proposal would have entailed half a million Magyars 
returning to Hungarian rule, while Romanian documents refer to Hungary 
gaining 24,000 square kilometres of territory.)* 11 
9 PRO FO 371, 48461, R1220; Telegram, Moscow to Foreign Office, 16 January 
1945, Minute by Warner, 18 January 1945. 
10 G. Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, 1944-62, London, 1964, p. 110. 
11 PRO FO 371, 57194, U1608, Minute by Marjoribanks, 30 January 1946; Archive 
of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Fond Conferinta de Pace de la Paris, vol. 70, 
Telegram, Stoica (Romanian Head of Mission in the Hague) to Romanian Foreign 
Ministry, 4 August 1946. 
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The Groza government was able to extract considerable propaganda 
advantage from the fact that only Moscow supported the full restoration of 
the Trianon frontier. This led Ian Le Rougetel, head of the British Political 
Mission in Romania in 1944-46, to criticize strongly London’s position. 
Le Rougetel often differed with his political masters in London over policy 
towards Romania generally, favouring a much more pro-Romanian line. 
On this issue he argued that Britain should unequivocally back the return 
of the Trianon frontier. In October 1945 he forwarded a copy of a letter 
from Alexandru Negreu, a lawyer, to Maniu. Negreu claimed to have had 
an audience with Groza, in which the Prime Minister said that he was 
presiding over the government in order that Romania could benefit from 
the Soviet promise on the return of Transylvania. According to Negreu, 
Groza offered to resign in favour of Maniu, leader of the National Peasant 
Party, if the British and Anericans would give Maniu an official assurance 
on the Transylvanian boundaries.12 While Groza’s alleged promise was 
highly dubious, and would almost certainly not have been kept, it proved 
that he was able to gain considerable political capital out of the failure of 
Britain and the US to state their position clearly. Although he was sure 
Groza was bluffing about resignation, Le Rougetel nevertheless felt that 
the bluff should be called, and urged the Foreign Office to drop ideas of 
revising the Trianon frontier: ‘We have everything to lose and nothing to 
gain by flogging this dead horse’, he later wrote.13 
D. L. Stewart, the officer responsible for dealing with Romanian affairs 
in the Foreign Office, noted, however, that Britain could not call Groza’s 
bluff and even if this could be done ‘the net gain would only be to give 
Maniu a debating point against Groza’. While Stewart acknowledged that 
Groza was making considerable political capital out of the failure of the 
Western powers to guarantee their support for a return to the Trianon 
frontier, he noted that ‘if we lose anything [...] in Roumania, at least we 
do not lose it in what is now the much more promising field of Hungary’.14 
12 PRO FO 371, 48578, R18430, Despatch, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 25 
October 1945. 
13 PRO FO 371, 48578, R18430, Despatch, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 25 
October 1945; PRO FO 371, 48607, R21534, Despatch, Le Rougetel to Foreign 
Office, 28 December 1945. 
14 PRO FO 371, 48578, R18430, Minute by Stewart, 22 November 1945. The fact 
that Stewart appeared so indifferent to the outcome of any political struggle 
between Maniu and Groza is testament to the distant attitude taken by Britain to 
the historic parties in Romania (see M. Perdval, ‘British Attitudes Towards the 
Romanian Historic Parties and the Monarchy, 1944-47’ in D. Deletant (ed ), 
Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies, 7, 1995, pp. 15-24). Since Maniu 
represented the political grouping with the most support in Romania, and Groza 
was a stooge imposed by Moscow, the statement effectively amounts to a 
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Stewart’s motives for regarding Hungary as ‘more promising’ are unclear, 
particularly since Britain had more commercial assets in Romania. It is 
possible that the rationale behind British policy at this time, however, was 
that Britain regarded it as almost inevitable that Romania would come 
under heavy Soviet influence. This British view was reinforced by the 
position taken by the Soviets at the London Foreign Ministers’ conference 
the previous September, and the attitude of US Foreign Secretary James 
Byrnes that concessions should be made to Moscow over Romania and 
Bulgaria. The Communization of Hungary proceeded much more slowly 
than in Romania and the 1945 elections were more or less fair, with the 
historic parties maintaining control. In November 1945, Hungary appeared 
far less likely than Romania to come under Soviet domination. It may 
therefore have been considered more sensible for the Western powers to 
cultivate influence in Hungary by supporting a modification of the Trianon 
frontier than in Romania, which was probably regarded as Tost’. 
Even if this was British policy in 1945, however, there is little evidence 
that the desire to promote Western influence in Hungary was a major 
factor behind Britain’s stance on the frontier question in subsequent 
months, a fact which makes Stewart’s comment difficult to comprehend.15 
On 10 November 1945, Le Rougetel drew London’s attention to 
discussions which had taken place between Romanian Foreign Minister 
Tatarescu and representatives of the National Bank at the end of October. 
During this meeting, the Romanian Foreign Minister had said that because 
of British and American opposition to the return of the whole of 
Transylvania to Romania, Credit Minier had been sacrificed to the Sovrom 
Bank in order to encourage Soviet support over Transylvania.16 
In January 1946, Le Rougetel reported that King Michael’s principal 
advisors, in a conversation on 14 January with James Marjoribanks, First 
Secretary at the British Legation, had said that one of the reasons why 
Groza wanted to delay the elections was to capitalize on the diminishing 
popularity of the British and American governments as a result of their 
support for adjustment of the Trianon frontier in favour of Hungary. In the 
same month, Le Rougetel reported that all the Romanian political parties 
demonstration of indifference as to whether or not the Soviet Union colonized 
Romania. 
15 On the Communist take-over in Hungary, see F. A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in 
Hungary, Cambridge, MA, 1961, pp. 28-35. 
16 PRO FO 371, 48578, R19765, Despatch, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 10 
November 1945. 
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were making a strong stand over Transylvania.17 In February 1946, Le 
Rougetel had a conversation with Savel Radulescu, King Michael’s chief 
political adviser, who repeated the point that the government was trying to 
postpone the elections in order to exploit popular reaction to British and 
US revisionism. The British political representative strongly favoured 
statements by Britain and the US to the effect that they did not intend to 
raise the frontier issue. This would undermine the government’s efforts to 
postpone the elections. Le Rougetel paraphrased the statement he had 
made the previous December: ‘We seem to have everything to gain and 
nothing to lose by making this gesture.’18 On 26 February, at a lunch with 
Le Rougetel and other members of the British Legation, King Michael 
asked if Britain would come out in favour of maintaining the Trianon 
border and pointed out that the government was making considerable 
capital out of the frontier issue. This prompted the Foreign Office to 
question its policy. William Hayter, head of the Southern Department, 
noted that although he thought there were arguments in favour of revision, 
it was unlikely to take place and so the idea should be dropped.19 
There was, in fact, some debate about policy on this question within the 
Foreign Office in January and February 1946. James Marjoribanks, who 
had served with Le Rougetel in Bucharest (as Consul) and who by 1946 
was a senior Foreign Office official in London working on peace treaties, 
wrote a memorandum on 30 January questioning the British policy of 
supporting US proposals for revision of the frontier. He took issue with 
Washington’s argument that such a change would make the frontier fairer. 
It was generally accepted both by advocates and by opponents of revision 
that the railway which ran from Oradea to Satu Mare should be in the 
territory of one power or the other, since partition would create serious 
local economic difficulties. (The railway had also been a factor behind the 
fixing of the original Trianon frontier.) Marjoribanks argued that if the 
railway were to be given to Hungary, more Romanians would be 
transferred to Hungarian rule than Magyars, and the most homogeneous 
Magyar group in Transylvania (in the east of the province) would still be 
under Romanian rule. Marjoribanks further argued that the Soviet Union 
was solving the problem already, by encouraging the Groza government to 
give substantial autonomy to the Magyars of Transylvania and to develop 
17 PRO FO 371, 59095, R7891, Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office 15 January 
1946; PRO FO 371, 59145, R1057, Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 20 
January 1946. 
18 PRO FO 371, 59145, R2866, Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 22 
February 1946. 
19 PRO FO 371, 59097, R3199, Telegram, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 26 
February 1946; Minute by Hayter, 28 February 1946. 
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the closest possible relations with Hungary. (Petru Groza, who spoke 
Hungarian, went so far as to advocate a customs and currency union.) 
Marjoribanks was well aware of Soviet motives for encouraging close 
relations between Romania and Hungary. Since Romania was already very 
much under Moscow’s control, the policies advocated by Groza would 
also have helped enhance Soviet influence in Hungary. He recognized, 
however, that despite Moscow’s cynical aims, the policies were good ones 
for resolving the Hungarian-Romanian conflict. Marjoribanks seemed to 
think that British policy was not to support Hungarian claims on the 
grounds that Romania was much more heavily under Soviet influence and 
hence the West should concentrate on cultivating Hungary. However, he 
pointed out that even if this was a consideration, Britain would not gain 
much influence in Hungary if it supported Budapest’s claims and then had 
to retract under Soviet pressure. He also thought it would be unwise for 
Britain to accept that Romania was lost to the Soviets, since antipathy to 
Communism was so deep-seated. Just as Le Rougetel was arguing at the 
same time, Marjoribanks also emphasized how damaging British and US 
policy on the frontier issue was to Western influence in Romania, and the 
deep concern of pro-British circles from the King downwards. One reason 
why the Groza government wanted to postpone the elections until after the 
peace conference was to capitalize on Moscow’s clear support for 
restoring the Trianon frontier. Marjoribanks concluded that, while it would 
have been difficult for Britain to go back on its agreement with the US that 
revision should be considered, the US delegation should be strongly 
dissuaded from raising the matter at the peace conference.20 
Marjoribanks’s views, however, were strongly opposed by Professor 
C. A. Macartney, the Habsburg scholar from Oxford University who was 
seconded to the Foreign Office Research Department during the war and 
immediately afterwards. A month after Marjoribanks’s memorandum. 
Macartney expressed ‘the strongest dissent’ from its conclusions and the 
‘strongest hope’ that the British Government would not go back on the 
policy elaborated in 1940 by the then Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. 
Halifax had said that the British Government would ‘use all its influence’ 
to obtain a settlement ‘so just and equitable as to give hopes of its 
durability’. Macartney interpreted Halifax’s statements as meaning that the 
British Government had pledged itself to support the revision of the 
Trianon frontier in Hungary’s favour. Macartney’s argument, based mainly 
on Hungarian and Transylvanian Magyar sources, was that the Groza 
policy was a facade and that ill-treatment of Romania’s Magyars was 
continuing. He said that large numbers of Seklers wanted to move into 
20 PRO FO 371, 57194, U1608, Minute by Marjoribanks, 30 January 1946. 
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Hungary and some had applied for admission into the Soviet Union in 
preference to living under Romanian rule. (Macartney was naive to take 
this at face value. It is probable that if such statements had been expressed 
by Seklers, they were arranged by the Soviets prior to March 1945 as a 
means of putting pressure on Romania to accept the Soviet choice of 
government.) Macartney suggested population transfers, and believed that 
if the Seklers moved, one of the great difficulties in the way of a settlement 
would be eliminated. He appeared to advocate a frontier along the line of 
the Bihar mountains, and to consider that an equitable solution would 
involve equal numbers of Magyars and Romanians living outside Hungary 
and Romania respectively. This argument ignored the fact that the 
Hungarian population of Transylvania is, with the exception of the Sekler 
counties in the east, far more dispersed than the Romanian and such a 
settlement would have involved large areas in which Romanians form a 
majority being annexed to Hungary. Unlike Marjoribanks, Macartney 
believed Britain stood a better chance of cultivating political influence in 
Hungary than in Romania and that this was a further motive for supporting 
Hungary’s claims.21 
Macartney’s views on the frontier, however, did not represent the 
general Foreign Office line. Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary 
(number two in the Foreign Office hierarchy) decided that the US should 
make the running on the border question, and that the British 
representatives at the peace conference, if they had to say anything at all, 
should state that the question needed examination but that the UK was not 
yet convinced that the case for a change in the Trianon frontier had been 
made.22 Thus the British line was midway between the position set out by 
Marjoribanks and that of Macartney. There was little enthusiasm among 
top officials for Macartney’s pro-Hungarian views (and the Professor 
21 PRO FO 371, 57194, U1608, Minute by Macartney, 28 February 1946. There was 
a certain subjective sympathy for Hungary among the staff of the Foreign Office 
Research Department. In February 1944 a paper produced by that Department on 
the social structure of Romania (PRO FO 371, 44021, R7397) noted that in 
Transylvania the Romanians’ ‘contact with their Hungarian and Saxon neighbours 
has produced amongst them a slightly more advanced type of civilisation’. 
Hungarian political memoranda tended to be received more favourably in the 
Foreign Office than Romanian In June 1946, in response to a letter from Cardinal 
Mindszenty protesting at the return of Transylvania to Romania when, according to 
the Cardinal, it had a ‘Western’ culture, as opposed to Romania’s ‘Eastern’ 
culture, the official responsible for dealing with Romania in the Foreign Office 
Research Department noted that the Hungarians presented their memoranda on 
good quality paper and in readable form ‘in strong contrast with some effusions we 
have recently received from Roumanian sources’ (PRO FO 371, 59148, R10831). 
22 PRO FO 371, 57194, U1608, Minute by Sargent, 4 February 1946. 
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resigned in May 1946, a move which pro-Hungarian sources interpreted as 
resulting from his differences with the Foreign Office over the Hungarian- 
Romanian frontier).23 Nevertheless, the failure of Britain to come out 
openly in support of the Trianon frontier, as Marjoribanks and Le Rougetel 
wanted, meant that the Groza government in Romania was able to 
continue to make propaganda gains in the run-up to the November 1946 
elections. The fact that Britain wanted US support for a new arrangement 
for the Danube was given as justification for the failure to adopt a more 
openly pro-Trianon policy.24 
Le Rougetel and Marjoribanks clearly understood the importance 
which a statement that Britain supported the Trianon frontier (as King 
Michael had requested) would have had in the promotion of Western 
influence in Romania. Neither Michael Williams, the Assistant Head of the 
Foreign Office Northern Department, nor Adrian Holman, who succeeded 
Le Rougetel in March 1946 as the British political representative in 
Bucharest, however, saw any pressing need for the British position to be 
clarified, in spite of the fact that the uncertainty was so damaging to 
Britain’s position in the country. A minute by Williams summed up the 
Foreign Office’s uncertain attitude: ‘We propose to agree with the 
Americans that this frontier question needs examination, but not to press 
for any changes, unless the course of the negotiations [at the Peace 
Conference] seems to warrant this.’25 Holman, who had admittedly arrived 
only recently in Bucharest, appeared rather lost on the Transylvanian issue. 
He reported a conversation with his Turkish colleague on 1 April, who 
said that the story was constantly being put about that while the USSR 
supported the return of all of Transylvania to Romania, the UK and US 
favoured some sort of partition. Holman reported that he had ‘heard the 
same story from other sources’. He clearly did not realize that the ‘story’ 
had a strong element of truth, and suggested that a statement should be 
made to the effect that Britain stood by the terms of the Armistice with 
regard to Transylvania.26 Such a statement would not have clarified the 
British position, however, since the Armistice itself was vague on this 
question, as Williams recognized. He said that no statement could be 
made, although ‘there would [...] be no harm in telling the King that we 
23 PRO FO 371, 59147, R8149, Magyar Nemzet, 29 May 1946. Internal Foreign 
Office minuting, however, suggests that Macartney left simply because the time 
had come for him to return to Oxford following his wartime secondment (ibid., 
Minute by Warner, 3 June 1946). 
24 PRO FO 371, 57194, U1608, Minute by Hood, 3 February 1946. 
25 PRO FO 371, 59145, R2866, Minute by Williams, 28 February 1946. 
26 PRO FO 371, 59145, R5227, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 2 April 1946. 
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are well aware of Romanian views and they will be given full weight’.27 
One justification for Britain’s uncertain position advanced by officials in 
London was a technicality — Britain could not commit itself publicly on 
one clause of the Peace Treaty before any statement was made on the 
progress of the Treaty as a whole, and all of Romania’s post-war frontiers 
should be agreed at the same time. (There was still some doubt as to the 
exact delineation of the Soviet-Romanian frontier.)28 
In a despatch sent from the Foreign Office to the British Legation in 
Bucharest on 17 April 1946, Holman was advised that he could tell the 
King for his own information that Transylvania was being discussed at the 
Council of Foreign Ministers and that Britain did not intend to suggest any 
change to the Trianon frontier, but would recognize any change agreed by 
Romania and Hungary themselves. The suggestion that negotiations might 
take place between Romania and Hungary was a recurring idea in British 
thinking during 1946 — until August, when it seems to have been 
abandoned. In practice British support for such talks amounted to a 
rejection of the Trianon frontier and support for an adjustment in favour of 
Hungary. Romania vehemently opposed the idea of talks because it 
regarded the Trianon frontier as non-negotiable. Moreover, the King was 
told that Britain could not make a public statement.29 Thus Holman’s 
elaboration of the British position to the King, which was intended to be 
reassuring, had the opposite effect, and merely fuelled the propaganda 
machine of the Groza government. The British failure to make a public 
statement was seized upon by the Romanian Government and the Soviet 
Union. On 13 April, Holman reported a noticeable increase in propaganda 
to the effect that only the Soviet Union favoured the return of all of 
Transylvania to Romania. ‘Less informed public therefore assumes’, he 
wrote in a telegram to London, ‘that the Americans and ourselves are the 
stumbling block. [...] The position has therefore become more 
embarrassing for us.’30 
British equivocation over the Hungarian-Romanian frontier question 
led to criticism from Hungarian quarters too, and to anti-Western 
propaganda from pro-Soviet interests in that country. In June 1946, 
Hungarian Communist leader Matyas Rakosi made a speech at the Forum 
Club in Budapest in which he commented that Britain was supporting the 
restoration of the Trianon frontier. In Rakosi’s view, Britain was ‘selling 
out’ Hungarian interests, because of its interest in Romanian oil. This 
27 PRO FO 371, 59145, R5227, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 2 April 1946. 
28 PRO FO 371, 59145, R5227, Despatch, Foreign Office to Bucharest, 17 April 
1946. 
29 Ibid. 
30 PRO FO 371, 59145, R5797, Telegram, Holman to Foreign Office, 13 April 1946. 
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prompted William Hayter, the head of the Foreign Office Southern 
Department, which covered Hungary and Romania, to suggest that Rakosi 
should be reminded that it was the Soviet Union which had been the main 
advocate of the return to the pre-war frontier.31 Later in the same month, a 
Hungarian Government delegation visited London, and a junior Foreign 
Office Minister stated that the frontier question had been considered at 
length but that Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, had ‘felt it 
would be useless to raise the matter again’ because of ‘Soviet 
intransigence on this subject’.32 Prime Minister Attlee said that although 
the frontier had been settled by the four Powers, ‘the best hope would be 
for Hungary to have discussions with Romania and Czechoslovakia with a 
view to getting a permanent settlement of the boundaries’. Attlee believed 
this was necessary to prevent repeated conflict over the territories and 
stated that any move towards ‘stabilization’ would have the support of the 
British Government. (The Romanians, of course, were not prepared to 
negotiate over the Trianon frontier and Attlee’s formula of encouraging the 
two countries to negotiate for themselves was rejected by the Peace 
Conference in August, on the grounds that it would provoke the very 
conflicts which Attlee hoped could be prevented.)33 British officials 
formed a favourable view of the Hungarian delegation, which contrasted 
with the often highly negative view of Romanian politicians and the 
Romanian people in general. A record of the discussion sent to the British 
delegation at the Paris Peace Conference reported that the Hungarian 
Prime Minister hoped that the frontier question would be raised ‘by 
another Great Power’ (meaning the US) and that Britain would allow the 
discussion to take its course and not oppose the US initiative.34 At the 
Paris Peace Conference British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin echoed 
Attlee’s view. He told a Hungarian government delegation that he had 
originally supported the US proposal for an adjustment of the Trianon 
frontier, but had decided it was pointless to press the issue in view of the 
Soviet position. Bevin hoped, however, that an adjustment could be 
arranged after the Peace Treaty had been signed and the Romanian 
elections had taken place. The British Foreign Secretary said that if the 
31 PRO FO 371, 59025, R9242, Minute by Hayter, 17 June 1946. 
32 PRO FO 371, 59025, R9283, Record of meeting between Hungarian Government 
delegation and unnamed Foreign Office Minister, 21 June 1946. 
33 PRO FO 371, 59025, R9283, Record of meeting between Hungarian Government 
delegation and British Prime Minister Attlee, 21 June 1946; PRO FO 371, 59099, 
R7207, Undated minute referring to Hungarian-Romanian frontier; Minute by 
Williams, 10 April 1946. 
34 PRO FO 371, 59025, R9283, Despatch, Foreign Office to Lord Hood, British 
Delegation to Paris Peace Conference, 22 June 1946. 
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frontier question came on the agenda, Britain would be sympathetic to 
adjustments.35 
The wording of the reference to Transylvania in the Peace Treaty was 
contentious. The final version read simply The decision of the Vienna 
Award of August 30 1940 is declared null and void. The frontier existing 
between Hungary and Romania on January 1st 1938 is hereby restored’.36 
Earlier drafts, however, contained additions to this. In a version which the 
US objected to, the sentence continued ‘the whole of Transylvania thus 
being included in the territory of Roumania’. An American proposal for an 
additional sentence — ‘nevertheless the Allied and Associated powers 
would be prepared to recognize any rectification of the Roumanian- 
Hungarian frontier that may subsequently be mutually agreed between the 
parties directly concerned and which would substantially reduce the 
number of persons living under alien rule’ — was rejected by the Soviets. 
The British objected to the concluding part of the sentence: ‘and which 
would substantially reduce the number of persons living under alien rule’. 
An earlier American draft to which the British objected (despite the 
formula having been endorsed by Attlee the previous June), on the grounds 
that it would provoke perpetual disputes, read: ‘The decisions of the 
Vienna Award of 30 August 1940 are declared null and void without 
prejudice, however, to direct negotiations between the Governments of 
Rumania and Hungary looking toward an adjustment of the frontier, which 
would substantially reduce the number of persons living under alien 
rule.’37 Nevertheless, in 1947 the British Foreign Office had still not 
entirely ruled out the idea of negotiations between the two countries. 
London was willing to authorize its representative in Bucharest to inform 
the Romanian government that Britain welcomed the Hungarian initiative 
to open negotiations. The qualification which in practice killed the idea 
was that the Foreign Office was only prepared to take this step if the US 
and Soviet representatives in Bucharest made similar statements to the 
Romanian Government.38 
35 PRO FO 371, 59025, R9565, Record of meeting at George V Hotel, Paris, 
between British Foreign Secretary Bevin and Hungarian Government Delegation, 
August 1946. 
36 PRO FO 371, 59099, R7207, Undated minute referring to Hungarian-Romanian 
frontier. 
37 Ibid.; PRO FO 371, 59145, R6146, Draft statement on the Hungarian-Romanian 
frontier for the Romanian Peace Treaty tabled by the US; Minute by Gladwyn Jebb, 
13 April 1946; Minute by Marjoribanks, 17 April 1946. 
38 PRO FO 371, 67215, R935, Foreign Office note to US State Department, 10 
January 1947. 
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Romanian documents in the Foreign Ministry Archive in Bucharest 
emphasize the effect which the British and American attitude to 
Transylvania had in pushing the Romanian Foreign Ministry, under the 
control of Gheorghe Tatarescu, closer to the Soviet Union. On 1 April 
1946, Richard Franasovici, the Romanian charge in London, reported a 
lunch with the US expert on South-East Europe at the Foreign Ministers’ 
meeting. Franasovici correctly deduced from this conversation that the 
Americans definitely favoured a change in the Trianon frontier but did not 
attach great importance to achieving this. He also assumed that the British 
position was the same as the American. Franasovici referred to information 
supplied by the Soviet Ambassador in London, which helped him to 
deduce the Anglo-American position. On 10 April, Franasovici reported 
that the Soviet Ambassador told him that Transylvania had not been 
discussed at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference the previous day. In earlier 
telegrams, Franasovici had reported being given the cold shoulder by the 
British — Bevin would not see him — and on 30 March, he had reported 
that in view of the delay in being received by Bevin, he unofficially visited 
the Soviet Ambassador: ‘I was received extremely cordially’, wrote 
Franasovici, ‘and he offered me all his help’.39 
On 11 Apnl, Franasovici reported a conversation with Sir Onne 
Sargent, which demonstrates the uncertainty of the British position on 
Transylvania. Sargent began by saying he hoped for a revival of 
commercial relations ‘to which’, wrote the Romanian charge, ‘they [the 
British] attach great importance’. Sargent added that the Romanian treaty 
‘did not present great difficulties’ which prompted Franasovici to deduce 
that in fact Britain was not thinking in terms of a change in the 
Transylvanian frontier. ‘In general, it was a more cordial meeting than that 
with Hayter, the head of the South-East European section’, wrote 
Franasovici. (Hayter had been an advocate of supporting the American line 
on Transylvania.)40 Franasovici went on, however, to refer to the 
difficulties which he was having in doing his job because of the cold 
shoulder which he was being given by Bevin and other members of the 
British government. On 17 April he reported on the ‘cold attitude which 
England has towards us, an attitude which I feel in every moment’.41 
39 Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Fond Conferinta de Pace de la Paris, 
vol. 69, Telegrams, Franasovici to Romanian Foreign Ministry, 1 April 1946 and 
10 April 1946. 
40 Ibid., Telegram, Franasovici to Romanian Foreign Ministry, 11 April 1946; PRO 
FO 371, 59097, R3199, Minute by Hayter, 28 February 1946. 
41 Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Fond Conferinta de Pace de la Paris, 
vol. 69, Telegrams, Franasovici to Romanian Foreign Ministry, 11 April 1946 and 
17 April 1946. 
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On 12 April, the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow reported that the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry had informed him of the requests of the Hungarian 
delegation, which was then visiting Moscow, for the cession of 24,000 
square kilometres of territory. A senior official in the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry assured the Romanian Ambassador that the Soviet Union would 
not change its position and would continue to support the Romanian 
viewpoint. On 15 April, in response to information from an unknown 
source that the British and Americans also supported the cession of 24,000 
square kilometres to Hungary, Romanian Foreign Minister Tatarescu 
asked Franasovici to find out ‘through our friend’ about the possible 
boundaries and other conditions which would apply to the cession. 
Although the telegram does not make clear who ‘our friend’ is, it almost 
certainly refers to the Soviet Ambassador in London. On 16 April, the 
Romanian charge in London reported that he had the impression that the 
Americans would drop their position on Transylvania ‘in the face of a 
decisive Soviet resistance’ in return for other concessions. On 17 April, 
however, he noted that the Hungarian head of mission in London had been 
received relatively quickly, more quickly than, for example, his Finnish 
counterpart.42 Even in August 1946, after the decision on Transylvania had 
been taken at the Peace Conference, the British and American 
equivocation over the issue was still influencing the attitude of Romanian 
diplomats. On 4 August, the Romanian Ambassador in The Hague 
reported a meeting with his Soviet counterpart at which the Romanian 
requested and received an assurance that no change would be made to the 
decisions taken in May regarding Transylvania.43 
The close contact between the Romanian Legation in London and the 
Soviet Embassy is significant, given that at this stage the Romanian 
diplomatic service was by no means staffed entirely by Communists. 
Although a purge took place on 6 March 1946, it was only after Ana 
Pauker took over from Tatarescu as Foreign Minister in November 1947 
that the Communists established firm control of the service and ousted 
those not deemed to be fully loyal to the new administration. Prior to this, 
many high-ranking Romanian diplomats belonged to the Tatarescu clique, 
many of whom had links with the deposed King Carol.44 While the 
42 Ibid., Telegrams, Franasovici to Romanian Foreign Ministry, 12 April 1946, 15 
April 1946, 16 April 1946 and 17 April 1946. 
43 Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Fond Conferinta de Pace de la Paris, 
vol. 70, Telegram, Stoica [Romanian Head of Mission in The Hague] to Romanian 
Foreign Ministry, 4 August 1946. 
44 D. Deletant, ‘New Light on Gheorghiu-Dej's Struggle for Dominance in the 
Romanian Communist Party’, Slavonic and East European Review, 73, 1995, 4, 
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Tatarescu clique represented an opportunistic element within Romanian 
political life, it was not pro-Communist as such. This point is illustrated by 
correspondence between the Romanian Legation in London and the 
Foreign Ministry in Bucharest concerning an article in the Daily Worker 
critical of Bevin. The article referred to the fact that Bevin had not seen 
Franasovici but had seen Grigore Gafencu. In his report to Tatarescu, 
Franasovici pointed out that Gafencu and Bevin had actually met at the 
theatre and not officially, and went on to describe the efforts he had made 
to persuade the Foreign Office that the article had not been inspired by the 
Romanian Legation. Franasovici thought that it had been inspired by 
Romanian Communist circles in London. Although Franasovici’s word is 
not necessarily reliable, it is unlikely that he would have had any motives 
for lying to Tatarescu in a diplomatic report.45 It is therefore not 
unreasonable to speculate that had the British and Americans supported 
the restoration of the Trianon frontier from the outset, Romanian diplomats 
might have been less inclined to cultivate such a close and even dependent 
relationship with their Soviet counterparts. The wisdom of the British 
attitude to the Romanian Legation in London is also questionable. While 
the Legation obviously represented a government of which Britain 
disapproved (although by 1946 it had been recognized under the Moscow 
Agreement), it might have been more subtle to recognize the difference 
between Romanian diplomats, most of whom owed their allegiance to 
Tatarescu, and the Communists who were behind the activities of the 
Romanian Government. While the British Foreign Office was right to be 
under no illusions about the personal integrity of these people, there were 
nevertheless good reasons, based on self-interest, for Tatarescu’s 
diplomats to oppose the complete Sovietization or Communization of 
Romania. There were large-scale resignations among Romanian diplomats 
abroad following the replacement of Tatarescu by Pauker in November 
1947 and after the forced abdication of King Michael on 30 December 
1947. 
The British authorities failed to appreciate fully the emotiveness of the 
Transylvanian issue for Romanians. ‘This question of Transylvania seems 
to be very much on the minds of the Roumanians and of our mission in 
Bucharest’, Williams wrote in April 1946.46 London’s vague promises to 
take Romanian views into account were not enough to satisfy the strong 
pp. 659-90 (684); G. lonescu, Communism in Rumania, London, 1964, p. 141; H. 
L. Roberts, Political Problems of an Agrarian State, London, 1951, p. 309. 
45 Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Fond Conferinta de Pace de la Paris, 
vol. 69, Telegrams, Franasovici to Romanian Foreign Ministry, 18 April 1946. 
46 PRO FO 371, 59145, R5227, Minute by Williams, 4 April 1946 
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feelings on the subject. The issue was a particularly important one for 
Romanians at this time, since their armies had suffered heavy casualties in 
Transylvania’s reconquest.47 The possibility of cultivating influence in 
Hungary, which appeared less likely to fall under Soviet control, may have 
been one argument in favour of a policy of supporting revision. Such an 
approach, however, would have been out of kilter with the general 
Western policy at this time of trying to reach an accommodation with the 
Soviet Union. Once the Groza government had been imposed in March 
1945, Moscow was in favour of restoring the Trianon frontier with 
Hungary and was not prepared to compromise. Ultimately neither Britain 
nor the US were prepared for an altercation with the Soviet Union over the 
issue. As William Hayter, the Assistant Head of the Foreign Office 
Southern Department eventually recognized, it would therefore have been 
better for the idea of revision of the Trianon frontier to have been dropped. 
Moreover, Britain did not regard Hungary as a priority for the cultivation 
of Western influence any more than Romania. Sir Onne Sargent had 
appeared to suggest in his July 1945 paper Stocktaking after VE Day that 
Britain would have to acquiesce in Soviet domination of Romania and 
Hungary in order to prevent the subjugation of Bulgaria.48 The main 
motive for Britain’s equivocal position over the Romanian-Hungarian 
frontier was maintaining faith with Washington in order to secure US 
support for the protection of the Danube as an international waterway. The 
trade-off was, however, counter-productive. The uncertain Western 
position over the frontier issue pushed Romania closer to the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, once the Sovietization of Romania had taken place, the 
Danube in any case came under the control of the Communist Bloc. By 
1949, Hungary too had been lost to the Western world, in spite of US 
support for revisionism and Britain’s equivocal stance on the issue. 
The case for changing the frontier in Hungary’s favour, as set out by 
Professor Macartney, rested on a misguided belief that this in itself would 
create greater stability in the region. In practice, a change would at best 
have done nothing to improve inter-ethnic relations and at worst would 
have generated considerable hardship and possibly tension, particularly if 
Macartney’s drastic idea of moving the centuries-old Sekler community 
into Hungary had been put into effect. Population transfers would have 
destroyed the whole culture of Transylvania, which is enriched by its 
diverse ethnic groups. In practice, the only long-term solution was and is 
47 PRO FO 371, 59146, R6443, Kingdom of Roumania, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Memorandum on the Militaiy and Economic Contribution of Roumania to the 
War against Germany and Hungary, Bucharest, 1946, pp. 13-15; Despatch, 
Holman to Foreign Office, 19 April 1946. 
48 G. Ross. The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 209-16. 
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for Hungarian-Romanian political, economic and cultural relations to be as 
close as possible in order to reduce the importance of the frontier. The 
policy was advocated by Nicolae Titulescu, the former Romanian Foreign 
Minister, in the 1930s, and was supported in the 1940s by British officials 
like Le Rougetel and Marjoribanks who had served in Romania. While the 
Groza government supported Hungarian-Romanian co-operation purely to 
serve the interests of its masters in the Kremlin, it was unfortunate that 
more British and particularly US officials did not recognize that the policy 
in itself was meritorious, despite the cynical motives of those who 
advocated it. Had Britain and the US concentrated on promoting genuine 
Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation, rather than on the inevitably divisive 
issue of the border, Western influence in both Hungary and Romania might 
have been preserved for longer. 

The Repression of the Gheorghiu-Dej Era in the 
Light of the Securitate Files 
Dennis Deletant 
Since the fall of Communism in Romania, opposition voices have 
maintained that the SRI is, if not a crypto-Securitate, then the successor to 
the Securitate. In an effort to halt the speculation and accusations, Virgil 
Magureanu, the director of the SRI, took the initiative in 1994 of printing a 
multi-volume history of the Securitate. I say printing because the history 
has not been made available to the general public. The SRI is the first of 
the post-Communist security services in Eastern Europe to produce such a 
study. Its aim, to quote the compilers, is ‘to present sine ira et studio the 
activity of the Securitate, which between 1948 and 1989 was the principal 
Romanian institution empowered to defend the security of the state, and to 
collect and to process information about potential enemies inside and 
outside the country’.1 Whilst recognizing the considerable scale of the 
Securitate’s repressive activities, the compilers point out that ‘the 
documents examined by us also show that the Securitate had departments 
whose exclusive role was to gather and process information relevant to the 
defence of national values’.2 What these national values were is not 
defined by the compilers, yet it is clear from reading the five volumes that 
the primary ‘value’ was, until the 1970s, the maintenance of the one-party 
state under the dominance of the Communist Party. But as the state and 
party came to be identified from the mid-1970s exclusively with Nicolae 
Ceau§escu and his wife, so the overriding objectives of the Securitate’s 
work became the protection of the dictator and his family. 
In selecting their material — and there are almost 3,000 pages of it in 
these volumes — the editors have chosen documents which represent 
several aspects of the Securitate’s activity. The work of almost all of the 
directorates is exemplified, ranging from that of domestic intelligence and 
counter-espionage to penal investigation and foreign intelligence. Much of 
1 Cartea Alba a Securitatii, 5 vols, 1994-96, Bucharest, I, p. 1. 
2 Ibid., I, p. 3. 
Ill 
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this takes the form of periodic reports on departmental activity and shows 
that the bulk of senior officers’ time was consumed with pushing paper. 
Not surprisingly, no foreign intelligence operational files are reproduced, 
that is, material relating to the running of particular operations and agents 
and the information obtained. Information from domestic agents and 
informers, on the other hand, appears in abundance, often in the form of 
‘syntheses’ compiled by regular officers. The eyes of the Securitate are 
permanently vigilant. Even after his release from prison in 1955, the Social 
Democratic Party leader Constantin Titel Petrescu was kept under 
permanent surveillance and his conversations with friends reported back to 
the Securitate.3 The apparently innocuous singer Maria Tanase was 
another subject of eavesdropping: ‘On 5 November 1957, she [Maria] said 
in conversation with her husband in a restaurant that when an occasion 
arose for her to travel abroad, she would remain there permanently’.4 
Of especial interest to the student of the Gheorghiu-Dej period — 
represented by half of the material — are the files describing the 
repressive measures used by the Securitate during those years. There is 
wealth of detail about the arrest, interrogation, trial, and imprisonment of 
political opponents, the fate of political prisoners and the administration of 
jails. Where the compilers have been more coy is on the subject of deaths 
in the jails and labour camps. Glimpses are given as to the scale of 
mortality: in January 1953, a list is given of the 133 prisoners who died at 
work that month on the Danube-Black Sea canal, but of greater use to the 
historian would have been a consolidated list of all such deaths between 
June 1950, when prisoners were brought to the canal, and 18 July 1953, 
the date fixed by the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers 
for the abandonment of the project.5 
Omissions of this kind raise questions about the criteria for selection of 
documents and the reasons behind them, and are likely to persuade those 
who suffered at the hands of the Securitate that what has been left out of 
the compilation is more important than what has been put in. It is a matter 
of regret that, in the accompanying notes to the historical introductions to 
volume two, misleading figures for the numbers of political prisoners held 
between 1955 and 1960 are given. We are told that ‘in 1955, 6,406 
political prisoners convicted of crimes against state security were held in 
jail. In January 1958, their number had fallen to 6,211; in December of the 
same year it rose to 10,125, only to rise again in January 1960 to 17,613’.6 
3 Ibid., II, pp. 529-30. 
4 Ibid., Ill, p. 197. 
5 Ibid., II, Anexa, p. 84. 
6 Ibid., II, pp. 107, notes 75 and 95. 
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The important word here is ‘convicted’. There is no mention in this note of 
the several thousand people arrested between 1949 and 1955 and 
imprisoned ‘for administrative reasons’, the Securitate’s own jargon for 
‘without trial’. The Securitate’s figures state that in 1952, 24,826 persons 
were arrested and there is no evidence to suggest that between 1952 and 
1955 some 18,000 of these arrested persons were set free. Furthermore, 
the compilers, in their notes, do not account for the 6,635 persons arrested 
in 1950 and the 19,236 arrested in the following year; most of these would 
have certainly remained in detention for more than two years, convicted or 
not. 
Despite these inconsistencies, the publication of these documents is 
invaluable for reconstructing the past. They show in several instances that 
the Securitate was aware of its own shortcomings and that senior officers 
sought to address them. This is particularly evident from their efforts to 
round up partisan groups; the Securitate accounts of these operations 
often, although by no means always, bear out what the partisans 
themselves have to say in the memoir literature which has appeared since 
1989. 
It was only after the overthrow of Ceau§escu that details emerged of 
how several small bands of self-styled ‘partisans’ took to the Carpathian 
mountains in the late 1940s and resisted arrest by the authorities.7 The last 
member of the longest-surviving group was not rounded up until 1960. 
This ‘armed anti-Communist resistance’, as it has been called, was a 
spontaneous phenomenon and there were no links between the different 
groups, but they were driven by a common aim, namely not to submit 
themselves to consequences of the Communization of their country. The 
groups, composed on average of between twenty and forty persons, did 
not pose a major threat to Communist power, yet as long as they remained 
at liberty they undermined the regime’s claim to to have total control of the 
country. 
The groups were formed in the villages in the mountain foothills and 
were composed of peasants, former army officers, lawyers, doctors, and 
students. Ill-equipped, they relied on an assortment of rifles, revolvers and 
machine-pistols left over from the war and were always faced by an acute 
7 For a useful sketch of the activity of these partisan groups, together with a 
bibliography, see §tefan Andreescu, ‘A Little-Known Issue in the History of 
Romania: The Armed Anti-Communist Resistance’, Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, 
33, 1994, 1-2, pp. 191-7. This article can be supplemented by first-hand accounts 
from survivors of groups which have appeared in the review Memoria, published 
by Fundatia Culturala Memoria since 1990. For an account of the partisan group, 
led by a forester Nicolae Pop, in the Tible§ mountains in Maramure§, see §tefan 
Bellu, Padurea razvratita, Baia Mare, 1993. 
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shortage of ammunition. They received support from villagers who brought 
them food and clothing and often gave them shelter. The Communist 
propaganda of the period dubbed these anti-Communist partisans 
‘legionaries’, that is, members of the extreme right-wing movement known 
as the Iron Guard, and indeed several of them had been members of it. The 
partisans, however, were by no means exclusively ‘legionaries’, as the 
Securitate’s own statistics show. A report of the Direcfta Generala a 
Securitafti Poporului of 1951 states that the political affiliation of 804 
persons arrested for either belonging to or aiding seventeen ‘mountain 
bands’ (bande din munfi) was as follows: 88 former members of Iuliu 
Maniu’s National Peasant Party, 79 members of the Ploughmen’s Front, 
73 former legionaries, 42 former members of the Communist Party, 15 
members of the National Liberal Party and others.8 According to another 
Securitate report, this time dated September 1949, there were ‘terrorist 
bands’ active in the regions of Craiova, Bra§ov, Sibiu, Ploie§ti, Suceava, 
Gala|i, Oradea, Cluj, Timisoara and Constanta. None of these groups were 
more than twenty-five strong, and most of them had less than ten 
members.9 
The longest-surviving group was the Haiducu Muscelului (‘Outlaws of 
MusceF). Elisabeta Rizea, the only surviving member of the group, has 
given us an account of the early months of its activity, but her arrest 
shortly afterwards means that for the remainder of the story we are reliant 
upon the second-hand versions by relatives of the participants. Many of 
the dates and incidents are confirmed by the Securitate records but the 
8 Cartea Alba a Securitatii, II, p. 82. Most of the members of the partisan group led 
by Major Nicolae Dabija in the Apuseni mountains between 1947 and 1949 were 
peasants who were not, as the Communist authorities claimed, chiaburi or owners 
of extensive properties. Thirty-two persons were tried as members or sympathisers 
of the group at the end of September 1949 in Sibiu and seven were sentenced to 
death and executed on 28 October. Their unmarked graves were identified in the 
Communal Cemetery of Sibiu in January 1994 (see Andreescu, ‘A Little-Known 
Issue in the History of Romania’, p. 191). The memoirs of a former legionary show 
that caution is required in applying the label ‘legionary’ indiscriminately to the 
resistance groups. Filon Verca acknowledges that one of two main partisan groups 
in the Banat mountains in 1948 was led by Spiru Blanaru, a former legionary, but 
points out that one of the commanders of the second group was Colonel loan Uta, 
a prefect of Lugoj county, who had acted against the legionaries in 1939 (Filon 
Verca, Paraputati in Romania vanduta. Mi§carea de rezistenta 1944-1948, 
Timi§oara, 1993). Blanaru and the bulk of his small group were caught and 
executed near Timisoara on 16 July 1949. Uta’s band of thirty partisans fought off 
a company of Securitate troops near the village of Teregova on 22 February 1949, 
only to be caught on 8 March in a skirmish in which Uta died. 
9 Cartea Alba a Securitatii, II, doc. 75, pp. 198-204. 
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latter give a different interpretation to them. For example, these records 
allege that innocent civilians were murdered by the ‘partisans’ who are 
constantly vilified, being termed ‘fascist terrorists’. What is reasonably 
clear from both sides is that the group, which at any one time never 
numbered more than thirty or forty persons, was formed by two ex-army 
officers, Gheorghe Arsenescu (1907-62) and Toma Amautoiu (1921-59), 
in their native district of Muscel in the foothills of the Carpathians. 
According to the Securitate records, Arsenescu had hidden weapons at a 
hermitage in the village of Cetateni in the summer of 1947 and in the 
following spring had set up a ‘terrorist group’ comprising Gheorghe 
Hachenzelner, Petre Cojocaru, Longhin Predoiu, Ion Mica and Ion and 
Gheorghe Pumichescu. Arsenescu spent the autumn and winter in 
Bucharest and it was there, at the end of 1948, that Toma Amautoiu 
contacted Arsenescu with a view to setting up a resistance group in the 
district around Nuc§oara in the county of Arge§. From the recent accounts 
given by contemporaries, Arsenescu seems to have put his faith in a 
general armed insurrection which was to be led by other former army 
officers in the west of the country but which never materialized. He agreed 
to provide Amautoiu with small anus and the latter then returned to 
Nuc§oara with Nicolae Nitu and recruited his brother, Petre Amautoiu, Ion 
Chirca and the village priest Ion Dragoi. In March 1949, Arsenescu came 
to Nuc§oara to join the group and in the ensuing months it expanded to 
include several more villagers. 
The Ministry of the Interior was clearly worried that the symbol of 
resistance posed by the band might be contagious and it was for this 
reason that it poured troops and Securitate officers into the region. Helped 
by their local knowledge of the difficult mountain terrain and by several 
families in the commune of Nuc§oara, notably Gheorghe and Elisabeta 
Rizea, Ion Sandoiu and Ion Sorescu, the group secured provisions and 
escaped arrest. On the night of 18 June 1949, members of the group were 
ambushed as they came to collect supplies and in the ensuing gun-fight 
two Securitate officers, Constantin Apavaloaiei and Florea Lungu were 
killed. The group’s escape under cover of darkness through a security 
cordon thrown around the area resulted in a massive search being carried 
out for them by two army batallions and units of the Securitate troops, and 
in the arrest of families suspected of aiding them.10 
Among those arrested was Elisabeta Rizea. She has recounted how she 
was taken to the mayor’s office in Nuc§oara where she was beaten with a 
heavy stick by Second Lieutenant Constantinescu of the Securitate. She 
10 A. Marinescu, ‘Pagini din rezistenta armata anticomunista’, Memoria, 1992, 7, 
pp. 47-51. 
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was then held in the cellar of a peasant house for four days after which she 
was transported to the prison in Pite$ti. Eighteen months passed before she 
was put on trial. In the meantime she was beaten on several occasions by 
Warrant Officers Zamfirescu and Mecu. She was finally tried and 
sentenced in December 1950 to seven years imprisonment for helping the 
partisan group.11 
After the ambush of 18-19 June 1949, Arsenescu decided to split his 
men into two bands, one under his command, the other under the 
leadership of Amautoiu. The first band, which included Ion Chirca, Titi 
Mamaliga, Benone Milea, Constantin Popescu and Nae Ciolan, based 
itself in the Riul Doamnei valley, and the Amaufoiu band, made up of his 
brother Petre, Titu, Maria and Constantin Jubleanu and Maria Plop, in the 
Vilsan valley. Arsenescu’s band did not survive for long. Milea was 
captured on 1 November 1949 and Popescu and Ciolan suffered the same 
fate three days later. Chirca disappeared without trace. Arsenescu and 
Mamaliga were caught in a trap by the security troops, the latter being 
wounded in a shoot-out while Arsenescu fled from the area and led a 
hermit-like existence in the hills for ten years until he was finally caught in 
1960. Mamaliga managed to make his way to the Amautoiu group. 
Shortly afterwards, in the spring of 1950, this group too was forced to 
split up to avoid detection. One band, made up of the husband and wife 
Titu and Maria Jubleanu, their son Tica and a young doctor. Ion 
Marinescu, were tracked down and in the resulting gunfight Maria was 
shot dead. Titu Jubleanu was arrested but the two young men managed to 
escape, joining the second band, composed of the two Amautoiu brothers, 
Toma and Petre, Maria Plop and Mamaliga. Marinescu and Mamaliga 
were killed in skirmishes with the Securitate in 1952 and the remaining 
four hid out in a cave near the village of Poenarei for several years. On 20 
May 1958, the brothers were deceived by a local man into drinking 
drugged spirits, and after falling into a comatose state were arrested. Plop, 
who in the meantime had given birth, surrendered with her child, but Tica 
Jubleanu refused and shot himself. A sweep of the surrounding villages in 
the district was made and scores of families were detained for assisting the 
Amaufoiu brothers. 
The trial of the brothers took place in the following year. Toma and 
Petre Amautoiu were sentenced to death and executed at Jilava prison by 
firing squad on 18 October 1959, as were the following persons accused of 
rendering them assistance: Nicolae Andreescu and Ion Constantinescu, 
Orthodox priests in Poenarei, Ion Dragoi, the Orthodox priest of Nuc§oara, 
11 Povestea Elisabetei Rizea din Nuc§oara, Bucharest, 1993, pp. 118-25. 
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Nicolae Ba§oiu, Titu Jubleanu, Constantin Popescu, Ion Sandoiu, Nicolae 
Sorescu and Gheorghe Tomeci, all peasant farmers, and the teachers 
Alexandru Moldoveanu, Nicolae Nitu and Gheorghe Popescu. Benone 
Milea was also sentenced to death and executed but Maria Plop received 
life imprisonment and died in jail.12 Others also tried with this group, 
according to the Securitate records, were Ilie Dragomirescu and Ion 
Grigore, arrested on 22 June 1958, Nicolae Vasilescu, arrested on 4 July 
1958, and Ion Dumitrescu, arrested on 6 February 1959. All received long 
jail terms.13 Arsenescu’s trial took place in February 1962, two years after 
his capture. He was sentenced to death and executed at Jilava on 29 May 
1962. His wife Maria and his father Gheorghe were also tried for assisting 
him and were given prison terms of ten and fifteen years respectively.14 
A second notable resistance group was that led by Ion Gavrila- 
Ogoreanu (bom 1923) in the Fagara§ mountains. Gavrila-Ogoreanu, a 
student at Cluj university, formed his group of eleven from his university 
colleagues in 1948. For seven years they tied up several companies of 
Securitate troops before they were captured and sentenced to death in 
1957. Gavrila-Ogoreanu escaped arrest and, with the help of friends, 
escaped detection until June 1976 when he was finally picked up in Cluj.15 
12 Marinescu, ‘Pagini din rezistenta armata anticomunista’, pp.57-8. 
13 Arhiva Serviciulni Roman de Itformatii, Fond D, File 9585, UM 0336 Pite§ti, pp. 
44-66. 
14 M. Arsenescu-Buduluca, ‘Sunt sotia “teroristului” Gheorghe Arsenescu’, 
Memoria, 1993, 8, p. 59. The unwillingness of the post-1989 Romanian authorities 
to recognize that opponents of the Communist regime were the victims of political 
assassinations is illustrated by the following case. In December 1951, Traian 
Murariu, a peasant from the commune of Padureni in the county of Timi§, was 
sentenced to death for sheltering Nicolae Mazilu and Ion Mogo§, two members of 
the anti-Communist group in the Fagara§ mountains. He was executed a year later 
at Jilava jail for ‘plotting against the social order’. In 1992, his daughter appealed 
to the Supreme Court for the sentence to be rescinded. After three years, the court 
informed her that the sentence was ‘well-founded and legal’: Zina, 18 July 1995. 
15 Ion Gavrila-Ogoreanu, Brazii se frang, dar mi se indoiesc, 2 vols, Timisoara, 
1993-5, II, p. 264. Gavrila-Ogoreanu’s arrest in Cluj is tersely reported in a 
Securitate note of 30 June 1976 (Cartea Alba a Securitatii, IV, doc. 136, p. 372. 
Gavrila-Ogoreanu recounts an episode in 1952 which illustrates the motivation of 
the resistance groups: in order to distract the pursuing forces of the Securitate, 
Gavrila-Ogoreanu took part of his group to a tourist chalet near lake Balea. After 
forcing the tourists from the chalet, Gavrila-Ogoreanu addressed them as follows: 
‘Spuneti, va rog, oamenilor din tara ca mai exista un colt din regatul Romaniei, 
care nu §i-a plecat capul inaintea comuni§tilor. §i atata timp cat ne vor sta capetele 
pe umeri, acest colt de tara va fi liber. Spuneti-le sa-§i pastreze increderea ca Tntr-o 
zi toata Romania va fi libera. Rugati-va sa va ajute §i sa ne ajute Dumnezeu.’ (Tell 
everyone that there is still a place in the kingdom of Romania which has not bowed 
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Nothing illustrates more graphically the coercive nature of the policies 
pursued by the Communist regime than its use of forced labour. Just as 
Beria was, at Stalin’s death in 1953, the second largest employer of labour 
in the Soviet Union, so too the Ministry of the Interior in Romania was 
effectively charged with managing part of the economy. Forced labour was 
introduced under the labour code of 8 June 1950. A Directorate for Labour 
Units was set up in the Ministry of the Interior whose task was ‘to re¬ 
educate through labour elements hostile to the Romanian People’s 
Republic’. Cosmetically obscured by the euphemism ‘temporary labour 
service’, which the Council of Ministers was given the right to demand 
from citizens, forced labour was used as an instrument of punishment for 
the thousands charged with economic sabotage and absenteeism. Included 
among their number were the tens of thousands of peasants who resisted 
the forced collectivization of agriculture. The ‘labour units’ were renamed 
‘work colonies’ by a decision of the Council of Ministers of 22 August 
1952 and their administration, like that of the prisons, placed in the hands 
of the Ministry of the Interior. 
As yet, only estimates can be given for the numbers of persons 
deported to the labour camps which were set up under the auspicies of the 
Ministry of the Interior in June 1950.16 It is believed that, in the early 
1950s, 80,000 detainees were held in camps scattered around the country. 
The largest concentration of camps — fourteen in all — was for 
construction work on the Danube-Black Sea canal. These camps were 
packed with prisoners from every walk of life. Members of the 
professional classes rubbed shoulders with dispossessed peasant-farmers, 
Orthodox and Uniate priests with Zionist leaders, Yugoslavs from the 
Banat with Saxons from Transylvania; all were victims of the denial of 
human rights which accompanied this particular part of the Romanian 
regime’s programme of political and economic revolution. 
The construction of the canal was undertaken on the initiative of 
Comecon and approved by the Politburo on 25 May 1949. Its official 
purpose, according to Decree No. 75 of the Grand National Assembly of 
23 March 1950, was to provide the cheapest and most direct means of 
transport by river to the Black Sea by building a canal cutting the 
Danube’s passage to the sea by 260 kilometres. Construction of the canal 
would also help to industrialize the south-eastern comer of the country, 
to Communism. As long as our heads are on our shoulders, this corner of the 
country will be free. Tell the people not to lose faith, for the day will come when 
the whole of Romania will be free. Pray God for it, so help us God): Gavrila- 
Ogoreanu, Brazii se /rang, dar nu se indoiesc, I, p. 304. 
16 Organizarea p functionarea Organelor Ministerului de Interne de la Infiintare 
plna inprezent, Bucharest, 1978, p. 112. 
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would improve the irrigation of the Dobrogea province, thereby increasing 
agricultural yields, and would provide training in new engineering 
techniques to those involved in its construction.17 
But the canal may also have had a broader economic purpose as well as 
a military significance: in respect of the former, it could have served as 
part of a wider Soviet scheme to create an ‘Eastern Ruhr’, for which 
Soviet iron ore was to be shipped through a double canal: Black Sea- 
Danube and Danube-Oder-Rhine; its military rationale lay in the ability it 
offered Stalin to send many small Soviet vessels up the Danube in the 
event of a deterioration of relations with Yugoslavia. Support for both 
scenarios was found in the Soviet decision to give financial backing to the 
project, backing which would not have been given to other Romanian 
economic plans. 
Work on the canal began at the end of summer 1949 on the basis of 
construction plans drawn up by a special Soviet-Romanian commission in 
May. The plans were approved by the Council of Ministers on 22 June 
under resolution 613 and to run the project a board called the Directia 
Generala a Lucrarilor Canalul Dunare-Marea Neagra (General Directorate 
of the Danube-Black Sea Canal Works) was set up. In September, 
Gheorghe Hossu was appointed director of the project, and Mayer 
Grunberg was appointed first assistant director and chief engineer.18 
Before excavation proper could be undertaken, a great deal of preparatory 
work was necessary. This involved the erection of barrack-like wooden 
shacks to house workers, canteens, access roads to the sites, modifications 
to the railways, electrical generators, and, of particular importance, 
measures to remove the mosquitoes which infested the area. Medical care 
was to be provided by one doctor, a health-worker and two nurses for each 
1,500 workers. 
The workforce was to be supplied from three sources: volunteer paid 
labour, forced labour and army conscripts. On 29 June 1949, the Canal 
Directorate requested all ministries to instruct every factory under their 
control to recruit manpower for the canal. There was an urgent need for 
surveyors, mechanical and building engineers, and technicians. 
Administrative persomiel were also required such as managers, and 
accountants, together with support staff such as typists. Among the skilled 
labourers sought were welders, blacksmiths, carpenters, locksmiths, 
plumbers, car mechanics and bricklayers. Recruiting offices were set up in 
17 Doina Jela, Cazul Nichita Dumitru: Incercare de reconstituire a mini proces 
comunist, Bucharest, 1995, p. 28. 
18 A special body was established to supervise the construction of the canal with the 
name Directia Generala a Lucrarilor Canalul Dunare-Marea Neagra: see ibid., p. 26. 
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Bucharest and in the major towns. It was reported that by September 8,960 
persons had been recruited.19 
Both the planning and execution of the canal was supervised by Soviet 
counsellors. The whimpering tone of some of the requests sent by 
Gheorghe Hossu, the director general of the canal, to Shaposhnikov, the 
head of the Soviet commission for planning the canal, indicates that 
relations between the two parties were far from smooth, and to judge from 
a stenogram of a meeting in May 1952 between Hossu and another Soviet 
specialist called Vorob'ev about the payment of bonuses, the latter 
considered himself to be a master rather than a partner.20 
A special newspaper called Canalul Dunare-Marea Neagra was 
printed to instil enthusiasm into the workforce. Initially, it appeared as an 
eight-page weekly, but later appeared two or three times a week. In its first 
edition, of 3 September 1949, it took up a speech of Ana Pauker, given on 
the eve of 23 August, the national holiday, in which she saluted the plan 
for the canal which ‘we will build without the bourgeoisie and against it’. 
In fact, this slogan was hung from a pole in front of the canteen on the site 
at Cemavoda. Pauker’s threatening tones constrasted with the idyllic, 
exalted character of the other articles in this issue, one of which reported 
the ceremonial handing-over of a library and a radio to the workers on the 
sites at Poarta Alba and Canara. The library, it said, numbered almost a 
thousand volumes, ‘many of which were works of Soviet literature’. The 
festive occasion was crowned by the singing of the International and the 
showing of a Soviet film. 
Another article laid down the tasks of the ‘agitator’, as he was termed. 
These were to read out loud the party newspaper Scinteia in the evening in 
the dormitory, to get the labourers to listen to the radio in a group, to 
concoct suitable slogans to inspire the workforce, to encourage workers in 
the surrounding villages to give support to the canal labourers, and last, but 
probably not least, to umnask saboteurs. The charge of sabotage against 
unfortunate scapegoats came to be used with increasing frequency in an 
attempt to cover up a lack of planning which became all too evident in 
most areas. 
The canal files are revealing: insufficient on-site accomodation meant 
that many workers were forced to sleep either in or under carts; the 
unasphalted tracks exacted a heavy toll on lorry tyres, which continually 
exploded, and there was a shortage of facilities for reparing inner-tubes. 
19 On 9 August 1949, the DGC sent in a request to the Ministry of Trade and Food 
for 28,500 kilos of salted bacon for the workforce. At the same time, a large 
number of Ziss lorries were ordered from the State Planning Committee. 
20 Jela, Cazul Nichita Dumitru, p. 31. 
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Medical care was administered from peasant houses due to a lack of 
clinics. Feeding the huge force of voluntary workers not only posed 
logistical problems but placed an enormous strain on the resources of the 
Dobrogea region. A report from the Ministry of Industry dated 26 
September 1949 expressed alarm that between 600 and 800 sheep were 
being slaughtered daily to feed the workers on the canal. These sheep were 
prized for their wool and the Ministry recommended that sheep from other 
parts of the country who gave poorer quality wool be slaughtered in their 
place.21 
It is now possible to give more exact figures about the number of 
political prisoners exploited on this project, since some 2,400 files on the 
scheme, held in the State Archives in Constanta, have been opened for 
research.22 Political prisoners were euphemistically termed forte MAI 
(‘labour resources of the Ministry of the Interior’) and were held in 
fourteen camps. By spring 1952, their numbers had reached 19,000. In 
addition, 20,000 voluntary civilian workers were employed together with 
18,000 conscript soldiers.23 The documents in Constanta include 
Securitate material about the technical problems facing the workforce and 
the poor conditions in which the paid labourers were expected to work, but 
there is little material about the conditions in which the political prisoners 
toiled. For these we have to consult memoir literature. 
One eloquent record comes to us from no less a figure than Gheorghe 
Cristescu, the general secretary of the outlawed RCP from 1921 to 1924. 
He spent periods in prison in the inter-war period as a member of an illegal 
organization, and in 1949 he was re-arrested for ‘rightist deviation’. Asked 
by a fellow prisoner at the Capul Midia penal colony — one of the 
fourteen camps supplying labour for the Danube-Black Sea canal — to 
compare the penal regime under King Carol with that under the 
Communists, Cristescu replied that treatment at the hands of the 
‘bourgeois’ Siguranta and their prisons was ‘luxurious’ in comparison 
with that meted out by his comrades.24 The prisoners were poorly fed and 
driven to exhaustion in their attempts to meet the daily quota of digging 
four cubic metres of earth and carting it up a mound with a wheelbarrow. 
Many died of heart failure or tuberculosis. One detainee, §erban 
Papacostea, who had been arrested in 1949 for the ‘crime’ of frequenting 
the French library in Bucharest, was fortunate in his experience at the 
21 Ibid., p 38. 
22 These have been studied by Doina Jela and the results of her research have been 
published in ibid. 
23 Ibid., pp. 21, 148. 
24 Communication from Dr §erban Papacostea, 5 March 1995. 
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Capul Midia camp. Although suffering from a muscular disability, he was 
put to the daily task of digging but was unable to fulfil this norm. 
Expecting severe punishment, he was shielded by one of the guards, a 
Lieutenant Filip, who often helped the prisoners.25 
The conditions under which the conscript soldiers were expected to 
work drove them to protest. Their low morale was the subject of a 
Securitate report dated 1 October 1949. They complained that they had no 
underwear, boots or trousers and this had led them to coin the slogan: 
Armata democrat a, desculfa $i dezbracata (A people’s army [is one which 
is] unshod and undressed). Insufficient food and space in the military 
canteens, unfinished billets, no washing facilities or soap added to their 
misery. They therefore washed in the Danube.26 A report of the following 
day registered workers’ dissatisfaction that they had not received their 
wages. Other reports signalled soldiers’ complaints about their officers 
who struck them when they criticized the working conditions. 
The true reasons for the abandonment of the canal project were never 
made public but the documents in the Constanta archives reveal that bad 
planning played a major part. Work began long before the plans were 
completed and when they finally arrived, it was discovered that the 
original estimates in scale and cost of the construction were 50 per cent 
below the true costs. The geological studies made by Soviet specialists 
were found to be inaccurate, and the machinery imported from the Soviet 
Union was either in poor condition or did not work at all, since much of it 
was brought from the construction sites for the Volga-Don canal and those 
linking the White Sea and the Caspian Sea. Facing huge losses and robbed 
of a major propaganda victory, Gheorghiu-Dej sought scapegoats and the 
Securitate was ordered to organize show trials of workers who were 
accused of sabotage. 
In the summer of 1952, Colonel Mi§u Dulgheru, the head of the penal 
investigations directorate of the Securitate, was summoned to a meeting at 
the Ministry of the Interior. The principal persons present were the 
minister, Alexandru Draghici, politburo member Iosif Chi§inevski, 
Securitate generals Gheorghe Pintilie, Alexandru Nicolski and Vladimir 
Mazuru, a Soviet official, Agop Garabedian, and the Soviet security 
counsellors Aleksandr Sakharovskii, Tiganov and Maximov. Chi§inevski 
ordered Dulgheru to organize a show trial of saboteurs at the canal and 
told him that ‘comrade Gheorghiu-Dej wants this trial over quickly’.27 
25 Interview with Dr §erban Papacostea, 14 April 1993. 
26 Cartea Alba a Securitatii, II, Anexa, doc. 6, p. 13. 
27 Ibid., doc. 31, p. 96. 
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The first of these trials opened on 29 August 1952 in the workers’ club 
at Poarta Alba, some twenty kilometres west of Constanta. Eight engineers 
and two mechanics were charged with carrying out premeditated acts 
designed to sabotage the construction of the canal. One of the charges was 
that they had neglected the maintenance of machinery, including 
locomotives, which had consequently broken down. The accused, having 
undergone long hours of interrogation, confessed to their ‘crimes’. Thirty- 
one witnesses were produced for the prosecution and none for the defence. 
On 1 September, the military prosecutor. Major Ovidiu Teodorescu, read 
out the indictment. The proceedings had, he argued, ‘removed the mask 
from the hideous face of the criminals in the dock; this small number of 
worthless individuals, the scum of society, aided by the British and 
Americans, those cavaliers of crime and the gun, those propagators of 
death and destruction, have shown here their true face’.28 
After expressions of regret for their ‘crimes’, sentence was passed on 
the same day: five were sentenced to death and the other five to hard 
labour for periods ranging from twenty years to life. After the sentencing, 
the party newspaper reported that ‘the working people greeted the just 
sentence with stormy applause’. Upon appeal, two of the death sentences 
were commuted to hard labour for life; the other three were upheld. On 14 
October 1952, Nicolae Vasilescu, Aurel Rozei-Rozemberg and Dumitru 
Nichita were executed by firing-squad somewhere in the Dobrogea. 
To compensate for the withdrawal from Romania of Soviet troops in 
July 1958, and to allay Soviet fears that it might demolish the underpinning 
of the Romanian regime, Gheorghiu-Dej approved the immediate 
introduction of stringent internal security measures in order to maintain the 
party’s control. Amendments were made to the penal code which were 
even more draconian in their remit than the provisions for the death 
penalty enacted in 1949. Under Decree No. 318, of 21 July 1958, new 
crimes attracting the death penalty were defined. Article 9 of the code 
imposed the death penalty on any Romanians contacting foreigners to 
perpetrate an act ‘which could cause the Romanian state to become 
involved in a declaration of neutrality or in the declaration of war’. This 
was clearly designed to deter those who might be tempted by the example 
of Imre Nagy in Hungary who, during the 1956 revolution, proclaimed his 
country’s neutrality and thus, implicitly, its withdrawal from the Warsaw 
Pact. That temptation might prove even greater in the absence of a Soviet 
occupation force. The definition of ‘economic sabotage’ was enlarged to 
include theft and bribery, as was that of so-called ‘hooligan’ offences 
committed by juveniles. By the autumn of 1958, the first death sentences 
28 .Jela, Cazul Nichita Dumitru, p. 193. 
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for the new crimes were applied. The application of these new measures, 
especially that of Decree No. 89 of 1958 which ordered the arrest of 
former members of the Iron Guard, led to a rapid rise in the numbers of 
political prisoners. If in 1955 there were, according to official figures, 
6,406 persons imprisoned for offences against state security (this does not 
include those imprisoned without trial, for which official figures are not 
available), this number had fallen to 6,211 in January 1958 only to rise in 
December of that year to 10,125, and in January 1960 to 17,613.29 
Gheorghiu-Dej’s rift with Moscow, by striking a chord with the deep 
anti-Russian sentiment felt by most Romanians, attracted some support for 
his regime. Drawing on the inherent anti-Russian sentiment offered 
Gheorghiu-Dej a simple way of increasing the regime’s popularity whilst 
at the same time putting a distance between himself and his Soviet 
masters. A series of anti-Russian measures introduced in 1963, which 
involved closing the Russian Institute in Bucharest, eliminating Russian as 
a compulsory school subject and replacing the Russian names of streets 
and public buildings with Romanian ones, signalled the wider autonomy 
from Moscow. With these changes in Romania’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union came a notable shift in the severity of police rule. 
The number of persons sentenced to imprisonment for crimes ‘against 
state security’ (that is, against the one-party state), stood in January 1960 
at 17,613. The first notable decrease occurred between January and 
December 1962, when the number fell from 16,327 to 13,017, as many 
former Iron Guardists were freed. In the next twelve months, following 
pardons decreed by Gheorghiu-Dej in 1963 (Decrees No. 5 and 767), the 
figure fell to 9,333, and in 1964 (Decrees No. 176 of April and No. 411 of 
July) most of the remainder were released.30 The amnesty marked the end 
of an era of political terror which had cost the lives of tens of thousands of 
Romanians, but the instrument of that terror, the Securitate, remained 
intact, unreformed and ubiquitous. The Securitate and its powerful and 
ambitious head, the Minister of the Interior Alexandru Draghici, who had 
held office since May 1952, remained a constant reminder of the past and 
a threat to the future. 
29 Cartea Alba a Securitapi, III, p. 107, note 75. 
30 According to official figures, in 1965 only 258 persons were arrested by the 
Securitate for ‘actions hostile to the state’; in the following year, 294 were 
arrested, and in 1967, 312. 
The Traditional Parties and the Romanian 
Elections of May 1990 
Peter Siani-Davies 
The Romanian elections of May 1990 were the first multi-party elections 
to be held in the country since November 1946. At these earlier elections 
the ruling Communist-dominated coalition, the Bloc of Democratic Parties, 
had competed in a bitter campaign with the three traditional parties of 
Romanian politics: the National Peasant Party (PNT), the National Liberal 
Party (PNL) and the Romanian Social Democrat Party (PSD).1 Held at a 
time when Romania was only just emerging from the chaos of the Second 
World War, the electoral campaign had been marked by widespread 
violence, and it is widely recognized that the actual result itself was totally 
fraudulent. One popular myth holds that the votes of the PNT and the 
Communist-dominated Bloc were merely reversed to give the latter 70 per 
cent of the vote and 349 of the 414 seats in the new Assembly.2 In May 
1990 a broad left-leaning ruling grouping, the National Salvation Front 
(FSN), which had only recently adopted the title of party, was faced by an 
opposition again headed by the three traditional parties. Just as in 1946, 
the latter went to the polls divided, unable to decide on a common 
candidate for the presidential polls or a joint list for the parliamentary 
elections, preferring instead to rely on an informal electoral non-aggression 
pact. The campaign was again marked by violence, although not on the 
same scale as in 1946, and one party, the FSN, won an overwhelming 
1 The expression ‘traditional parties’ is preferred here to the more frequently 
encountered ‘historic parties’ because the latter term has often carried pejorative 
overtones. As, for instance, prior to the 1946 elections, when Andrei Vyshinskii, 
the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, is reputed to have disparagingly remarked that 
the historic parties could be more fittingly termed ‘archaic parties’ or perhaps even 
‘parties which had reached the archive’: quoted in Public Record Office, FO 
371/48550 R4409. 
2 For the reversing of the result in the 1946 election see Keith Hitchins, Rumania 
1866-1947, Oxford, 1994, p. 533. For an alternative view see Stephen Fischer- 
Galati, Twentieth-Century Romania, New York, 2nd edn, 1991, pp. 104-6. 
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victory, gaining 263 of the 387 seats contested for the Chamber of 
Deputies. In 1990 there were also serious allegations of electoral fraud, 
not only from the opposition parties themselves but also from international 
observers who were allowed to monitor the poll. At first glance, the 
elections of May 1990, therefore, provoke a strong sense of deja vu and 
some of the protagonists at the time did often seem to be fighting old 
battles anew. A tendency also existed among some outside observers to 
see 1990, if not as an extension of 1946, at least as a final battle against 
Communism.3 This paper will contend that, although perceptions of the 
past did play a role in determining the events of 1990, overall the elections 
can best be evaluated in the context of the collapse of Communism in 
Romania. 
Under Communism all three of the traditional parties had been 
suppressed and to all intents and purposes had disappeared from the public 
eye.4 But within days of the downfall of the Romanian Communist Party 
(PCR) regime, after more than forty years of enforced quiescence, the 
traditional parties had re-emerged phoenix-like to contest for power once 
more. Indeed, as early as 22 December, the very day of Ceau§escu’s 
overthrow, five venerable survivors of the old pre-war National Peasant 
Party, including Comeliu Coposu, Ion Puiu and Ion Diaconescu, had met 
in Bucharest to reactivate the party and draw up a draft proclamation. This 
was printed later that night and distributed the next morning.5 During the 
following days, the old party seems to have rapidly merged with two new 
groups, with similar political inclinations, which had appeared during the 
revolution: the predominantly youth-based Christian Democratic Party and 
the Christian National Peasant Party.6 After these mergers the National 
3 An American member of an International Republican Institute team (affiliated to 
the Republican Party) when asked to define their mission candidly replied to 
Thomas Carothers ‘We saw Romania as one last chance to stick it to the Soviet 
Union’: see Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of 
Romania, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 37. 
4 Rumours of their activities occasionally reached the West: see, for instance, 
Vladimir Socor, ‘Are the Old Political Parties Stirring in Romania?’, Radio Free 
Europe Research, RAD Background Report/69 (Romania), 22 July 1985, pp. 1-7; 
Vladimir Socor, ‘Three Romanians Reported to have Endorsed Joint Dissident 
Statement’, Radio Free Europe Research, Romanian Situation Report/12, 6 
November 1986, pp. 33-4; Vladimir Socor, ‘National Peasant Group Silenced after 
Human Rights Initiative’, Radio Free Europe, Romanian Situation Report/1, 6 
February 1987, pp. 23-6 
5 Interview with Comeliu Coposu, September 1993. 
6 Judy Dempsey, ‘Romanian Radicals Press Case for Electoral Law’, Financial 
Times, 8 January 1990, p. 2; Vladimir Socor, ‘Political Parties Emerging’, Radio 
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Peasant Party added the epithet Christian Democratic to its historic name.7 
The party was formally re-established on 26 December 1989, at a meeting 
of more than 100 veterans and younger supporters, and a provisional 
leadership was elected with Comeliu Coposu at its head.8 Reports from 
foreign correspondents at the time speak of scenes of chaos at Nicolae 
Titulescu’s old villa, the party’s first temporary headquarters, as elder 
party members mingled with crowds of youngsters. In these early days the 
ranks of the party were also boosted by the return of a number of 
influential exiles, the most important of whom was to be Ion Ratiu.9 
Within a month, the PNJ was claiming a membership of 260,000 and, 
although the veracity of this figure may be questioned, its leaders at this 
time do seem to have believed that the party enjoyed considerable popular 
support.10 When this was coupled with their natural obduracy and a 
conviction that the PNJ was one of the ruling parties of Romania, it led 
them to adopt a self-confident posture in the talks then taking place with 
the FSN over the formation of the Provisional Council of National Unity 
(CPUN) and produced expectations of a high vote in the forthcoming 
elections. 
Although in the first days after the overthrow of Ceau§escu the pace 
was largely set by the PNT, by the beginning of January former members 
of the other great traditional party of Romanian politics, the National 
Liberal Party, had also begun to reactivate their organization. Following 
two earlier meetings, one of which seems to have designated Mihnea 
Marmeliuc as chairman, a committee of initiative was registered on 6 
January 1990. This had eleven members, with an executive of five headed 
by another returned exile. Radii Campeanu, who was made General 
Free Europe Research, 1:7, 16 February 1990, pp. 30-1, quoting from the NPP 
journal Renasterea. 
7 For the sake of convenience and because of historic convention the abbreviation 
PNT has been retained in this work rather than the more cumbersome PNT-CD. 
* » 
8 ‘infiintarea Partidul National Taranesc-Democrat §i Cre§tin’, Adevarul, 29 
December 1989, p. 3. 
9 Posted to the Romanian Embassy in Great Britain during the Second World War, 
Ratiu had remained in exile after the Communist take-over. Subsequently, he 
combined an extremely successful business career with a public role as one of the 
most trenchant critics of the PCR regime. See the brief biographical notes in Petre 
Datculescu and Klaus Liepelt (eds), Rena$terea unei Democratii: alegerile din 
Romania de la 20 mai 1990, Bucharest, 1991, p. 197; and Personality publice- 
politice, Bucharest, 1993, pp. 182-3. 
10 ‘Romanian’s Opposition Cautious about Offer to Share Power’, Financial Times, 
1 February 1990, p. 2. 
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Secretary of the party.11 Although they were slightly less prominent than 
the PNJ in the demonstrations on the streets, by the end of January the 
PNL were gathering considerable support in the opinion polls — in the 
elections they were actually to gain nearly three times as many votes as 
their PNJ allies. 
The third of the traditional parties, the Romanian Social Democrat 
Party, has historically played a relatively minor role in a country which, 
until the advent of Communism, had a limited industrial base and a largely 
non-unionized workforce. After the Second World War, the left-leaning 
Social Democrats were placed in a more ambiguous position vis-a-vis the 
PCR than the other traditional parties. Indeed, the largest segment of the 
party actually joined the Communists in the National Democratic Front, 
before eventually merging with them in May 1946. An important remnant, 
however, under the distinguished Social Democrat leader, C. Titel 
Petrescu, remained outside the Communist-dominated bloc and, instead, 
aligned themselves with the PNL and PNJ. It was as heirs to this heritage 
that some veteran members of the party gathered in Bucharest after the fall 
of Ceau§escu to resurrect the party. Adrian Dimitriu, a pre-war minister, 
was declared honorary president and Sergiu Cunescu active president. The 
party was only to have a modest impact on the political stage in May 1990, 
however, and thus the comments below will be largely directed towards 
the more influential PNL and PNT. 
By resurrecting parties from the pre-Communist past the Romanians 
were following a pattern seen throughout Eastern Europe in the years after 
1989. For instance, within South-Eastern Europe both the Croatian Peasant 
Party and the Democratic Party in Serbia have reappeared as prominent 
opposition groupings. In Hungary the Independent Smallholders Party 
even won a place in the Antall Government after the 1990 elections, but 
since these heady days the party has declined in importance and the 
historic parties that have reappeared have in general had a patchy electoral 
record. By and large, they have been excluded from power in favour of 
either the heirs of the Communists or other newer political groupings. The 
Romanian experience, where the traditional parties immediately became 
the main focus of opposition to the FSN and where the PNT and a branch 
of the PNL are now leading parties in the new post-November 1996 
11 Along with many other PNL leaders, Campeanu had been arrested by the 
Communists in 1947. After his release in 1956 he had worked first as a labourer 
and then in positions of greater responsibility at the Bucharest Roads and Bridges 
Department. He obtained political asylum in France in 1973. See the brief 
biographical notes in Datculescu and Liepelt (eds), Renaperea unei Democratii, 
p. 196, and Personality publice-politice, p. 29. 
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coalition government, is something of an exception to the general rule. In 
looking for an explanation for this several factors would seem to play a 
role. 
First, both the PNL and the PK\ had particularly strong identities 
rooted in a history that had seen both closely aligned with state-building in 
Romania. The PNL had played a leading role in Romanian politics ever 
since its foundation in 1875 and the PNJ had its roots in the old Romanian 
National Party of Transylvania. The strength of these traditions was 
sufficient to strike an evocative chord within a section of the electorate in 
1990. Some members even seemed to have joined the resurrected parties, 
not so much out of any ideological conviction, but because of past links — 
if not on their own part, then on the part of their parents. Indeed, it might 
be said that for some membership was almost a means of expunging the 
past and honouring the memory of their forebears. Through their own 
careers the new leaders of the traditional parties underlined this sense of 
continuity. Radu Campeanu, the first post-revolution Liberal leader, was 
the son of a PNL Prefect of Dambovita and had been a prominent ‘Young 
Liberal’ before the war, while Comeliu Coposu, the undisputed leader of 
the PNJ until his death, had been a personal secretary of Iuliu Maniu, the 
party’s famous leader in the pre-Communist period. This background gave 
Coposu an unchallenged legitimacy as leader of his party despite his age 
and this was to be an important factor in maintaining the cohesion of the 
PNJ, immunizing it from the suicidal fracturing of other groups such as the 
Liberals.12 Although it may have helped the cause of party unity, however, 
his advanced age, and that of many other senior leaders, was not without 
electoral cost. It led to jibes about a gerontocracy which did not aid the 
party’s cause in what is, fundamentally, a youthful society. 
The second factor which led to the traditional parties’ becoming the 
main focus of opposition in 1990 was the absence of any other credible 
alternatives to the FSN during the first months after the revolution. To a 
large extent this was due to the degree of coercion exerted by the 
Ceau§escu regime, which had effectively prevented the growth of any 
opposition movement that might have possibly sought the mantle of 
leadership after the revolution. Thus, although a large number of other 
political parties did rapidly emerge — seventy-five stood in the elections 
— the vast majority were little more than hollow shells that served as 
platforms for their often vociferous spokesmen. The vagueness of their 
policies and a lack of knowledge about their past activities meant that the 
Romanian public in general were to remain deeply suspicious of these 
12 For a profile of Coposu see Tom Gallagher, ‘Old Man of Romanian Politics’, 
Transition, 12 May 1995, pp. 9-11. 
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‘unknowns’ who wished to proclaim themselves as leaders. This left the 
political spotlight firmly fixed on the three more recognizable political 
entities of the traditional parties. 
Thirdly, amongst some of the population — and especially the young 
people who had been prominent on the streets during the revolution — the 
FSN rapidly came to be seen as little more than a neo-Communist 
organization. Disenchanted, these revolutionaries began to turn towards 
the traditional parties which, with their impeccable anti-Communist 
credentials, seemed better to embody the ‘true’ spirit of the revolution. 
This was particularly true of the PNJ which, after the Second World War, 
had refused all blandishments to participate in the ‘bogus coalition’ of 
Petru Groza and had been at the heart of the resistance to the Communist 
take-over. As a consequence, following the arrest of Iuliu Maniu and other 
senior members in 1947, it had been officially dissolved and banned.13 
This tradition of resolute anti-Communism and refusal to compromise was 
fully embraced by the ‘new’ leaders of the party, many of the more elderly 
of whom, like Coposu, had endured long terms in jail and suffered great 
persecution during the preceding forty years. Their intransigence was also 
buoyed by the myth that the party had been the real victor of the 1946 
election, only to be robbed of power when the Communists reversed the 
vote.14 This not only produced a belief that the party had a legitimate right 
to accede to power, once the Communist regime fell, but it also cast the 
last forty years of Romanian history as an illegal and disastrous 
interregnum, the malign effects of which could only be expunged by the 
return of a PNJ government. 
This anti-Communist position, however, whilst proving undeniably 
popular with the more implacable foes of the past regime, was also 
something of a double-edged sword. For most Romanians everyday 
existence under Communism had entailed some degree of compromise, 
however small this might have been, and this made few so free of sin as to 
be able to cast the first stone. The edge was also taken off the PNJ’s anti- 
Communist rhetoric — especially as regards its attempts to tar its FSN 
opponents — by the fact that within Romania the dominant public 
perception of the previous regime was that it had been Ceau$escu’s 
personal dictatorship; the view that it was a Communist dictatorship 
appears to have been only secondary. For many the death of Ceau§escu 
13 ‘Salami tactics’ only netted the relatively insignificant Anton Alexandrescu, whilst 
the only dissident voice of any stature within the party, Dr Lupu, continued to keep 
his own council. Maniu was later to die in jail. 
14 For the reversing of the result in the 1946 election see Hitchins, Rumania 1866- 
1947, p. 533. 
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could be equated with the death of the previous regime, and this 
perception was encouraged by the leaders of the Front, many of whom 
were former Communists. By building on this belief and emphasizing their 
performance during the revolution, they were able to slough off the stigma 
of their Communist past in the eyes of most of the population. The new 
leadership was also helped in this task by the fact that, by the time of the 
elections, the chief concerns of the population had already shifted away 
from fears of a return of Communism to more everyday issues, such as 
general living standards and the increasing threat of unemployment. 
The position of the PNL, in keeping with the party’s traditions, was 
never quite so uncompromising as that of its PNJ ally. Prior to the 
Communist take-over it had been in office for much of Romania’s history 
as an independent state, breeding an expectation of power and a feeling 
that it was the natural party of government. This belief appears to have 
often prompted a greater readiness to compromise and participate in 
governments of various political hues 6 an impulse which can most 
charitably be interpreted as a desire to serve the nation. The most recent 
and significant example of this practice was the participation of Gheorghe 
Tatarescu in the post-war Communist-dominated Groza government. 
These natural tendencies towards compromise may have been reinforced 
in 1990 by the fact that the party had fared badly in the 1946 elections — 
older members can remember Bratianu, the leader of the party, being 
ashen-faced when he heard the result — and so had possessed no myth of 
victory to sustain itself during the long years of Communism. During this 
time, the PNL disappeared as a political entity, with many of its members 
suffering as much as those of the PNT. But, unlike the PNT, the PNL was 
never formally dissolved and banned. Instead, it appears to have just 
‘faded away’, leaving the party in a far more ambiguous position vis-a-vis 
the Communist past than the PNT. These factors all combined to give the 
PNL in 1990 a slightly less belligerently anti-Communist air than the PNT. 
Radu Campeanu, in particular, seems to have favoured the idea that the 
party should occupy a distinct position in the centre of Romanian politics 
between the former Communists of the FSN and the PNJ. The PNL’s 
tradition of alliance-building coincided well with the initial desire of the 
Front to build the broadest of coalitions and, shortly after the revolution, a 
number of party members entered the new administration. Most 
prominently, Mihnea Marmeliuc became Minister for Labour and Social 
Security, but Nicolae Grigorescu was installed as an advisor to the Prime 
Minister and Campeanu himself was later to be one of the Front’s 
nominees for the Executive Bureau of the Provisional Council of National 
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Unity (CPUN).15 Conspicuously, this gesture of support was not extended 
to the PNJ nominee. Ion Diaconescu. 
Contradictions, however, were inherent in the PNL’s attempt to 
maintain an intermediary position within the political spectrum. Even as it 
was building these often personal links with the National Salvation Front, 
the PNL was also joining the PNT and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
in organizing a series of demonstrations in Bucharest and other major 
cities to protest at the Front’s decision to participate in the forthcoming 
elections. These demonstrations gathered substantial public support and at 
first it did seem that this recourse to the politics of the streets would pay 
dividends, since shortly afterwards the Front announced the formation of 
the CPUN and with it a place for the traditional parties within the structure 
of power. At the same time, however, the Front also took measures to 
counter the demonstrations as, following the example of the previous 
regime, it began to mobilize large numbers of worker auxiliaries in support 
of its own cause. In a day of angry violence, on 29 January, these 
auxiliaries attacked the headquarters of both the PNL and the PNT in 
Bucharest, with Coposu only escaping from an intimidating situation when 
the Prime Minister, Petre Roman, arrived to escort him personally from the 
scene in an armoured personnel carrier.16 This day heralded the onset of a 
period of political violence that was to stretch up to the May elections and 
beyond, as rival supporters of the regime and the opposition transformed 
the streets and squares of Bucharest and other cities into the main 
competitive political arena. 
Against this backdrop of growing instability, the FSN, although it 
undoubtedly enjoyed substantial advantages, entered the election campaign 
looking increasingly vulnerable. In contrast, the traditional parties, starting 
from a much lower base, seemed to be growing in strength, with one 
opinion poll in March suggesting that the Liberals might gain 24 per cent 
of the vote. In some quarters there was even talk of the possibility of a 
coalition government, with 15 per cent of the population apparently 
15 But note the disclaimer from the PNL stating that Marmeliuc and Grigorescu took 
office in a personal capacity and not as representatives of the party: BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC), EE/0675, B/7-8:18, 30 January 1990, 
Bucharest Radio, 20.00 GMT, 27 January 1990. 
16 Celestin Bohlen, ‘To an Old Party Chief, the Menace is Familiar’, New York Times, 
30 January 1990, p. A. 12 (Bohlen seems to have been inside the PNT headquarters 
at the time); Nicholas Kotch, ‘Opposition Chiefs Flee Iliescu Supporters’, 
Independent, 30 January 1990, p 1; Victor Mallet, ‘Bucharest Mob Attacks 
Opposition’, Financial Times, 30 January 1990, p. 2; Christopher Walker, ‘Mob 
Attacks Opposition in Bucharest’, The Times, 30 January 1990, p. 9; BBC, 
EE/0676, B/7:6, 31 January 1990, Bucharest Radio, 16.00 GMT, 29 January 1990. 
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believing that the PNL would win the largest share of the vote.17 Yet, by 
the beginning of May, this figure had slumped to just 7 per cent, as only 
the PNL’s most stalwart supporters remained optimistic regarding the 
party’s electoral chances. 
An examination of the 1990 election is not simply a question of charting 
the abject failure of the traditional parties to make any impact on the 
Romanian electorate after the fall of Communism. It is also necessary to 
examine why, after a relatively promising opening to the campaign, they 
fared so badly in the actual polls. Indeed, the performance of the oppo¬ 
sition presidential candidates and parties was not just disappointing but, in 
many instances, downright disastrous. The PNJ, for example, polled just 
2.56 per cent of the national vote for the Chamber of Deputies (Table 1). 
Even these poor results, however, were not without some crumb of 
comfort for the traditional parties. A closer analysis of the results reveals 
that in terms of both the geographic distribution of the vote and the consti¬ 
tuency, the traditional parties were laying the foundations for their future 
electoral success even at this early stage of post-Communist politics. 
If the votes of the two presidential candidates from the traditional 
parties are added together to give an aggregate of the anti-Iliescu vote — 
an exercise which is not without validity given the subsequent coalition 
building between the PNL and PNT — the outline of the geographical 
division that has marked post-Communist Romania is revealed for the first 
time. In every county in the Banat, Cri§ana, Transylvania and the 
Dobrogea, Campeanu (PNL) and Ratiu (PNJ) gained a combined figure of 
10 per cent or more of the vote. In Moldavia, Muntenia and Oltenia they 
fared far worse, generally gaining less than 10 per cent. The only 
exceptions to this rule were the urban centre of Bucharest and the 
relatively developed county of Prahova, along an axis between the capital 
and Transylvania. The aggregate vote of the traditional party presidential 
candidates was highest in the Hungarian dominated areas of Harghita 
(80.43 per cent) and Covasna (67.89 per cent), but they also gathered a 
strong vote in Timi§ (29.85 per cent) and Bucharest (23.28 per cent). 
Outside these areas they scored far less well, with the lowest collective 
vote being the 3.8 per cent recorded in Boto§ani in the far north-west of 
the country. The striking feature about this electoral map is that it is 
17 Datculescu and Liepelt (eds), Renapterea unei Democratii, p. 83. For a less 
optimistic poll see Pavel Campeanu, Adriadna Combes and Mihnea Berindei, 
Romania inainte $i dupa 20 mai, Bucharest, 1991, p. 35. For opinions about which 
party will do best see Datculescu and Liepelt (eds), Rena$terea unei Democratii, 
pp. 91-2, and for talk about a coalition government see Daniel N. Nelson, 
‘Romania’, Electoral Studies, 9, 1990, 4, p. 356. 
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Table 1: Results of the 20 May 1990 elections. 
Presidential % of Vote Total Vote Seats 
Ion Iliescu (FSN) 85.1 12,232,498 — 
Radu Campeanu (PNL) 10.2 1,529,188 — 
Ion Ratiu (PNT-CD) 4.3 617,007 — 
Senate 
FSN 67.01 9,353,006 92 
UDMR 7.20 1,004,353 12 
PNL 7.06 985,094 9 
PNT-CD 2.15 348,687 1 
MER 2.50 341,478 1 
AUR 2.45 300,473 2 
PER 1.38 192,574 1 
Independent 1 
Chamber of Deputies 
FSN 66.3 9,089,659 263 
UDMR 7.2 991,601 29 
PNL 6.41 879,290 29 
MER 2.62 358,864 12 
PNT-CD 2.56 351,357 12 
AUR 2.12 290,875 9 
PDAR 1.83 250,403 9 
PER 1.69 232,212 8 
PSDR 1.12 143,393 5 
PSD 0.53 t 2 
GDC 0.48 t 2 
PDM 0.38 t 1 
PLE 0.34 t 1 
PRNR 0.31 t 1 
PTLDR 0.31 t 1 
FDG 0.28 t 1 
UL ‘Bratianu’ 0.26 t 1 
UDRR 0.21 t 1 
Key 
f = less than 100,000 votes. 
FSN=National Salvation Front, UDMR=Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, 
PNL=National Liberal Party, PNT=National Peasant Party-Christian Democratic, 
MER=Romanian Ecological Movement, AUR=Alliance for Romanian Unity, 
PDAR=Romanian Democratic Agrarian Party, PER=Romanian Ecological Party, 
PDSR=Romanian Socialist Democratic Party, PDS=(Romanian) Social Democratic 
Party, GDC=Centre Democratic Group, PDM=Democratic Labour Party, PLE=Free 
Exchange Party, PRNR=Party of Romanian National Reconstruction, 
PTLDR=Romanian Free Democratic Youth Party, FDG=Germans’ Democratic 
Forum, UL ‘Bratianu’=Bratianu Liberal Union, UDRR=Democratic Union of 
Romanies in Romania. 
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Table 2: Distribution of presidential votes by region. 
Voters (as % 
Region of whole Contribution of each region in % of vote for: 
country) 
Ion Iliescu Radu Campeanu Ion Ratiu 
* ,, 
Banat 7 6 11 11 
Cri§ana 7 6 12 7 
Dobrogea 5 5 2 4 
Moldova 20 23 8 11 
Muntenia 20 22 8 12 
Oltenia 11 12 5 6 
Transylvania 20 17 43 22 
Bucharest 10 9 11 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Petre Datculescu and Klaus Liepelt (eds), Renaflerea unei Democratii: 
Alegerile din Romania de la 20 mai 1990, Bucharest, 1991, p. 115. 
precisely in those counties where the traditional party candidates achieved 
over 10 per cent of the vote in 1990 that Emil Constantinescu gained a 
higher proportion of the vote than Ion Iliescu in the 1996 elections. 
If the votes for the three presidential candidates are broken down by 
region, it can clearly be seen that Campeanu gained most of his votes in 
Transylvania (see Table 2). This was largely because he received the 
support of the majority of the Hungarian community of Romania. Exit-poll 
evidence suggests that 63 per cent of Hungarians voted for Campeanu, 20 
per cent for Iliescu and 7 per cent for Ratiu.18 Outside the Hungarian 
areas, although Campeanu gained slightly more votes than Ratiu in every 
county, the difference between the two was usually not so striking.19 For 
instance, in Bucharest they each gained approximately 11 per cent of the 
vote. 
If the support the candidates of the traditional parties received is 
broken down by age and profession, the first signs of another pattern 
which was to lead to later victories is also discernible (see Table 3). Exit- 
poll findings show a slight preference for the candidates of the traditional 
parties amongst young voters (although this seems to have sharply 
diminished during the actual campaign) and older voters, who presumably 
identified with the pre-Communist traditions of the parties. A general 
picture is also revealed of support for the traditional parties rising with 
levels of education. Proportionally they seem to have gained their highest 
vote from professional groups and from students. Their lowest support was 
18 Datculescu and Liepelt (eds), Renaflerea unei Democratii, p. 140. 
19 Ibid., pp. 113-14 
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Table 3: Voting patterns within key groups 
Group Ion Iliescu Radu Campeanu Ion Ratiu * 
Male electors 81 13 6 
Female electors 85 10 5 
Aged 18-34 80 14 6 
Aged 35-64 86 9 5 
Aged 65+ 83 10 6 
Workers 87 10 3 
Skilled staff 84 11 5 
Professionals3 71 17 12 
Collective Farm Workers 94 4 2 
Private Peasants 85 9 6 
Pensioners 84 10 5 
Students 66 21 13 
a Defined as holder of a higher degree. 
Source. Petre Datculescu and Klaus Liepelt (eds), Renapterea unei Democratii: 
Alegerile din Romania de la 20 mai 1990, Bucharest, 1991, pp. 134-8. 
from collective-farm workers. Amongst this group fears of the effect of the 
introduction of a market economy on their livelihood would have provided 
ready ammunition for local FSN officials. Similar concerns were shared by 
the workers, who also solidly backed Iliescu and the Front, but within the 
more urban and industrialized counties with better-developed service 
industries there were also the first signs of a trend which was to become 
far more important in subsequent elections. Already in 1990 these were 
beginning to show greater support for the opposition than the more heavily 
agricultural counties which leaned even further towards the FSN.20 
In searching for the reason for their failure in the elections, the losing 
presidential candidates and the parties they represented were quick to 
point an incriminating finger at an alleged FSN connivance in widespread 
voting irregularities.21 In making these allegations they received some 
moral support from a number of foreign observer groups who were also 
critical of the election process.22 Suggestions were made that ballot boxes 
20 Ibid., p. 117 
21 See, for instance, BBC, EE/0775, B/ll, 28 May 1990, Bucharest Radio, 13.00 
GMT, 24 May 1990; BBC, EE/0770, C/12, 22 May 1990, Rompres, 22.25 GMT, 
20 May 1990; BBC, EE/0771, Cl/2, 23 May 1990, 15.00 GMT, 21 May 1990. 
22 A US IRJ-NDI joint mission suggested that the elections had been flawed and the 
US State Department later pointed to ‘serious distortions’, see BBC, EE/0771, 
Cl/1, 23 May 1990, Rompres, 18.07 GMT, 21 May 1990; Nora Boutsany, ‘State 
Department Says Elections in Romania Were Tainted’, Washington Post, 26 May 
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had been stuffed and that the extension of polling by one hour, ostensibly 
because long queues of people were still waiting to vote, had merely been 
a mechanism to facilitate fraud. Lingering doubts also remained over the 
actual number of electors. This was officially given as 17,200,722, a figure 
which the opposition suggested was an extremely large percentage of a 
total population which numbered 23,206,720. Eventually, 14,826,616 of 
these electors were to cast their vote in the presidential poll giving (on the 
basis of the official figures) an exceptionally high turnout of 86.2 per cent. 
These figures raised some suspicions, and these tended to be centred on 
the special registration lists which allowed electors to vote in any polling 
station in the country merely on production of an ID card, even if they 
were not on the electoral list. Such an open voting procedure, which was 
partly justified because of the incompleteness of the Ceau§escu-era 
registration lists, seems to have received wide usage. Theoretically this 
procedure could have permitted widespread double-voting, although little 
firm evidence seems to have been produced of such abuses. 
A large number of votes were also ruled as invalid: 3.02 per cent in the 
presidential poll, 5.85 per cent in the election for the Senate and 7.54 per 
cent, or 1,117,753 votes, for the Chamber of Deputies. In subsequent 
elections the opposition was to charge that the invalidation of ballot papers 
had occurred at their expense. In this first poll after the revolution, 
however, the very complexity of the ballot papers, which for the Chamber 
of Deputies were between ten and twenty-five pages long, meant that such 
a rate of nullification might not have been so extraordinary.23 Despite all 
the suspicions of widespread irregularities, actual evidence of fraud was 
hard to gather. The totally overwhelming nature of the victory of Iliescu 
and the FSN made it difficult for the opposition to argue that it had been 
robbed of victory, and they were perhaps aware of this when they began to 
speak in more general terms of an unspecified ‘moral fraud’.24 It seems 
clear that 1990 was not the same as 1946. Most independent observers 
concluded that, although the elections were marked by a high number of 
irregularities, they did broadly conform to the preferences of the Romanian 
people. Significantly, this view also seems to have been shared by the 
voters of Romania, with only 8 per cent in a post-election opinion poll 
1990. See also the views of an Austrian observer in BBC, EE/0771, Cl/1, 23 May 
1990, Vienna Radio, 05.00 GMT, 21 May 1990. 
23 It is interesting to note that this rate of invalidation is far lower than that recorded 
in the more fiercely contested 1992 elections and about the same as that registered 
in 1996, when the opposition won both the parliamentary and presidential polls. In 
1992 the rate of invalidation for the Chamber of Deputies was 12.73 per cent and 
in 1996 it was 6.38 per cent. 
24 Nelson, ‘Romania’, p. 361. 
138 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
stating that they considered the elections to have been conducted in an 
incorrect fashion — a figure far lower than the 17.5 per cent who said the 
result was not as they wished.25 The fact that the vast majority of the 
Romanian electorate considered the vote to have been gathered by fair 
means, as much as the Front’s success in the polls themselves, legitimized 
the new regime. This prevented the population as a whole from 
questioning the FSN’s right to rule, even after the miners’ rampage 
through Bucharest in June 1990. 
Whilst the vote itself can broadly be said to have reflected the 
preferences of the Romanian people, there is little doubt that the preceding 
electoral campaign was marked by unacceptable levels of violence and 
intimidation. Not only was this the dominant image projected in the 
Western media but, inside Romania, most of the electorate also seems to 
have felt that the campaign was unfolding in an atmosphere of social 
tension — although to a certain extent this perception seems to have been 
influenced more by the inter-ethnic disturbances in Targu Mure§ in March 
1990 than by the election campaign itself.26 Prior to the elections, scores 
of incidents were reported, with Coposu claiming that during this period 
two PNJ members were killed, 113 injured and 162 party offices attacked. 
Both the opposition presidential candidates were involved in unpleasant 
affrays, with Radu Campeanu stating that one attack on him in Braila was 
a clear ‘assassination attempt’.27 The opposition alleged that these attacks 
received official sanction, but the extent to which the FSN leadership was 
involved is far from clear. Daniel Nelson has suggested that the leadership 
of the FSN did not support the violence and that they were, on the 
contrary, concerned that they could not track down the culprits.28 Dennis 
Deletant also broadly concurred with this point of view and suggested that 
the localized and largely spontaneous intimidation was in part caused by 
the failure of Front activists to see the opposition as ‘adversaries rather 
than enemies’.29 This is undoubtedly true but it can nevertheless be argued 
that the flames of intolerance were at least partially fanned by the official 
media and the Front press. The FSN had come increasingly to adopt an 
25 Campeanu, Combes and Berindei, Romania inainte $i dupa 20 mai, p. 58 It is 
interesting to note that this is far below the 34 per cent of voters who did not vote 
for the FSN, but above the 14.9 per cent who did not vote for Iliescu. 
26 Datculescu and Liepelt (eds), Renaflerea unei Democratii, p. 54; Campeanu, 
Combes and Berindei, Romania inainte $i dupa 20 mai, pp. 40-1, 55. 
27 Dan Ionescu, ‘Violence and Calumny in the Election Campaign’, Report on 
Eastern Europe, 25 May 1990, pp. 37-42. 
28 Nelson , ‘Romania’, p. 357. 
29 Dennis Deletant, ‘The Romanian Elections of May 1990’, Representation, 29, 
1990, 108, p. 23. 
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exclusionist stance after the breakdown of the initial post-Ceau§escu 
revolutionary coalition. It still claimed to be the embodiment of the 
revolution and, therefore, the voice and will of‘the people’, but from being 
the whole population who rose against Ceau§escu, ‘the people’ were now 
subtly redefined within more selective bounds. The theme was fully 
enunciated by Iliescu in a resounding and passionate speech to Front 
supporters on the 29 January 1990. In this he declared: 
The Front has gained the trust of the people through everything it has proposed 
to do in order to promote a true democracy, the people’s democracy! [...] The 
Front holds nothing more sacred than serving the interests of the Romanian 
people! [...] Our force lies only in the people and the unity of the people 
around the Front is our guarantee of victory!30 
By Iliescu’s definition, ‘the people’ had thus become those who unified 
around the Front, leaving those who chose to escape its embrace beyond 
the political pale, and as the Front leader warned, ‘Anybody who detaches 
himself from the people will represent nothing in this country’.31 
Such an exclusionist viewpoint clearly left little room for opposition to 
the Front in the forthcoming elections, but a considerable proportion of the 
electorate also came to share this view, largely because it articulated some 
of the more dominant strands within Romanian political culture. Historical 
experience, nationalism, the ideals of the village and Orthodox preaching 
on conformism and universality all emphasized above everything else the 
importance of preserving national unity.32 As the ultimate source of 
authority, Iliescu and the Front were able to present themselves as the 
guarantors of this national unity, allowing them to brand any of those who 
opposed them as forces antipathetic to social harmony. The strength of the 
public’s aversion to social discord was fully visible in post-revolutionary 
opinion polls which placed absenteeism from work and the disruptive 
effect of too many demonstrations high on the list of public concerns.33 In 
particular, the beginning of the infamous University Square demonstration, 
which was eventually to be ended brutally by the miners in June, seems to 
have had considerable public impact. Iliescu christened the occupiers of 
the square golani (hooligans) and, whilst the demonstrators afterwards 
bore this name with pride, his description appears to have struck a chord 
with the public at large, who increasingly associated the young protesters 
30 BBC, EE/0676, B/5-6:5, 31 January 1990, Bucharest Radio, 14.00 GMT, 29 
January 1990. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Michael Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics and Society; Political Stagnation 
and Simulated Change, London, 1985, pp. 132-5 
33 Campeanu, Combes and Berindei, Romania inainte $i dupa 20 mai, p. 21. 
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with the opposition parties, seeing both as a serious threat to the future 
stability of Romania.34 
Indeed, in 1990 a sizeable proportion of the public, lacking in 
experience of democratic practices and unaccustomed to debate and 
political competition, seems to have seen the very existence of a multi¬ 
party system as a threat to political stability. In a pre-election opinion poll, 
40 per cent of the population stated that they considered that the chief 
threat to the stability of Romania came from the excessive number of 
political parties (fifty at that time). This yearning for a return to the organic 
solidarity of the revolution may also explain the paradox that at the same 
time as they were giving an overwhelming electoral vote to the Front, an 
opinion poll suggested that the vast majority of the population (82 per 
cent) wished to see a coalition government established. Indeed, instead of 
a competitive election, it would appear that much of the population seem 
to have viewed the May vote as a referendum on the performance of the 
Front, which had been able to guarantee its success effectively through an 
early avalanche of decrees rectifying the worst abuses of the Ceau§escu 
years. There also seems little doubt that Iliescu was a genuinely popular 
figure. On the evidence of the IRSOP/INFAS exit poll, he seems to have 
received the votes of 30 per cent of those who voted for the PNL in the 
parliamentary election and even the votes of 28 per cent of PNT 
supporters.35 
The traditional parties were also placed at a considerable disadvantage 
by the control exerted by the Front over the machinery of state and the 
official media. Radio and television, in particular, were instrumental in 
securing the successful diffusion of the regime’s message, especially in 
rural areas. The traditional parties, along with all the other political 
groupings, were not entirely excluded from the official media. Each party 
was able to get a short presentation on policy read on television, but, as 
one observer noted, these offered little more than ‘cloudy visions of 
Romania’s past ills and future prospects’.36 A programme called ‘Studio 
Electoral’ also allowed the expression of divergent views. All the 
presidential candidates also participated in a mammoth televised debate 
lasting two hours forty-five minutes. This seems to have been watched by 
an astonishing 96 per cent of those with access to a television. Although it 
was described by one Western commentator as ‘a stilted occasion without 
34 For the importance of the golani as an election issue, see Tom Gallagher, 
‘Romania: The Disputed Election of 1990’, Parliamentary Affairs, 44, 1991, 1, 
pp. 85, 91, and the opinion of a French election observer in BBC, EE/0771, Cl/2, 
23 May 1990, Rompres, 14.55 GMT, 21 May 1990. 
35 On the genuine popularity of Iliescu, see Gallagher, ‘Romania’, p. 87. 
36 Nelson, ‘Romania’, p. 359. 
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genuine debate about policy options’, an opinion poll revealed that 90 per 
cent of Romanians, unaccustomed to such debates, seem to have viewed it 
positively.37 There is also some evidence that it had an impact on floating 
voters, with both iliescu and Ratiu recording slight gains after their 
performance and Campeanu a small loss. 
Arguably the greatest impact television had on the electoral campaign, 
however, stemmed from the time of the overthrow of Ceau§escu, when it 
was largely responsible for turning some of the key actors, such as Iliescu 
and Roman, into ‘icons of the revolution’. Through regular appearance on 
the screen, then and afterwards, they had been able to project their 
authority both as guardians of the national consensus and as competent 
technocrats able to resolve Romania’s many problems. They had gained 
the trust of the nation and in opinion polls at the time this was rated the 
single most important factor amongst the electorate when they came to 
decide for whom they would cast their vote.38 In opinion polls measuring 
ratings of public trust and confidence, Iliescu constantly gained a figure 
over 70 per cent, with Petre Roman only slightly lower. In sharp contrast, 
the ratings of leading members of the opposition, such as Ratiu, Coposu 
and Cunescu, were usually in single figures or, at best, in the low teens. 
Radu Campeanu did fare slightly better, scoring a figure over 30 per cent 
in an opinion poll, but he was noticeably unable to translate this into votes 
at the election, when he received only 10.64 per cent of the presidential 
poll, and, as already noted, this was mainly because he was the beneficiary 
of much of the ethnic Hungarian vote. It seems possible that Campeanu’s 
initial higher trust rating was based on his apparent willingness to co¬ 
operate with the FSN regime. Certainly, once he moved into a more 
adversarial posture prior to the elections, poll evidence seems to suggest 
that his trust rating collapsed. 
Generally, although they may have had high visibility in the outside 
world, these opponents of Communism, along with dissidents such as 
Doina Cornea and Radu Filipescu, did not gain the trust of the people of 
Romania. They were thus not in a position to translate their moral standing 
into political capital. Indeed, it might even be extrapolated from the low 
trust ratings received by many dissidents that the much remarked absence 
of dissidence in Ceau$escu’s Romania may partly stem not from the fact 
that intellectuals were not prepared to speak out but from the failure of the 
37 Gallagher, ‘Romania’, p. 89 
38 Campeanu, Combes and Berindei, Romania inainte p' dupa 20 mai, p. 70. The 
second most important factor was an understanding of the problems of the people, 
an attribute for which neither Ratiu’s nor Campeanu’s years of exile rendered them 
particularly suited. 
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general population to respond to their actions due to a political culture 
which traditionally placed a high value on deference and the preservation 
of national consensus. 
The low levels of trust the public had in the leaders of the traditional 
parties, as reflected in the opinion polls, was not just due to the fact that 
the Front was able to suggest that the opposition was undermining the 
existing national consensus. Equally important was the fact that, in the 
traditions of Romanian political discourse, the regime was able to brand 
their leadership as agents of foreign influence and suggest that they 
displayed a lack of patriotism. At the simplest level, this involved little 
more than reinforcing crude stereotypes from the Communist past and 
playing on the fear of change, with often vicious caricatures of the 
traditional parties — both the PNL and the PNT were frequently 
associated with the monarchy and grasping capitalists. At a Front mass 
meeting on 28 January, one speaker explicitly linked the traditional parties 
with the familiar spectre of foreign capitalism, joining this in a rather 
strange juxtaposition with the recently deceased Communism, when he 
announced ‘we don’t want exploitation or Communism and we don’t want 
exploitation from abroad’.39 The foreign contacts of many of the leaders of 
the traditional parties — particularly Campeanu’s and Ratiu’s long years 
spent in exile — were ruthlessly played upon to try and delegitimate their 
position within the domestic political arena. During the same meeting it 
was mischievously charged that the leaders of the traditional parties had 
never suffered the hunger and cold of the Ceau§escu years, and these 
sentiments were later echoed in the Front slogan ‘While we were suffering 
here under Ceau§escu, they had coffee and croissants in Paris!’.40 
Aside from these wider perceptions, other more practical factors also 
explain the relative failure of the traditional parties in the 1990 election. 
Not only were they unable to draw upon the advantages of power, but their 
39 I. Stefan, C. Varvara, Gheorghe Ionita and A. Papadiuc, ‘Doua zile care au zguduit 
tara, duminica, 28 ianuarie: multe nelini§ti §i Tntrebari al caror raspuns nu se va gasi, 
totu§i, in piata’, Adevarul, 30 January 1990, pp. 1,3. 
40 Michael Shafir, ‘Schopflinian Realism and Romanian Reality’, Report on Eastern 
Europe, 2:7, 15 February 1991, p. 35; and for a specific rebuttal by Coposu see 
Mihai Radulescu, Tragedia lui Lucre tin Patra$canu: convorbiri cu omul politic 
Corneliu Coposu, Bucharest, 1992, p. 5. The sentiments of the time were 
graphically and crudely shown in a front page cartoon in Adevarul of 28 January 
1990. In this, a blindfolded ‘ordinary’ citizen surrounded by caricatures of the 
other parties (the PNL is represented in crown and ermine, the ecologists as 
innocent babies and the PNT as old peasants and grasping capitalists) is seen 
desperately searching for the isolated and gagged figure of the Front (dressed in 
the suit of a technocrat). 
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electoral campaigns were seriously under-funded, largely because the 
Front had passed a law preventing political parties from tapping the 
fortunes of exiles.41 Lack of funding and resources meant that 
organizationally the traditional parties tended to be weak, especially in the 
countryside, where they were often unable to find sufficient 
representatives to sit on the polling station committees. Much depended on 
the integrity of these committees, which were not only in charge of the 
voting process but also counted the ballots. They were also responsible, in 
the first instance, for adjudicating any matters of dispute. The electoral law 
stipulated that the president and deputy president of each committee 
should be a neutral non-party figure, with the remaining committee 
members being drawn from the various political parties. With 
representatives of the opposition either not available or, so it seems, 
sometimes intimidated from attending the polls, especially in rural areas, 
the committees appear to have been largely left in the hands of FSN 
supporters.42 In such circumstances, even if the committee resisted the 
temptation to actually doctor the ballot, they were still in a strong position 
to influence what was almost certainly a willing electorate in the direction 
of the FSN. In doing so, both officials and electors were merely following 
the practices acquired during the previous forty years of Communist rule. 
The consequences of the failure of the traditional parties in the May 
1990 election were considerable. They had sought to compete with the 
Front, but their stance had evoked little public sympathy and both in the 
ballot box and on the streets they had been worsted by their opponents. 
With the traditional parties in disarray, other groupings were drawn into 
the political arena to oppose the FSN, the most important being the Civic 
Alliance grouping, which sought to be a voice for Romania’s intellectuals. 
The response of the PNL and PNT to these challenges was to determine 
their immediate political futures. The PNT, under the leadership of 
Comeliu Coposu, regrouped and began a process of coalition-building, 
which led to the party becoming the driving force behind the Democratic 
Convention of Romania, one of the dominant forces within Romanian 
politics. In contrast, for the PNL the 1990 elections were for a long time 
the high-water mark of their post-Communist fortunes. Afterwards the 
party plunged into a suicidal frenzy of schisms which saw it virtually 
41 Gallagher, ‘Romania’, p. 84. 
42 This was what Dennis Deletant found around Pite§ti: see Deletant, ‘Romanian 
Elections’ (see note 29 above), p. 24. See also the comments of an Austrian 
observer reproduced in BBC, EE/0771, Cl/1, 23 May 1990, Vienna Radio, 05.00 
GMT, 21 May 1990. 
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wiped off the electoral map in the 1992 elections.43 The root cause of the 
divisions amongst the liberals has often been ascribed to personality and, 
indeed, too often the vanity of old men out of touch with younger 
generations seems to have been the spur. Internal debates over the exact 
position the party should occupy in the political spectrum and, particularly, 
what posture it should adopt towards both the FSN and the PNJ also 
played a part. Underlying all these disputes, however, there were also a 
number of more fundamental fault-lines which were to tear the party 
apart.44 
First, a division can be traced between those liberals who had remained 
in Romania during the Communist period and those who had fled the 
country and gone into exile, mostly in France. Too much should not be 
made of this divide but, nevertheless, two distinct lines of descent can be 
traced. In particular, those who returned to Romania after December 1989, 
even if they had earlier served jail sentences under the Communists, lacked 
the moral authority of those who had remained in the country throughout 
the whole period. This especially applied in the case of Campeanu, who, 
although he had served many years in jail alongside Coposu, had left for 
exile in France in 1973. This past, although it conferred on him 
considerable status amongst the PNL, also meant that his position was 
never as absolute or as unchallenged as Coposu’s in the PNT. When this 
was allied to Campeanu’s more excitable and contradictory character, it 
made not only his own position vulnerable within the party but also, given 
the tendency in Romania for parties to be identified with personalities, it 
seriously weakened the position of the PNL as a whole. 
Secondly, the composition of the PNL leadership also tended to be 
disproportionately dominated by Bucharest intellectuals. A future member 
of the party, who attended the first meeting of the resurrected PNL after 
the fall of Ceau§escu addressed by Lazarescu and Enescu, both of whom 
were over seventy years old, was surprised to find that, instead of a 
meeting expressly concerned with the reactivation of a political party, the 
gathering resembled more a political lecture. It even contained wild and 
patently unfounded allegations that the party had conspired in the downfall 
of Ceau§escu. With the return of the exiles from abroad, the party 
established a more structured organization and a more serious face but, in 
43 For the process of reshuffling within the various liberal factions see Michael Shafir, 
‘The “Centripetfugal” Process of Unifying the Liberals’, Transition, 25 August 
1995, pp. 49-53. 
44 I am deeply indebted to Professor Nico!ae-§erban Tana§oca, who provided the 
inspiration for much of this analysis of the PNL’s post-1989 fortunes. 
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reality, it remained little more than a club with only a small active 
membership. The traditional image of the PNL as a somewhat aloof party 
of the higher intellectuals and former aristocracy fitted ill with the needs of 
a Romanian society which had been transformed by over forty years of 
socialist homogenization. The result was a party with plenty of potential 
leaders but few technicians and foot-soldiers. This gave it only a limited 
local organizational base, although the party was probably stronger than 
the PlSTf in Bucharest and in certain provincial towns. The preponderance 
of intellectuals did, in general, make the PNL less inclined to take 
entrenched positions and fostered an unwillingness to accept uncritical 
beliefs. Any benefits which may have arisen from this tradition of debate, 
however, were completely obliterated by the resultant lack of 
predictability. Frequent contradictions in policy totally undermined 
electoral support. 
Thirdly, the great families of the PNL have historically constituted the 
political, and frequently the actual, aristocracy of Romania. In 1990 the 
scions of these dynasties once more came to the fore, reactivating the old 
political class. Each of these factions sought representation on the party’s 
committees and in its search to accommodate the past — particularly the 
traditional divide between the Bratianu and the Tatarescu liberals — the 
party was sometimes in danger of ignoring the present. Indeed, matters 
were further complicated by the fact that several laid claim to the Bratianu 
name, including Ion Bratianu, who established a separate party, the 
Bratianu Liberal Union. 
Lastly, by its very name the PNL laid claim to one of the chief 
ideological alternatives available in post-Ceau§escu Romania. Indeed, 
since 1989 at least eight different parties at one time or another have 
appeared with the appellation ‘liberal’ in their name, including the Liberal 
Monarchist Party, the New Liberal Party and the Socialist Liberal Party. In 
the prevailing atmosphere of ideological uncertainty, in which no group 
seemed to offer a clear vision of the future, the appellation ‘liberal’ had a 
certain talismanic quality in drawing supporters, including a number with 
no prior links to the party. The arrival of these often younger people led to 
a certain amount of generational conflict, but this was underscored by a 
more serious ideological rift. For beyond a common belief in individualism 
and property rights, two distinct interpretations of liberal doctrine could be 
found within the party. One, generally espoused by older members, looked 
back to the traditions of the party and the nineteenth-century model of Ion 
Bratianu, which stressed state-sponsored modernization from above. In 
this largely paternalistic vision, which placed limited expectations on a 
populace still thought of as being essentially peasants, the need for 
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authoritative leadership was accentuated. Indeed, some of the adherents of 
what may be considered the Bratianu line have even expressed a sneaking 
regard for Iliescu, who might be seen as embodying this virtue. Competing 
with this world-view was another liberalism, espoused by members of the 
younger generation such as Dinu Patriciu, grounded in the historic free 
market liberalism of Western Europe as interpreted during the 1980s by, 
among others, Margaret Thatcher. In their view, the application of a free 
market model with large-scale privatization would be a catalyst for the 
transformation of Romanian society. After the May 1990 elections, all 
these forces were to combine to drive the Liberals off the main political 
stage as, in an apparently interminable and, to the outside observer, often 
baffling process of reshuffling, the various factions divided and reformed 
in a kaleidoscope of different permutations. 
For the traditional parties the rebirth of political diversity in Romania 
presented great opportunities. In a political landscape in which the Front 
was the only major player, the strength of their past traditions allowed 
them to have an initial impact beyond their actual capacities, but by a twist 
of fate the same history that had thrust them to the fore also weighed 
heavily upon them, circumscribing their horizons and often preventing 
them from fully seizing the opportunities on offer. In 1990 they still did not 
seem to have realized that in order to succeed they had to combine this 
legacy of the past with an understanding of the needs of the present, so as 
to produce a message relevant to the electorate of the day. Only when this 
lesson was fully learnt did they finally find the key to electoral success and 
achieve a return to government. 
Romania’s ‘Velvet Revolution’? The Electoral Victory 
of Emil Constantinescu and the CDR in November 1996 
Peter Siani-Davies 
The general elections of November 1996 were the third to be held in 
Romania since the bloody revolution of 1989 which secured the overthrow 
of the Ceau§escu dictatorship. In contrast to the serious questions raised 
about the conduct of the earlier polls of 1990 and 1992, the latest elections 
were judged by most observers to have been a highly successful exercise 
in mass democracy.* 1 Although concerns remained over issues such as the 
special voting registers and the quality of the ballot papers, the elections 
were pronounced ‘free, reasonably fair and transparent’ by the inter¬ 
national observers from the Council of Europe. Similar verdicts were also 
passed by the observers from the Organisation for Security and Co¬ 
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the US State Department.2 The two 
The author was present during the elections as an OSCE observer in Suceava. He 
would particularly like to thank his fellow observer, Professor Dennis Deletant, for 
generously sharing his findings for this article Thanks should also be extended to 
Stephen Judson and Electoral Reform International Services, who were responsible for 
organizing the UK team of observers for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
1 Concerns about the fairness of the May 1990 poll were raised in Dennis Deletant, 
‘The Romanian Elections of May 1990’, Representation, 29, 1990, 108, pp. 23-6; 
Daniel Nelson, ‘Romania’, Electoral Studies, 9, 1990, 4, pp. 355-66; and Tom 
Gallagher, ‘The Disputed Election of 1990’, Parliamentary Affairs, 44, 1991, 1, 
pp. 79-93. For similar concerns about September 1992, see Henry P. Carey, 
‘Irregularities or Rigging: Romania’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections’, East 
European Quarterly, 29, 1995, 1, pp. 43-66. 
2 For the verdict of the Council of Europe observers, see BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts (hereafter BBC), EE/2762, B6-7, 6 November 1996, Rompres, 15.31 
GMT, 4 November 1996; and for the OSCE see BBC, EE/2761, B/5-6, 5 
November 1996, Rompres, 14.00 GMT, 4 November 1996. The British obser¬ 
vation team, which was part of the OSCE delegation, endorsed this view in their 
short-term election observation report to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
prepared by ERIS. The US preliminary report characterized the elections as 
‘orderly and taking place without significant incidents’: Sonia Winter, ‘Romania: 
U.S. Calls Elections “Orderly”’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News 
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leading domestic election monitoring groups, the Pro-Democracy 
Association and the League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADO), 
also accepted that the elections were broadly sound, although only after 
the President of LADO, Nicolae §tefanescu-Dragane§ti, had first raised the 
possibility of serious irregularities.* * 3 
The success of the elections from a procedural point of view is itself a 
reflection of the growing maturity now apparent in Romanian post- 
Communist politics.4 This increased stability was also evident in the 
continuity to be seen between the elections of 1996 and 1992. In both 
cases the principal challengers for the presidency were the same, Ion 
Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu, and there were only minor changes in the 
main parties contesting the polls. The Democratic Convention of Romania 
(CDR) coalition had seen some minor modifications amongst its junior 
constituents, the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) had 
renamed itself the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR), and the 
National Salvation Front (FSN), after adding Democratic Party to its name, 
had entered a new coalition with the smaller Social Democratic Party of 
Romania as the Social Democratic Union (USD).5 In both the latter cases 
the final removal of the appellation ‘National Salvation Front’, which is 
forever associated with the revolution, and its replacement with a 
designation including the word ‘party’, was not only a symbolic shedding 
(Electronic Edition), 5 November 1996. This appreciation of the polls became 
more positive following news of the victory of Constantinescu: see Sonia Winter, 
‘Romania: U.S. Congratulates Constantinescu’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
News (Electronic Edition), 19 November 1996. 
3 For §tefanescu-Dragane§ti’s concerns voiced on election day, see BBC, EE/2761, 
B/5, 5 November 1996, Romanian Radio, 14.00 GMT, 3 November 1996. For a 
more positive appreciation of the elections from Pro-Democracy see BBC, 
EE/2764, B/6, 8 November 1996, Romanian Radio, 11.00 GMT, 6 November 
1996. For agreement from both groups that, although the polls were marred by 
numerous irregularities, they were basically sound, see Oana Armeanu, ‘LADO §i 
Pro Democratia nu vor contesta alegerile’, 22 Puls, 6-12 November 1996, p. 3. 
4 A number of commentators stressed the growing maturity of the Romanian 
electorate. See, for instance, Michael Shafir’s comments in his interview with Oana 
Armeanu, ‘Un electorat matur’, 22 Puls, 6-12 November 1996, p. 1. 
5 In 1992 the CDR, alongside its main constituent, the National Peasant Party- 
Christian Democratic (PNT-CD), included amongst other groupings the Civic 
Alliance Party, the Liberal Party ’93, the Social Democratic Party of Romania 
(PSDR) and the Romanian Ecological Party (PER). Although the Hungarian 
Democratic Federation of Romania was formally a member of the Convention, it 
stood on a separate list in the election. In 1996 of these parties only the PNT-CD 
and the PER remained, although they had been joined by the National Liberal Party 
and a new grouping, the Party of Romanian Alternative. 
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of the past but also another affirmation of the growing normality of the 
Romanian political process. 
There can be little doubt that the polls of 1996 were a milestone in 
Romanian electoral history. They brought the first democratic change of 
head of state in the country since the foundation of an independent state in 
1859 and saw a ruling government voted out of office for the first time 
since 1937. To the supporters of the opposition in Romania, however, the 
electoral victory of Constantinescu and the CDR was laden with far 
greater historic symbolism than a mere exchange of power. After more 
than fifty years of oppression, they saw it as marking nothing less than the 
final defeat of Communism in Romania. In his first speech as president¬ 
elect, Constantinescu emotionally spoke of his triumph being not only a 
victory for today’s Romanians but also one for those who had endured 
years of suffering under Communism: 
It is the victory of millions of Romanian citizens who have lived and endured 
the oppression of the fifty-year-long Communist dictatorship, by preserving 
their hope for a better life as well as their humanity, honesty and sense of 
justice. It is the victory of the hundreds of thousands of Romanian citizens who 
have endured the cruel repression of Communist prisons without betraying 
their beliefs. It is the victory of those who sacrificed themselves for the love for 
their nation and for freedom, in the harsh years of dictatorship. It is the victory 
of those who opposed in thought, word or deed the raw force of the 
Communist regime, which did not succeed in crushing them.6 
This contention that the elections marked the final defeat of 
Communism in Romania was given added emotional impetus by the fact 
that the main constituent grouping of the victorious CDR, the National 
Peasant Party-Christian Democrat (PNT-CD), is generally held to have 
been cheated out of office in 1946 in the last pre-Communist polls in 
Romania when the Communists falsified the result.7 
The fact that the elections could be interpreted as marking the historic 
end of Communism also gave them a potential special significance for the 
Romanian revolution as a process. The PDSR in all its post-1989 
incarnations, because of its failure to institute major refonns, its style of 
leadership and, most of all, because of the background of many of its 
leaders, has been generally characterized by its opponents as nothing more 
than a neo-Communist holdover from the previous Romanian Communist 
6 BBC, EE/2773, B/6, 19 November 1996, Romanian Radio, 22.18 GMT, 17 
November 1996. 
7 For the reversing of the result in the 1946 election, see Keith Hitchins, Rumania 
1866-1947, Oxford, 1994, p. 533. 
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Party regime.8 Although it continued to claim legitimacy from the first FSN 
administration, created in December 1989, many considered it to have 
betrayed the ideals of the revolution and to have even stolen it from the 
crowd on the street. As his bitter rival, Iliescu, faced electoral defeat in 
1996, Petre Roman, the leader of the USD, spoke of Constantinescu’s 
victory consecrating the true ideals of the Romanian revolution and 
marking the ‘end of its confiscation’.9 These themes were also broadly 
echoed by the president-elect himself in his first speech after the elections, 
when he declared that the Romanian people had at last secured the ‘dignity 
and justice’ promised by the revolution.10 To many Romanian and foreign 
commentators the elections of 1996 were nothing less than the ‘real’ 
Romanian revolution in which the Communist and neo-Communist past 
had finally been swept away.* 11 Indeed, some even held that the elections 
marked the actual closing of the revolution, the latter being characterized 
in this point of view not as a process of change but solely as a political 
struggle between opposing groups.12 
The Electoral Framework 
During November 1996 the Romanian people in fact went to the polls 
twice, for three separate elections in which they chose a new president and 
members for both houses of parliament — the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. The elections took place under an electoral law which was 
broadly the same as in 1992. For the presidential election a French-style 
dual ballot system was again employed, which stipulated that in order to 
win on the first ballot a candidate had to gain the endorsement of more 
than half the voters entered on the electoral register. As this did not occur 
on 3 November 1996, a second ballot took place two weeks after the first, 
8 The PDSR in its earlier guise of the FDSN had once been part of the National 
Salvation Front (FSN), which took power on 22 December 1989. 
9 BBC, EE/2773, B8, 19 November 1996, Rompres, 07.32 GMT, 18 November 
1996. 
10 BBC, EE/2773, B6, 19 November 1996, Romanian Radio, 22.18 GMT, 17 
November 1996. 
11 For this view, see Roger Boyes, ‘Romanians Jettison Past to Elect Dissident 
Professor as President’, The Times, 19 November 1996, p. 13. 
12 For this view, see Nick Thorpe and Julian Borger, ‘Iliescu Bows Out of Office’, 
Guardian, 18 November 1996, p. 10, and the discussions in Cristian Preda, 
‘Sfir§itul Revolutiei?’, 22 Puls, 6-12 November 1996, p. 2. Also Aurelian Craiutu, 
‘Light at the End of the Tunnel: Romania 1989-1996’, paper presented at a 
conference on Democratization in the Balkans, Centre for Mediterranean Studies, 
University of Bristol, 16-18 May 1998. 
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on 17 November, in which the two leading candidates from the first round 
faced each other in a run-off. Partly because of the powers accruing to him 
under the constitution but also because politics in Romania tends to be still 
highly orientated towards personalities, the presidential vote was seen as 
the crucial poll and the touchstone upon which the election turned. 
In order for a person to stand for the presidency 100,000 signatures 
have to be gathered in support of his or her candidacy. In 1996 a 
particularly large field of sixteen managed to clear this hurdle and were 
entered onto the ballot paper. The three main challengers each represented 
the three leading political groupings in the country: Ion Iliescu (the 
incumbent) was associated with the ruling PDSR, Emil Constantinescu 
was leader of the CDR and Petre Roman, the first Prime Minister of 
Romania after the 1989 revolution, headed the USD. Alongside these three 
there were also candidates from all the other major parties, including 
Gyorgy Frunda of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR), 
the first Hungarian to stand for the Romanian presidency, Comeliu Vadim 
Tudor of the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and Gheorghe Funar of the 
Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR).13 There were also a number of 
fringe candidates, including Radu Campeanu, the losing National Liberal 
Party presidential candidate from the 1990 elections, who in 1996 stood 
for the National Liberal Ecologist Alliance, Nicolae Militaru, an ageing 
general who had featured prominently during the revolution and died 
shortly after the elections on 27 December 1996, and the eccentric 
Constantin Mudava, who appeared in the presidential television debate 
sporting an enormous wooden cross and was apparently under the 
impression that he had been divinely chosen to secure Romania’s national 
redemption.14 
Both Chambers of the Romanian Parliament are elected by a party-list 
proportional representation system based on forty-two multi-member 
constituencies. The threshold for representation in parliament is 3 per cent 
and, despite the large number of parties contesting the campaign (sixty-five 
entering the race for the Chamber of Deputies), only six managed to pass 
this limit (see Tables 5 and 6 below). The number of seats in parliament is 
13 For a profile of Frunda, see Zsolt-Istvan Mato, ‘Ethnic Hungarian in the Romanian 
Presidential Race’, Transition, 27 December 1996, pp. 18-19. 
14 The National Liberal Ecologist Alliance (ANLE) comprised the Ecologist Party, 
the Campeanu National Liberal Party and the Liberal Union Bratianu. The exploits 
of Mudava in the campaign prompted Michael Shafir to write: ‘Indeed, it is enough 
to watch wonder healer Mudava on television to start wondering whether one has 
landed in the Kingdom of Absurdity, where playwright Eugen Ionescu would have 
to be born again and start from scratch to catch up’: Michael Shafir, ‘When Humor 
Meets Politics’, OMRI Analytical Briefs, 30 October 1996. 
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not fixed, but allocated in direct proportion to the number of electors at the 
rate of one deputy for every 70,000 electors for the lower house and one 
senator for every 160,000 electors for the upper house. Any increase in the 
size of the electorate is thus reflected in a rise in the number of 
parliamentarians and, with over one million new electors on the register in 
1996, the number of deputies in the lower house has risen from 328 to 
343.15 The number in the Senate remains unchanged at 143. The actual 
distribution of mandates is resolved by a complex quota system in which 
votes surplus to the exact number needed to secure a mandate in a 
constituency are transferred to a national pool, where they are divided 
between the parties represented in parliament according to the largest 
average system. These seats are then redistributed back to the 
constituencies where the surplus was greatest in a highly proportionate 
system, which can occasionally produce startling anomalies.16 Such a case 
occurred in 1996 in the senatorial allocations for Giurgiu, where the 
UDMR was awarded a mandate even though the party only gathered 269 
votes out of the 112,158 cast within the constituency. 
The Media and the Electoral Campaign 
The electoral campaign lasted almost the sixty days stipulated by law and 
was free of major incident or unrest. As in past years, within the towns and 
cities the campaign was highly visible, with all available surfaces 
seemingly plastered with electoral posters, although it was noticeable that 
these were seldom to be seen in the countryside. In contrast to 1992, when 
the CDR had not mounted a major effort in the countryside, all the main 
political groups actively campaigned in rural and urban centres of every 
size. Attendance at meetings and rallies, however, was moderate enough to 
15 Aside from the 328 seats allocated by constituency, fifteen seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies were awarded to minority organizations which gained a certain 
proportion of the national vote. These were: Federation of Jewish Communities in 
Romania, Turkish Democratic Union of Romania, ‘Bratstvo’ Community of 
Bulgarians of Romania, Hellenic Union of Romania, Union of Poles of Romania, 
Democratic Union of Czechs and Slovaks in Romania, the Roma (Gypsy) Party, 
Italian Community of Romania, Democratic Union of the Turko-Muslim Tartars in 
Romania, Cultural Union of the Albanians in Romania, Democratic Union of the 
Serbs and the Carasovenians in Romania, Union of Armenians of Romania, Union 
of Ukrainians of Romania, German Democratic Forum of Romania. 
16 For details of this system, see the editor’s note in Deletant, ‘The Romanian 
Elections of May 1990’ (see note 1 above), p. 26. 
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raise some concern about voter apathy prior to the polls.17 In general, the 
electoral campaigns of the various parties were professionally mounted 
and, as in previous years, the influence of overseas techniques was again 
visible. For example, Constantinescu, in imitation of the Republican Party 
and Newt Gingrich in the USA, also presented his own electoral 
commitments as a twenty-point ‘Contract with Romania’, which was to be 
fulfilled within 200 days of achieving office. The Contract was clearly 
shaped with the CDR’s target electorate in mind, because, in its first 
proposals, it squarely put the emphasis on the questions of land restitution 
and peasant pensions. Short and lucid, the document gained a 68 per cent 
approval rating amongst electors.18 In contrast, the PDSR presented a far 
lengthier twenty-one point ‘Programme for Romania’, which seems to 
have made far less impact, even though it shared many of the same 
concerns as the CDR’s Contract, stressing social welfare, the necessity of 
curbing corruption and the need to ensure international economic 
competitiveness. 
On the actual hustings the campaign was often highly negative in tone, 
although the CDR were careful to avoid the anti-Communist rhetoric of 
past elections. In particular, Iliescu and the PDSR unsuccessfully tried to 
play upon the insecurities of the electorate, presenting Constantinescu as 
an inexperienced and untrustworthy candidate who would be a mere stop¬ 
gap ruler until the CDR achieved its real goal of the restoration of the 
monarchy. Peasants were cautioned that their land was once again under 
threat, as were their pensions, and emotional warnings were issued that a 
law allowing tenants to buy property nationalized under Communism 
would be rescinded, thereby opening up the possibility of mass evictions.19 
The rhetoric of nationalism was also invoked as, following the defeat of 
the PDSR, in the second round of the presidential contest Iliescu, along 
with Adrian Nastase, leader of the PDRS, repetitively warned that the 
CDR-USD coalition had signed a secret pact with the UDMR that 
threatened the very territorial integrity of Romania. It was alleged that the 
Hungarians would be granted regional autonomy and also be allowed to 
use their mother tongue for official business within their ethnic 
community.20 As speculation swirled about the possibility of the UDMR 
17 At the local elections earlier in 1996 the turnout had only been 56.9 per cent. The 
IRSOP-IFES exit poll on 3 November revealed that 45 per cent of the voters were 
very interested in the election, 32 per cent fairly interested, 18 per cent not very 
interested and 5 per cent not interested at all. 
18 Source: IRSOP-IFES exit poll. 
19 Michael Shafir, ‘Opting for Political Change’, Transition, 27 December 1996, p. 12. 
20 For the use of nationalism in the campaign, see Zsolt-Istvan Mato, ‘Iliescu and his 
Party Play the Nationalist Card’, OMRI Analytical Briefs, vol. 1, no. 461; Shafir, 
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participating in the new government, the CDR-USD coalition repeatedly 
denied the existence of any formal agreement between the parties and, 
despite its potential for inflaming emotions, in general the issue seems to 
have remained of marginal interest for an electorate more concerned with 
the struggle of everyday life. 
One of the most striking differences between the elections of 1992 and 
1996 was the political stance adopted by the media which, if anything, 
might this time be judged to have been slightly more favourable to the 
opposition than to the ruling regime. Of the three main dailies, 
Evenimentul Zilei, Adevarul and Romania Libera, Evenimentul Zilei was 
less hostile than usual to the PDSR and Iliescu, with Ion Cristoiu instead 
reserving his ire for Comeliu Vadim Tudor and the independent candidates 
Nicolae Militaru and Constantin Mudava. Romania Libera maintained its 
customary stance of hostility towards Iliescu and usually uncritical support 
for the Convention, but Adevarul displayed more editorial independence 
than in 1992, when it had supported the FDSN, the predecessor of the 
PDSR. During the 1996 campaign, however, it did carry a number of 
scurrilous attacks on the USD. In general, the tendency remains for 
newspapers to indulge in wild and often poorly researched denunciations 
of political adversaries in an effort to tarnish reputations.21 
The circulation of even the most popular national newspaper, 
Evenimentul Zilei, is only 170,000 and, although local newspapers also 
exist, for most of the population television and radio remain the main 
sources of news and information. Here, one of the chief differences 
between the elections of 1996 and those of 1992 was the presence of a 
number of independent television channels: Pro-TV, Antenna 1 and Tele- 
7abc. The largest of these stations, Pro-TV, whose coverage includes 
Bucharest and fifty-one of the biggest urban centres, is a subscription 
service which enjoys considerable popularity. In general, during the 
electoral campaign it was seen as favouring the opposition and it offered 
an important counterbalance to the perceived bias of the state television 
service (TVR). 
Outside the urban centres (45.6 per cent of Romania’s population still 
lives in a rural environment) and amongst poorer families unable to pay the 
‘Opting for Political Change’, p. 14, BBC, EE/2766, B/10, 11 November 1996, 
Romanian Radio, 11.00 GMT, 8 November 1996; BBC, EE/2769, B/6, 14 
November 1996, Rompres, 12.53 GMT, 12 November 1996; BBC, EE/2769, B/6, 
14 November 1996, Rompres, 15.28 GMT, 12 November 1996. 
21 For instance, an eve-of-polls edition of Romania Libera carried an interview with 
the ex-Securitate defector, Ion Pacepa, which accused Iliescu of being the ‘man of 
Moscow’: Gilda Lazar, ‘Persistenta Securitatii, principalul obstacol intre Romania 
§i NATO’, Romania Libera, 1 November 1996, p. 10. 
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subscription costs, public television and radio remain the prime sources of 
information. Although the public broadcasting institutions scrupulously 
respected the criteria stipulated by parliament, according to which they 
offered free air time to all parties and presidential candidates, as on past 
occasions the opposition parties voiced serious complaints about the state 
television’s general coverage of the campaign.22 At issue were not so 
much instances of specific political bias but what was seen as a more 
general failure of professional standards and objectivity. Similar concerns 
were also to be found in the findings of the European Institute for the 
Media (EIM) which again monitored the campaign.23 Despite finding the 
general media coverage better than in 1992, the EIM expressed concern at 
the complete lack of analysis and commentary on TVR news items relating 
to the campaign and the generally passive attitude of its journalists, who 
remained content to announce party press communiques without any 
attempts at analysis. It also confirmed opposition complaints that too much 
uncritical exposure had been given to a succession of meetings held by 
Iliescu and government ministers with foreign dignitaries, although it 
should be noted that such items have long been a staple of Romanian news 
coverage. 
As in previous elections, the main public television channel (TVR1) 
hosted the pre-election presidential debate a few days before the polls. All 
sixteen presidential candidates were present and each was given equal 
time to answer the same questions posed by journalists together with a 
final two minutes to address the nation. The order of appearance was 
decided by ballot and the time-limits were vigorously applied, with even 
Iliescu at one point being brusquely cut short when he exceeded his 
allotted space. Compared with 1992 the debate appeared more stage- 
managed, and the excessive number of minor candidates, together with the 
absence of any real polemic, seems to have made it a rather boring affair 
for many Romanians. 
The Election 
Partly as a legacy of the highly charged political atmosphere engendered 
by the revolution and partly as a consequence of a history which has seen 
election results more often reflect the choice of incumbent governments 
22 Although the costs of parliamentary parties were borne by the state, candidates and 
parties who were not members of the parliament were required to pay a fee of $11 
per minute on public radio and $16 per minute on the television (TVR1) if a pre¬ 
recorded cassette was used or $48 if they used a TV studio. 
23 My thanks to Dennis Deletant for drawing my attention to the findings of the EIM. 
156 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
than the choice of the people, the electoral process in Romania does not 
tend to be seen as politically neutral and non-partisan, as it generally is in 
the West. Instead, mistrust has tended to prevail as control of the electoral 
process has regularly come to be seen as the key determinant assuring 
victory in the polls. The competent and open conduct of recent national 
and local elections has started to overturn these prejudices, but they still 
remain well entrenched within Romanian political culture, buttressed by 
the fact that governments have rarely been voted out of office. Whether or 
not there is any credible evidence of fraud, it has remained a virtual reflex 
action for the losing side in any Romanian election to cry foul and point to 
a host of alleged irregularities which had cheated it of office. Before the 
1996 elections, concerns were already being voiced by the opposition that 
the polls might again be manipulated to the advantage of the ruling party 
and it was to forestall this possibility that a pre-election protocol was 
concluded by a number of parties, including the CDR, the USD and the 
UDMR, in which they agreed to collaborate in monitoring the elections so 
as to prevent fraud.24 In the past, the principal aim of the opposition in 
voicing complaints against the poll has been to undermine the legitimacy 
of the victorious party, but, as an almost invariable consequence, doubts 
have also arisen about the general validity of the electoral process. 
In recent Romanian elections those scenting a whiff of electoral fraud 
have focused their attentions on the large number of invalid votes which, it 
has been claimed, disproportionately counted against the opposition 
parties, and the provisions within the law permitting special registration 
lists that enable electors effectively to vote at the polling station of their 
choice anywhere in the country on the production of their ID card.25 The 
scale of some of these problems can be gauged from the 1992 elections, 
when 12.73 per cent of votes for the Chamber of Deputies and 12.06 per 
cent of those for the Senate were ruled as invalid. Moreover, as Henry 
Carey has estimated that 10 per cent of voters in that year were entered on 
24 See, for instance, Marian Chiriac, ‘PDSR pregate§te frauda’, 22, 30 October-5 
November 1996, p. 10; and Michael Shafir, ‘Romanian Opposition Parties Accuse 
Government of Planning Election Fraud’, OMR1 Daily Digest, 23 October 1996. 
The President of the European Union of Christian Democrats, Wim van Velzen, 
also voiced concerns about the likely impartiality of the polls. For the protocol see 
BBC, EE/2756, B/2, 30 October 1996, Romanian Radio, 11.00 GMT, 28 October 
1996. The immediate response of the PDSR was to suggest that now it might be 
the target of fraud by the opposition: see BBC, EE/2757, B/4, 31 October 1996, 
Rompres, 09.21 GMT, 30 October 1996. 
25 Despite having earlier approved the distribution of voters’ cards, the PDSR govern¬ 
ment later claimed that they could not be produced in time for the polls. Voters’ 
cards are seen by many as a significant step forward in the prevention of fraud. 
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the special lists, it is possible to suggest that approximately 20 per cent of 
the votes in 1992 may have been affected by one or other of these 
potentially fraudulent activities.26 In November 1996 the number of invalid 
votes was smaller than in 1992, amounting to only 6.01 per cent of the 
votes cast for the Senate and 6.38 per cent of those cast for the Chamber 
of Deputies. This figure, however, is still well above the number of invalid 
votes recorded at elections in most other countries and, in different 
circumstances, it is tempting to suggest that it might have still been high 
enough to produce a challenge as to the legality of the election.27 Although 
in previous elections fraud cannot be entirely ruled out, another, less 
emotive, reason for such high levels of vote invalidation in Romania would 
seem to lie in the adversarial structure of the polling-station committees, 
which usually contain members of all the major political parties. 
Theoretically, every vote has to be scrutinized by each representative and, 
particularly in 1992, this seems to have led to opposing parties invalidating 
each other’s votes on the flimsiest of excuses. The complexity of the ballot 
papers, which contain pages of often highly similar party names and 
symbols, does not ease the matter; nor does the practice of requiring the 
electors to mark their choice by an ink stamp. The rather poor quality of 
the paper used for the ballots, particularly in 1992, means that it was 
relatively easy, once the large ballot papers were folded, for some ink to 
be inadvertently transferred from one page to another and, in an 
atmosphere of mutual hostility, this was usually sufficient to get a vote 
ruled invalid. In 1996, not only were the electorate far more familiar with 
voting procedures, but a greater level of mutual trust seemed to exist 
within the polling stations, with the consequence that the validity of votes 
was less challenged. Thus, it is possible to suggest that the lower level of 
invalidations in 1996 should be taken as evidence of the growing maturity 
of the Romanian political process and the success of voter education 
programmes rather than the thwarting of fraud.28 Similarly, the special lists 
also seem to have continued to receive wide usage in 1996. Since voter 
26 Carey, ‘Irregularities or Rigging’ (see note 1 above), p. 56. 
27 For instance, the following rates of ballot invalidation were recorded in other post- 
Communist states voting in 1992: Bulgaria 2.7 per cent, Czech Republic 1.7 per 
cent and Poland 3.5 per cent. In the 1990 Romanian elections, 5.85 per cent of the 
votes for the Senate and 7.54 per cent of those for the Chamber of Deputies were 
declared invalid. 
28 Some evidence in support of the assumption that voter education is the answer to 
this problem comes from a table reproduced in Carey, ‘Irregularities or Rigging’, 
pp. 56-7. This shows that the number of invalid votes in 1992 was consistently 
highest in the poorest and least-educated areas of Romania. Of course, as these 
areas also tended to be the FDSN heartland, it could be argued, as it was by Carey, 
that fraud was easiest in such counties. 
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registration in most instances appears to have been fairly comprehensive, it 
must be presumed that the electors entered on such lists were travellers 
and those visiting friends and family for the weekend. Although, in the 
absence of official figures, it is impossible to quantify the number of 
electors who cast their votes in this way — at some of the polling stations 
observed by the author it amounted to 10 per cent — in different 
circumstances it is again possible to imagine that the continued usage of 
this largely unaccountable voting procedure would have brought protests 
and a suspicion of falsification. 
As a response to the perceived lack of neutrality in the electoral 
process, the Romanians have adopted two sometimes overlapping 
strategies. The first has involved introducing a series of confidence- 
building measures so as to increase the general transparency of the whole 
electoral mechanism; the most important of these has seen representatives 
of the political parties involved at every stage of the process and observers 
permitted to scrutinize the poll. The second strategy has been to create a 
number of parallel mechanisms to monitor the practices of official 
institutions. In 1996, this process reached a new level of sophistication, 
with the opposition mounting a complex parallel count to check the official 
vote tally and the distribution of mandates.29 Whilst driven by mistrust, 
such parallel mechanisms can, if they validate the procedures of official 
institutions, in themselves act as important confidence-building measures. 
As noted before, the most important confidence-building measure 
involves the participation of party representatives at all levels of the 
electoral process — from the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) in 
Bucharest, which was composed of seven judges and fifteen 
representatives drawn from all the main parties, to the more than 15,000 
local polling-station committees. Each of these consisted of an 
independent president and deputy president, both preferably judges, and 
up to seven party representatives. If there were more than seven applicants 
for the places on these committees, the members were selected by ballot. 
The local committees were responsible for counting the vote and, in 
general, this self-regulatory system does seem to have worked reasonably 
well, as the various members scrutinized each other as well as the ballots. 
The main weakness in this system is that the committees received no 
training as to how the ballots should be counted, with the result that the 
29 Part of the CDR parallel count for Bucharest was reproduced in 22 Puls, 6-12 
November 1996, p. 3. Carey notes that LADO were prohibited by the Central 
Electoral Bureau from mounting an effective parallel count in 1992, although there 
continued to be some debate about apparent discrepancies between the figures 
observed by CDR party workers and the official results for some days after the 
election in newspapers such as Cotidianul. Carey, ‘Irregularites or Rigging’, p 61. 
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process regularly degenerated into utter confusion. Often it seems that the 
final results were only produced after some vigorous "massaging’ of the 
figures to tally the number of votes counted with the number of votes cast 
and, whilst this cannot be seen as constituting attempted fraud, it does 
leave open the possibility of misrepresentation. 
Two other potential problems are also still present within this self- 
regulatory system. First, prior to the polls the opposition charged that in a 
number of cases county prefects had appointed as the presidents of local 
committees not the most able neutral candidates but PDSR supporters. 
Indeed, Shafir and Ionescu have suggested that the PDSR broke with two 
of its erstwhile coalition partners, the PUNR and the Socialist Labour 
Party (PSM), because it wanted to impose its own prefects on all the 
counties so as to be assured of control of the electoral process.30 The 
alignment between executive and political power was such that in some 
counties the prefect was also head of the local branch of the PDSR. 
Potentially, this situation could have laid the grounds for electoral fraud, 
but in reality the practical effects of the appointment of such partisan presi¬ 
dents on the polling process were difficult to gauge. In general, all that can 
be said is that in some cases weak presidents allowed other committee 
members to dominate the proceedings, but whether this had any effect on 
the voting or counting procedure is almost impossible to determine. 
Secondly, the representatives of the parties on the polling station 
committees were sometimes not members of the political parties concerned 
nor even their supporters. The smaller parties in particular seem to have 
been unable to mobilize enough representatives, and so had, instead, relied 
on "friends of friends’ to fill their places — not too difficult a task given 
the fact that members of the committees received payment for their day’s 
work at the rate of 104,000 lei for a president, 80,000 lei for a deputy 
president and 50,000 lei for other members. As this representation by 
proxy was supported by the parties concerned, it cannot be judged as an 
abuse but, once again, the potential for irregularities existed, although no 
evidence was found of these representatives failing to adequately 
scrutinize the vote during the counting procedure. 
Another confidence-building mechanism introduced into the electoral 
process is the facility for domestic observers to be present at the polls. 
Over the years this has been one of the more contentious feature of the 
Romanian electoral process and 1996 was no exception as, right up until 
the eve of the elections, considerable confusion persisted over the 
assignment of observers to polling stations and whether they would have 
30 Michael Shafir and Dan Ionescu, ‘Radical Political Change in Romania’, Transition, 
7 February 1997, p. 52. 
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access to the counting process.31 In the past, the majority of observers 
have come from the Pro-Democracy Association and the League for the 
Defence of Human Rights (LADO), but in 1996 several other lesser- 
known groups made a determined effort to supplant their dominance. 
Allegations were quickly raised that these other groups were a political 
device designed to undermine the scrutiny of the polls, since the law that 
permitted only one domestic observer at each polling station meant that, 
after the places were allocated by ballot, only just over half were covered 
by Pro-Democracy or LADO members (Table 1). In the process over 700 
observers were apparently excluded from the polls.32 To meet criticisms 
that many of these observers from the other groups were bogus and would 
not attend the elections, a procedure was initiated by which a substitute 
observer from another NGO could be registered if the nominated observer 
did not arrive on the polling day. As proportionately more of the 
nominated substitutes were from the suspect organizations, however, this 
move contributed little to defusing the problem. The whole issue caused 
much comment prior to the elections, and afterwards LADO and the Pro- 
Democracy Association continued to allege that few observers had been 
seen from the ‘phantom organizations’.33 
Table 1. Allocation of domestic observers to polling stations by the BEC 
NGO Total 
Observers 
Main 
Observers 
Substitute 
observers 
Substitute 
observers 
(%) 
AROLID 1,364 1,052 312 23 
GADDO 2,263 1,834 429 19 
LADO 5,297 4,716 581 11 
LIRDOCT 1,483 1,201 282 19 
Societatea Timi§oara 156 142 14 9 
Pro-Democratia 2,927 2,616 311 11 
Total 13,490 11,561 1,929 14 
Source: BEC Internet site 
31 The PDSR challenged the credentials of a number of observers and secured the 
removal of thirty-three from the LADO list and ten from Pro-Democracy: BBC, 
EE/2757, B/5, 31 October 1996, Romanian Radio, 05.00 GMT, 30 October 1996. 
For an overview of the attitudes of the political parties towards observers, see 
Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania, 
Washington, DC, 1996, p. 51. 
32 As an example, see Calin Ligia, ‘Observatorii “fantoma” vor supraveghea 
alegerile’, 22, 23-29 October 1996, p 10. For details of the lot-drawing process, 
see BBC, EE/2756, B/2, 30 October 1996, Romanian Radio, 11.18 GMT, 28 
October 1996. 
33 Oana Armeanu, ‘LADO §i Pro Democratia nu vor contesta alegerile’, 22 Puls, 6- 
12 November 1996, p. 3. 
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The Results: The Presidential Polls 
The presidential elections were a triumph for Emil Constantinescu, a 
former Rector of Bucharest University. In the first round Iliescu had held a 
slight (4 per cent) lead over Constantinescu, with Petre Roman performing 
strongly in third place, as he gained over 7 per cent more votes than his 
own USD coalition in the parliamentary polls. Frunda came in fourth, 
gaining, as expected, the majority of the Hungarian vote. After the signing 
of a formal coalition agreement on 7 November between the CDR and 
USD, which included an electoral pact for the second round of the 
elections, Constantinescu formally received the endorsement of Petre 
Roman. The USD leader also agreed to accompany Constantinescu when 
he campaigned in counties like Prahova, where Roman had secured a 
sizeable proportion of the vote in the first round of the election.34 
Subsequently, Constantinescu also gained the support of the UDMR and, 
more surprisingly, the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (PDAR), the 
Ecological Movement of Romania (MER) and even the Socialist Party 
(PS) (see Tables 2 and 3).35 
When they voted on 17 November the vast majority of Hungarians 
faithfully followed the UDMR party line and Constantinescu gained his 
highest share of the vote in the Hungarian-dominated counties of Harghita 
(91.59 per cent) and Covasna (86.81 per cent). Petre Roman’s supporters 
seem to have been more fickle. About 50 per cent heeded Roman’s advice 
and voted for Constantinescu but, perhaps mirroring the origins of much of 
the USD vote (see below), 40 per cent preferred to switch to Iliescu and a 
further 10 per cent abstained. Somewhat surprisingly, Constantinescu also 
seems to have picked up about 10 per cent of the PDSR vote from the first 
round.36 In all, the totality of these votes were sufficient for him to gain a 
convincing victory over Iliescu in the second round by almost ten 
percentage points. 
34 For Roman’s endorsement of Constantinescu, see BBC, EE/2765, B/9, 9 
November 1996, Rompres, 12.36 GMT, 7 November 96. For the coalition 
agreement, see Oana Iura§cu, ‘Emil Constantinescu a devenit candidatul comun al 
opozitiei’, Romania Libera, 8 November 1996, p. 1. 
35 For the UDMR’s endorsement, see BBC, EE/2766, B/10, 11 November 1996, 
Hungarian Radio, 09.00 GMT, 9 November 1996, for the PDAR and the MER, 
see BBC, EE/2769, B/5, 14 November 1996, Romanian Radio, 14.00 GMT, 12 
November 1996; and for the Socialists, see Tudor Mohora’s statement in BBC, 
EE/2769, B/4, 14 November 1996, Rompres, 13.18 GMT, 21 November 1996. 
36 These figures are to be found in Shafir, ‘Opting for Political Change’ (see note 19 
above), p. 15. 
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Table 2. Presidential candidates gaining over 1 per cent of the vote on 3 
November 1996 
Candidate Party % of vote 
Ion Iliescu PDSR 32.25 
Emil Constantinescu CDR 28.21 
Petre Roman USD 20.54 
Gyorgy Frunda UDMR 6.02 
Comeliu Vadim Tudor PRM 4.72 
Gheorghe Funar PUNR 3.22 
Tudor Mohora PS 1.27 
Source: BEC Internet site 
Table 3. Result of the presidential vote on 17 November 1996 
Candidate Party % of vote 
Ion Iliescu PDSR 45.59 
Emil Constantinescu CDR 54.41 
Source: BEC Internet site 
Map 1. Winner of the largest share of the vote by county in the 17 
November presidential elections 
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Table 4. Results and turnout for the presidential elections of 17 November 
1997 
Turnout 
(%) 
County Constantinescu 
<%) 
Iliescu (%) Winner of Most 
Votes 
86.96 Harghita 91.59 8.41 Constantinescu 
79.06 Sibiu 73.82 26.18 Constantinescu 
78.81 Covasna 86.81 13.19 Constantinescu 
78.68 Bra§ov 69.61 30.39 Constantinescu 
76.77 Constanta 57.85 42.15 Constantinescu 
76.40 Mure§ 68.82 31.18 Constantinescu 
75.87 Cara§-Severin 62.34 37.66 Constantinescu 
75.70 Alba 62.95 37.05 Constantinescu 
75.65 Arad 66.96 33.04 Constantinescu 
74.59 Hunedoara 49.94 50.06 Iliescu 
74.18 Timi§ 72.72 27.28 Constantinescu 
74.16 Braiia 40.61 59.39 Iliescu 
74.09 Suceava 45.71 54.29 Iliescu 
73.39 lalomita 
*> 
39.31 60.69 Iliescu 
72.75 Ia§i 46.05 53.95 Iliescu 
72.72 Salaj 64.87 35.13 Constantinescu 
72.02 Bihor 65.42 34.58 Constantinescu 
72.01 Neamt 43.53 56.47 Iliescu 
71.81 Cluj 69.03 30.97 Constantinescu 
70.97 Calara$i 36.40 63.60 Iliescu 
70.75 Bistrita-Nasaud 65.63 34.37 Constantinescu 
70.70 Prahova 53.62 46.38 Constantinescu 
70.68 Maramure§ 55.03 44.97 Constantinescu 
70.67 Buzau 35.40 64.60 Iliescu 
70.58 Tulcea 52.58 47.42 Iliescu 
70.45 Boto§ani 31.54 68.46 Iliescu 
70.37 Satu Mare 77.70 22.30 Constantinescu 
70.07 Vrancea 58.37 41.63 Iliescu 
70.04 Bucure§ti 62.82 37.18 Constantinescu 
69.99 Dolj 46.47 53.53 Iliescu 
69.93 Bacau 45.79 54.21 Iliescu 
69.47 Ilfov 56.98 43.02 Constantinescu 
69.02 Arge§ 41.62 58.38 Iliescu 
68.20 Teleorman 33.79 66.21 Iliescu 
68.17 Valcea 40.09 59.91 Iliescu 
67.89 Vaslui 36.34 63.66 Iliescu 
67.17 Olt 37.48 62.52 Iliescu 
66.80 Dambovita 46.25 53.75 Iliescu 
66.36 Mehedinti 45.90 54.10 Iliescu 
65.61 Giurgiu 43.94 56.06 Iliescu 
65.21 Galati 51.41 48.59 Constantinescu 
64.22 Gorj 37.31 62.69 Iliescu 
Figures in bold indicate a share of the vote over 60 per cent 
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The results from the second round of the presidential elections clearly 
show the geographic division present in Romanian politics (see Map 1). 
Constantinescu gained a greater share of the vote than Iliescu in all the 
counties of the north and west of the country (the Banat, Cri$ana, 
Maramure§ and Transylvania) bar one, Hunedoara, whilst in the poorer 
rural areas of the south and east (Oltenia, Muntenia and Moldavia) the 
picture was exactly reversed. The exceptions to this rule, counties which 
voted for Constantinescu in the Iliescu-dominated areas, were the urban 
centres of Bucharest and Constanta and their hinterlands, Prahova, a 
relatively developed axis between Transylvania and the capital, and the 
anomalous Galaft, which will be considered below. This geographic 
distribution broadly reflects the former divide between the Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires, with Constantinescu dominating in the regions once 
ruled by the former and Iliescu in those ruled by the latter. Too much 
should not, perhaps, be built into this observation but, when the 
presidential election results from the second round are mapped against 
turnout figures (see Table 4), a picture emerges which may, in part, reflect 
the different political cultures imparted by these historical experiences. 
Turnout was generally higher in the counties of Transylvania and it was in 
these areas that Constantinescu recorded his biggest vote, often by a large 
margin. In contrast, Iliescu dominated the voting in the south and east of 
the country, often by equally sizeable amounts, but here attendance at the 
polls was far lower. Despite the allure of competitions, such as that which 
promised communes recording the highest turnout a chance to win a 
tractor, it seems that Iliescu was never able to master the problem of 
mobilizing a large segment of his potential vote. 
The figures also reveal a surprisingly low turnout in Bucharest, which 
may have been because large numbers of people seem to have taken 
advantage of the electoral period to travel home to their native towns and 
villages — where they presumably added to the names on the special lists. 
More intriguing is the case of Galati, which recorded the lowest turnout of 
all the comities of Romania in the 3 November poll —just 60.14 per cent. 
This low turnout figure may be a clue as to how Constantinescu and the 
CDR managed to triumph in a rust-belt city, once dubbed ‘Red Galati’, 
after the victory of the left-wing Socialists in the 1992 local elections — 
the assumption being that voter apathy amongst potential PDSR supporters 
allowed the more motivated CDR followers to triumph. 
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The Results: The Polls for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
The triumph of Emil Constantinescu in the presidential poll was matched 
by the CDR in the parliamentary elections. The new ruling CDR-USD- 
UDMR coalition under Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea enjoyed a clear 
majority in both houses of parliament — by fifty-seven votes in the 
Chamber of Deputies and thirty-one in the Senate.37 In part, the result can 
be seen as a negative vote against the uncharismatic former premier, 
Nicolae Vacaroiu, and his regime’s poor handling of the economy. All 
sides apparently agreed it was time for a change, with even the incumbent 
PDSR advocating a speeding up of the economic reform process. 
Strikingly, the CDR seems to have not only achieved success among its 
traditional constituencies, such as urban professionals and students, but 
even to have secured a greater proportion of the workers’ vote, gaining 32 
per cent as against 21 per cent for the PDSR and 13 per cent for the USD 
(see Table 7). In contrast, the greatest proportion of the PDSR vote seems 
to have come from the elderly and those who live in the countryside. The 
CDR also appears to have secured a high percentage of the vote amongst 
entrepreneurs, which would suggest that this class is beginning to spread 
beyond the bounds of the former nomenklatura, a group which might have 
been expected to side with the PDSR. 
Table 5. Results of the elections for the Senate in 1992 and 1996 
Party 
% of vote 
1992 
Mandates % of vote 
1996 
Mandates 
CDR 20.16 34 30.70 53 
PDSR* 28.29 49 23.08 41 
USD** 10.39 18 13.16 23 
UDMR 7.59 12 6.81 11 
PRM 3.85 6 4.54 8 
PUNR 8.12 14 4.22 7 
PS — — 2.26 — 
PSM 3.19 5 2.16 — 
AN-L — — 1.92 — 
PPR — — 1.45 — 
PSMR — — 1.33 — 
PDAR 3.31 5 0.97 — 
Source: BEC Internet site 
Key as for Table 6 below 
37 For a profile of Ciorbea, see Michael Shafir ‘Victor Ciorbea: Romania’s Prime 
Minister-Designate’, OMRI Analytical Briefs, 20 November 1996. 
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Table 6. Results of the elections for the Chamber of Deputies in 1992 and 
1996 
Party 1992 
% of vote Mandates 
1996 
% of vote Mandates 
CDR 20.01 82 30.17 122 
PDSR* 27.72 117 21.52 91 
USD** 10.19 43 12.93 53 
UDMR 7.46 27 6.64 25 
PRM 3.90 16 4.46 19 
PUNR 7.72 30 4.36 18 
PS — — 2.92 — 
PSM 3.04 13 2.15 — 
AN-L — — 1.57 — 
PPR — — 1.44 — 
PSMR — — 1.73 — 
PDAR 2.99 — 0.87 — 
Source: BEC Internet site 
Key 
CDR=Democratic Convention of Romania, PDSR=Party of Social Democracy in 
Romania, USD=Social Democratic Union, UDMR=Hungarian Democratic Union of 
Romania, PRM=Greater Romania Party, PUNR= Party of Romanian National Unity, 
PS= Socialist Party, PSM= Socialist Labour Party, AN-L=National-Liberal Alliance, 
PPR= Pensioners Party in Romania, PSMR= Romanian Socialist Labour Party, 
PDAR=Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania. 
* Standing as the FDSN in 1992 
** Standing as the FSN in 1992 
Table 7. Voting patterns within key groups (by percentage) 
Group CDR PDSR USD UDMR PUNR Others 
Aged 18-24 35 17 14 8 7 19 
Aged 65+ 24 42 7 9 3 15 
Entrepreneurs 48 11 11 8 3 19 
Students 44 10 14 6 7 19 
Workers 32 21 13 9 6 19 
Peasants 18 53 11 6 3 9 
Urban 43 16 11 6 5 19 
Rural 26 34 11 8 4 17 
Source: IRSOP-IFES Exit Poll 
The USD consolidated its position as the third party of Romanian 
politics, gaining just under 3 per cent more of the vote than in 1992. Exit- 
poll evidence, however, suggests that the electorate of the USD has 
changed radically since 1992, with only 19 per cent of voters remaining 
with the party since the last general election. Most of its new recruits seem 
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to have come from disaffected PDSR supporters, but the USD also seems 
to have done disproportionately well among young first-time voters (see 
Table 8).38 Indeed, the fact that only 49 per cent of the victorious CDR’s 
electorate had remained faithful since 1992 highlights the fluidity of 
Romanian politics and the ease with which voters apparently change 
parties. Unlike some of the other political parties the USD recorded a 
remarkably even electoral performance across all of Romania, gaining its 
highest votes (over 20 per cent) in counties as geographically dispersed as 
Bistiffa-Nasaud, Bra§ov, Buzau, Constanta, Prahova, Sibiu and Suceava. 
Despite the relatively good showing of the USD, however, the election in 
fact brought a polarization of Romanian electors, as they consolidated their 
votes behind one of the two mainstream parties. Except in those 
constituencies where there was a large Hungarian vote, the pattern 
throughout the country was for 70-80 per cent of the vote to go to either 
the CDR or the PDSR. In Bucharest, for instance, 76.07 per cent of the 
vote was claimed by these two parties. 
Table 8. How voters changed their preferences between 1992 and 1996 
(by percentage) 
Preferences of CDR and USD voters in 1992 
Preferences of 
voters in 1996 
CDR PDSR* USD** Others New voters 
CDR 49 25 14 11 10 
USD 14 42 19 11 14 
Source: 1RSOP-IFES Exit Poll 
* In 1992 standing as the FDSN 
** In 1992 standing as the FSN 
This polarization of the vote inevitably had consequences for the 
smaller parliamentary parties. The PUNR, in particular, suffered a sharp 
reverse, losing nearly half its vote. Its strongest performance continued to 
be in its Transylvanian heartland, especially in the counties of Alba (13 per 
cent of the total vote), Bistrita-Nasaud (16.98 per cent), Cluj (24.54 per 
cent), Maramure§ (13.76 per cent), Mure§ (21.75 per cent) and Salaj 
(13.75 per cent). Elsewhere it gained little support, and outside 
Transylvania its performance was often disastrous. The reasons for the 
party’s decline are diverse, but would seem to include recurrent leadership 
disputes, association with the ‘Caritas’ scandal and the recently signed 
38 Dennis Deletant also found that the USD were particularly popular amongst first¬ 
time voters in Vaslui county. 
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Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, which not only undermined the party’s 
political position but also exposed it to comparison with Hungarian 
opponents of the same document.39 The PUNR’s main rival on the right, 
the PRM, did better, slightly increasing its share of the vote from 1992, 
although it still only registered 4.46 per cent nationwide. In contrast to 
the PUNR, it did better outside Transylvania and the Banat and, although 
its vote was in general more evenly spread across all of Romania, a slight 
clustering was still evident in three distinct areas. These were: (a) northern 
Moldavia: Bacau (7.36 per cent of the vote), Boto§ani (8.72 per cent), Ia§i 
(8.57 per cent), Neamt (8.02 per cent) and Suceava (7.89 per cent); (b) 
northern Oltenia: Arge§ (10.8 per cent), Gorj (8.07 per cent), Hunedoara 
(8.11 per cent), Olt (8.07 per cent) and Valcea (7.68 per cent); and (c) 
eastern Muntenia: Braila (7.52 per cent) and Tulcea (8.03 per cent). No 
obvious explanation exists to explain these groupings, but the rather 
isolated and rural nature of all these areas, where anti-intellectual and 
anti-urban prejudices might be expected to prosper, could have led 
PDSR protest votes to congregate with the PRM rather than the CDR. 
In northern Moldavia it is also possible that the PRM’s anti-Semitism 
might have found some response in an area where in the past there had 
been a large Jewish presence. The lack of success of the parties of the 
right in the 1996 elections has led some commentators to suggest that 
the tide of nationalism is at last ebbing in Romania. It is noticeable that, 
when Iliescu adopted his more markedly nationalist posture during the 
second round, presumably in search of the first round votes of Gheorghe 
Funar and Vadim Tudor, it did him little good among the wider Romanian 
electorate.40 
The UDMR secured a slightly lower proportion of the vote than in 
1992, but this can be largely ascribed to splits within the Hungarian 
community, as a number of parliamentarians not re-selected to represent 
the party chose to fight the elections as independent candidates.41 Prior to 
the polls, some concerns were voiced by local UDMR supporters that 
the decision of the Sekler Youth Forum to stand in the elections might 
further divide the Hungarian vote. These concerns proved to be illusory as 
39 Shafir, ‘Opting for Political Change’, p. 13. For ‘Caritas’, see Katherine Verdery, 
‘Faith, Hope and Caritas in the Land of the Pyramids: Romania, 1990 to 1994’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 37, 1995, 4, pp. 625-9. 
40 The argument that nationalism is on the wane has been advanced by Aurelian 
Craiutu, ‘Light at the End of the Tunnel: Romania 1989-1996’ (see note 12). For 
the use of nationalism in the campaign, see note 22. 
41 BBC, EE/2746, B/4, 18 October 1996, Duna TV satellite service, 16.00 GMT, 16 
October 1996. 
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the Forum, which claims a distinct Sekler, as opposed to Hungarian, 
identity for the inhabitants of Harghita and Covasna, gained only 2,142 
votes in the election for the Chamber of Deputies.42 Within the ranks of 
the smaller Romanian political parties, coalition-building often seems to 
resemble a game of musical chairs so comparisons are difficult to make, 
but amongst the groups failing to renew their mandate in the new 
parliament were the Socialists, who had dealt a fatal self-inflicted blow to 
their electoral prospects by splitting into the Socialist Party and the 
Socialist Labour Party.43 Given the ideological drift of the PDSR towards 
the centre, the absence of any of the socialist parties in the new parliament 
means that the left is effectively unrepresented. The PDAR, which had 
secured a foothold in both the parliaments of 1990 and 1992, also failed to 
renew its mandate when, alongside the MER and the New Romania Party, 
as part of the National Union of the Centre, it gained only 0.97 per cent of 
the vote. 
The swing to the CDR from the PDSR was not even across all of 
Romania and, when the county results are compared, some interesting 
variations can be observed (see Table 9). The CDR recorded a gain of 15 
per cent or more on its 1992 figure in thirteen constituencies, but the 
PDSR recorded an equivalent loss in only four constituencies. Whilst 
bearing in mind the aforementioned fluidity of Romanian voting patterns, 
this, nevertheless, suggests that the CDR gathered most of its extra support 
either from those voters who supported parties which had failed to cross 
the electoral threshold in 1992 or from first-time electors. Only in seven 
constituencies did the PDSR lose more votes than the CDR gained (see 
Table 10). In each of these the USD did better than its average vote, 
suggesting that it was the prime beneficiary of the PDSR’s decline. It is 
also noticeable, however, that amongst these counties there are a number 
of those from northern Moldavia where the PRM achieved results better 
than its national average. 
Of the fourteen constituencies in which the PDSR lost more than 10 per 
cent of its vote, all but four were in Moldavia (Bacau, Boto§ani, Galati, 
Ia§i, Vaslui, Vrancea) or eastern Muntenia and the Dobrogea (Buzau, 
Braila, Tulcea and Constanta). The exceptions to this rule were 
Teleorman, Prahova, Giurgiu and Bucharest (presumably reflecting the 
loss of the working-class vote). In contrast, the PDSR managed to defend 
42 BBC, EE/2758, B/8, 1 November 1996, Hungarian Radio, 11.00 GMT, 30 
October 1996. 
43 They also faced competition from a new grouping, the Socialist Workers’ Party. 
For the divisions within Romania’s socialists, see Michael Shafir, ‘A Split in the 
Socialist Camp’, Transition, 12 May 1995, pp. 2-5. 
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Table 9. CDR and FDSN/PDSR vote in 1992 and 1996 for the Chamber 
of Deputies (by percentage) 
County 1992 
CDR 
1996 
CDR 
+/- (%) 1992 
FDSN 
1996 
PDSR 
+/- (%) 
Alba 25.43 42.82 +17.39 21.97 15.07 -6.90 
Arad 36.87 42.86 +5.99 19.73 21.00 +1.27 
Arge§ 21.07 32.68 +11.61 45.78 38.95 -6.83 
Bacau 17.81 36.30 +18.49 50.12 34.02 -16.10 
Bihor 20.29 30.01 +9.72 16.65 14.75 -1.90 
Bistrita-Nasaud 23.18 38.09 + 14.91 20.22 11.58 -8.64 
Boto§ani 12.33 23.86 +11.53 67.17 46.69 -20.48 
Bra§ov 30.92 41.93 + 11.01 19.32 15.61 -3.71 
Braila 18.54 36.32 +17.78 52.30 37.67 -14.63 
Buzau 14.87 27.78 + 12.91 65.31 42.07 -23.34 
Cara§-Severin 41.75 50.94 +9.2 23.92 22.07 -1.85 
Calara§i 18.51 26.06 +7.58 50.70 53.78 +3.08 
Cluj 21.87 32.99 + 11.12 10.91 10.19 -0.72 
Constanta 31.75 45.90 +14.15 29.52 17.81 -11.71 
Covasna 7.65 7.30 -0.35 5.00 7.22 +2.22 
Dambovita 
* 
25.40 35.90 + 10.50 45.64 38.63 -7.01 
Dolj 24.87 45.37 +20.50 38.53 31.48 -7.05 
Galati 25.49 41.92 +16.43 52.46 37.74 -14.72 
Giurgiu 22.89 32.88 +9.99 56.02 43.93 -12.09 
Goij 16.04 31.62 +15.58 40.93 39.57 -1.36 
Harghita 5.70 2.80 -2.90 2.34 4.21 + 1.87 
Hunedoara 23.03 34.53 + 11.50 27.27 27.38 +0.11 
Ialomita 
* 
16.58 31.16 + 14.58 51.52 42.10 -9.40 
Ia§i 27.37 37.81 + 10.44 46.25 34.80 -11.45 
Maramure§ 21.76 32.14 + 10.38 22.61 19.61 -3.00 
Mehedinti 
* 
25.58 44.70 +19.12 40.13 34.52 -5.61 
Mure§ 8.16 15.44 +7.28 4.30 10.05 +5.75 
Neamt 
* 
20.84 27.60 +6.76 42.44 45.03 +2.59 
Olt 15.94 29.98 + 14.04 50.28 44.70 -5.58 
Prahova 25.75 45.55 + 19.80 36.65 23.35 -13.30 
Satu Mare 23.39 36.28 + 12.89 14.65 10.50 -4.15 
Salaj 14.44 26.48 + 12.04 17.93 19.09 -1.16 
Sibiu 38.90 49.74 + 10.84 16.35 11.07 -5.28 
Suceava 24.00 29.33 +5.33 46.58 38.84 -7.74 
Teleorman 15.41 31.44 + 16.03 58.63 43.54 -15.09 
Timi§ 54.43 56.29 + 1.86 17.47 13.02 -4.45 
Tulcea 23.28 39.30 + 16.02 49.59 38.71 -10.88 
Vaslui 14.43 32.09 +17.66 60.35 45.37 -14.98 
Valcea 19.14 39.14 +20.00 36.61 33.03 -3.58 
Vrancea 20.36 33.27 + 12.91 59.57 44.71 -14.86 
Bucure§ti 40.22 57.40 +17.81 32.01 18.67 -13.34 
S.A. Ilfov 38.56 47.74 +9.18 36.17 29.84 -6.33 
Figures in bold indicate a swing of over 15 per cent and a total vote over 40 per cent 
Peter Siani-Davies 171 
Table 10. Voting patterns in counties where PDSR losses were higher 
than CDR gains (by percentage) 
County CDR PDSR USD PRM PUNR 
Boto§ani 23.86 46.69 17.87 8.72 2.67 
Buzau 27.78 42.07 23.00 4.83 2.13 
Giurgiu 32.88 43.93 16.01 4.13 2.81 
Ia§i 37.81 34.80 16.43 8.57 2.18 
Suceava 29.33 38.84 20.50 7.89 3.28 
Timi§ 56.29 13.02 16.52 3.28 4.42 
Vrancea 33.27 44.71 15.70 4.27 1.94 
Figures in bold are above the national average for the respective parties 
its political base in Oltenia and other parts of Muntenia, actually recording 
a 3 per cent gain on its 1992 vote in Calara§i and suffering relatively few 
losses from a high base in Gorj, Valcea and Olt. Bucking the national 
trend, it also increased its vote in Neamt, Hunedoara, Arad, Covasna, 
Harghita and Mure§. In the latter Transylvanian counties it was 
presumably the beneficiary of a decline in the PUNR vote. The 
aforementioned tendency for the vote to polarize between the main 
parties, however, meant that, despite the relatively good showing of the 
PDSR in Oltenia, the CDR did even better, gaining the greatest share of 
the vote for both houses of parliament in the counties of Valcea, Mehedinti 
and Dolj as well as for the Senate in Arge§. Other areas where the CDR 
broke a previously impenetrable PDSR electoral stranglehold were Ia§i, 
Galaft (where it gained the highest vote for both houses of parliament), 
Suceava (where it gained most votes for the Senate) and Tulcea and 
Bacau, where it gained the majority of the votes for the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
In these areas the Convention seems to have not only consolidated its 
vote in the main urban centres but also to have made important gains in the 
smaller towns and the countryside, although overall in rural areas the 
PDSR still remained dominant as it seems to have collected 53 per cent of 
the peasant vote (see Table 7). In the countryside the main issue remains 
the division of collectivized land, and party alignment often seems to be 
determined by the local prospects for a settlement of this contentious 
question. A slight tendency does seem to exist for wealthier villages to 
favour the Convention, but usually it seems to be the personality of the 
mayor that determines a smaller community’s political orientation. In 
general, the Convention seems to have built on its successes in the local 
elections to form its own grass-roots patronage network and this process 
can be expected to increase now it has the power to appoint its own 
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prefects. In the long term it would seem that the best hope for the PD SR 
would be if it could rebuild its votes in the cities amongst the working- 
class voters. 
Romania's 'Velvet Revolution' 
The assertion that the elections of 1996 were the ‘real’ Romanian 
revolution — Romania’s own equivalent of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ — 
was perhaps tinged more than a little by the euphoria of the supporters of 
the opposition in their hour of victory.44 The very fact that many of the 
USD ministers in the new government, including Adrian Severin, Victor 
Babiuc and Bogdan Niculescu-Duvaz, also held prominent posts in the 
National Salvation Front government of Petre Roman formed after the 
May 1990 elections, highlights the difficulty in sustaining this argument. 
Instead of being the ‘real revolution’, or indeed the end of the revolution, 
the elections of November 1996 can best be viewed as ushering in another 
stage in the revolutionary process. The eventual end of the revolution will 
only come with a process of accommodation when ‘the main principles 
which the revolution has established cease to be a matter of contro¬ 
versy’.45 Romania has not yet fully reached this point, although there are 
many signs that it might not be far away on the horizon. Until then, it is 
perhaps best to assess the elections as an important step forward on the 
road to political maturity but also to heed the wise words of Michael 
Shafir, who has pointed out that the real test for Romanian democracy will 
only come when it successfully completes a second such change-over of 
power.46 
44 The secretary-general of the PNT-CD, Radu Vasile, characterized the election as 
Romania’s own ‘Velvet Revolution’: BBC, EE/2773, B/9, 19 November 1996, 
Rompres, 11.56 GMT, 18 November 1996. 
45 Jaroslav Krejci, Great Revolutions Compared: The Outlines of a Theory, New 
York, 2nd edn, 1994, pp. 5-6. 
46 Michael Shafir ‘Romania Enters the “Age of Normalcy”’, OMRI Analytical Briefs, 
vol. 1, no. 474, 18 November 1996, p. 2. 
The Post-Communist Security Services in Romania 
Dennis Deletant 
Of all the secret police forces of the Communist states of Eastern Europe, 
the Romanian Securitate has achieved the greatest notoriety. Indeed, such 
was the Western media’s obsession with it during the revolution of 
December 1989 that the acclimatization of the very word Securitate in the 
Oxford English Dictionary was ensured. That fixation was merely a 
reflection of the success of the Securitate — formerly the Department of 
State Security (DSS) — in instilling itself in the minds of Romanians as the 
ruthless instrument of repression. The Securitate’s most potent weapon 
was fear, and the depth to which it inculcated fear into the Romanian 
population proved the principal reason for its success. 
Although the Romanian Communist Party was declared dead in January 
1990, no death certificate was produced. Members of the Party merely 
swapped their cards for those of the ruling National Salvation Front (NSF), 
and most of them carried on as if nothing had changed in Romanian 
political life. The NSF tried to blend into the present and bury the past. It 
successors, the Democratic National Salvation Front and the Romanian 
Party of Social Democracy (PDSR), showed a similar reluctance to 
question the past. Only some of those responsible for the bloodshed in 
December 1989 have been brought to trial. They include twenty-five 
members of the politburo and the Central Committee, and eleven generals 
in the Securitate and the militia. For the events in Timisoara, twenty-nine 
leading figures in the Communist Party, the Securitate and the militia have 
been convicted of ‘incitement to murder’. Yet these convictions relate to 
the events between 16 and 22 December. 
The 800 suspected ‘terrorists’ who were arrested by the army between 
22 and 28 December were freed early in 1990. Many senior army, 
Securitate and militia officers whom their own subordinates have publicly 
identified as giving orders for demonstrators to be fired upon in Bucharest 
Research for this article was carried out with a grant from the Nuffield Foundation, to 
which body I express my thanks. 
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and in Cluj on 21 December remain at liberty, and some of them have been 
promoted to even more senior positions within the army and police. Their 
names have been revealed in the Romanian press.1 
One day after the execution of the Ceau§escus on Christmas Day, Ion 
Iliescu, at that time head of the Provisional Council of National Unity, 
signed a decree removing the Department of State Security from the 
control of the Ministry of the Interior and placing it under that of the 
Ministry of National Defence.2 In effect, the Securitate was integrated into 
the system and legitimized, thus enabling its officers to organize the 
release of all their colleagues held on suspicion of firing on demonstrators 
during the revolution. It is true that on 30 December a further decree was 
issued, under which the Securitate was dismantled and its directorate 
chiefs placed under arrest or in the reserve, but this was merely window- 
dressing. By then most of the suspected ‘terrorists’ had been given their 
freedom. The unreliablity of witnesses, bureaucratic inertia, and the desire 
to protect vested interests involving, first, Iliescu’s bodyguard (the SPP) 
which contained officers from the former Fifth Directorate of the 
Securitate (responsible for the protection of Ceau§escu) and, secondly, the 
anti-terrorist brigade of the SRI, whose numbers included men from the 
Securitate anti-terrorist unit (USLA), explain why the investigations into 
the deaths of the officially recognized thousand or so victims of the 
revolution were not completed and why relatively few charges were 
brought. 
Any new security service in Romania faces an enormous task in gaining 
the respect of the population, given the legacy of fear generated by the 
Securitate. Without candour, consistency and transparency on the part of 
the security services, Romanians will harbour the suspicion that any 
successor to the Securitate will simply be a revamped version of it, 
employing the same people and the same methods. In fact, there is not just 
one successor to the Securitate but at least nine security services known to 
be operating at present. To many Romanians, this fragmentation of 
security and intelligence agencies was merely a public relations ploy of the 
authorities to convince foreigners that the Securitate had been dismantled 
and that the centralized control of internal security activity had been 
abolished. But it was precisely that lack of a centralized authority, based 
on constraints codified in law and effectively implemented, that lay behind 
public suspicion of the security services. Unease about the nature of their 
activities, the duplication of their functions, the apparent lack of statutory 
1 See, for example, Evenimentul zilei, 14 July 1993, p. 3; Romania libera, 28 
December 1993, p. 10. 
2 Romania libera, 27 December 1989, p. 1. 
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control over some of them, and the opaqueness surrounding them has 
fuelled public concern over the last seven years. 
That public concern was shared by foreign observers who saw the 
position of these services as symptomatic of the problems of democratic 
accountability and responsibility in Romania during the period of Ion 
Iliescu’s presidency. Although the structures of democracy were put into 
place, they were not functioning adequately. To many Romanians the law 
in the West is designed, in broad terms, to protect the citizen against the 
government and fellow citizens, whereas in Romania the law, in past and 
present practice, is used by the government as an instrument to protect 
itself against the citizen. Deploying the law in this way, the government 
loses a moral basis for action, and that lack of morality destroys all values 
except that of making money by any means. 
Romanians themselves talk less about ‘the government’ and more about 
‘the power’ (puterea). This distinction is eloquent, for ‘the power’ referred 
until the recent elections to a clique composed of President Iliescu and his 
counsellors, among them the heads of the security services. The 
government headed by Nicolae Vacaroiu, it was argued, had responsibility 
but no authority. The authority rested with Iliescu and his entourage. But 
Iliescu and his group were not the only decision-makers. The key players 
in Romania are a small group of entrepreneurs, many of them employees 
of Securitate-controlled trade companies, who by taking advantage of the 
legal vacuum which followed the revolution, have set up new companies, 
re-invested their profits in them, in property and in the media, and who 
seek to gain control of the embryonic financial institutions. Their interest is 
in controlling change, and they co-opted the security services into helping 
them to do so.3 The maintenance of stability is a pre-requisite for control 
and the targets of the security services for surveillance are, by and large, 
those who are deemed to threaten that stability in any way. Into this 
category would fall individuals with links to opponents of the regime, both 
in Romania and abroad (including those with overt sympathies for the 
exiled King Michael), and potential rivals for economic power. 
Securitate control of foreign trade under Ceau§escu placed its officers 
in a position of privilege in post-revolutionary Romania. Securitate 
officers, with their specialist knowledge and their foreign contacts, 
3 For examples, see the anonymous article ‘PSM-ul este condus din umbra de junta 
Generalului Pelle’, Academia catavencu, 23-9 May 1995, p. 3. The daily Eveni- 
mentul zilei (1 June 1995, p. 7) has alleged that millions of dollars have found their 
way into the pockets of five or six businessmen in Romania as the proceeds of 
sanctions-busting with Serbia. Officers in UM 0215 are said to have co-operated in 
these illegal activities by allowing petrol tankers to cross into Serbia from Romania 
without customs controls being carried out. 
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triggered the creation of a veritable economic mafia. Using their privileged 
commercial expertise, these officers set up private import-export 
businesses and by exploiting their positions within the Foreign Trade 
Ministry and other government agencies cornered a significant part of 
Romania’s export activity. The depth of this penetration by former 
Securitate officers of the Romanian economy was signalled by the 
Romanian defector Liviu Turcu, and also by anonymous sources within the 
former Securitate.4 
The nine Romanian security and intelligence services are: 
1. Serviciul Roman de Informatii (SRI), the Romanian Security Service. 
2. Serviciul de Paza §i Protec|ie (SPP), the Presidential Protection and 
Guard Service. 
3. Serviciul de Informa|ii Exteme (SIE), the Foreign Intelligence Service. 
4. Direcjia Informatiilor Militare (DIM), the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence, subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. 
5. Direcjia de Contraspionaj a Ministerului Apararii Nationale (DCS), the 
Directorate of Counter-Espionage of the Ministry of Defence. 
6. Serviciul de Informa|ii al Ministerului de Interne (UM 0125), the 
Intelligence and Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior. 
7. Direc|ia de Supraveghere Operativa §i Investigate a Inspectoratului 
General al Polifiei (DSOI), the Directorate of Surveillance and 
Investigation of the Ministry of the Interior.5 
8. Serviciul de Informatii al Directiei Generale a Penitenciarelor (UM 
0400), also known as Serviciul Operativ Independent (SOI), the 
Intelligence Service of the General Directorate of Prisons, subordinated to 
the Ministry of Justice.6 
4 Turcu has disclosed that Mi§u Negritoiu, one-time Minister for Economic Reform 
and Strategy in the government sworn in on 20 November 1992, and from 
September 1993 economic counsellor to President Iliescu, was sent as head of the 
Romanian Commercial Bureau in Los Angeles. This position, Turcu alleges, was a 
Romanian intelligence one. 
5 The creation of this service was announced in the Romanian press in May 1994 
(Evenimentulzilei, 12 May 1994, p. 8). 
6 This service is mentioned in article 9, paragraph 1 of Law No. 51 of 1991 as a 
service specializing in the gathering of information within the prison system. 
Although some analysts have stated that it has taken over the tasks of the former 
Sixth Directorate of the DSS, responsible for penal investigation and interrogation 
of suspects, changes in procedures in penal investigation mean that there is no 
longer a statutory involvement of officers of UM 0400 in interrogation. The role of 
this service appears to be rather in gathering information from convicted prisoners 
in order to prevent breakouts or disturbances in jails. 
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9. Serviciul de Telecomunicajii Speciale (STS), the Special Tele¬ 
communications Service.7 
Since the revolution, the Romanian Security Service (SRI) has attracted 
the most attention in the Romanian press because it is the largest of the 
new security services. Set up under Decree No. 181 of 26 March 1990, it 
received a statutory foundation in Law No. 14 of 1992. The principal tasks 
of the SRI are to gather information to prevent and combat any threats to 
Romania’s national security. Combating terrorism and undertaking anti¬ 
terrorist actions are duties that the SRI shares with the SPP. The SRI is 
believed to employ from 10,000 to 12,000 officers and troops, as well as 
an unknown number of civilian secretarial staff. Its head was, until April 
1997, Virgil Magureanu. 
Among the internal civilian security services, the SRI, the Intelligence 
and Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior (UM 0215), and the 
SPP are the most significant. Public confidence in all three agencies has 
been wanting because the authorities have failed to investigate their roles 
in a number of acts of organized political violence.8 
The most notorious involved the miners’ invasion of Bucharest in June 
1990. The failure of the police to disperse rioters who on 13 June attacked 
the police headquarters, the offices of Romanian television and the Foreign 
Ministry, prompted President Ion Iliescu to appeal to miners from the Jiu 
valley to defend the government. Special trains were laid on to bring some 
10,000 miners to Bucharest at dawn on 14 June armed with wooden staves 
and iron bars. They were joined by vigilantes, some of whom were later 
identified as officers of the Securitate. For two days the miners terrorized 
the population of the capital, attacking anyone they suspected of 
opposition to the government. These events raised a number of questions 
to which a satisfactory answer has yet to be given, despite the 
government’s presentation of the findings of a parliamentary enquiry. The 
7 This service was created by a resolution of the government (No. 229) in 1993. It is 
responsible for ensuring secret radio and telephone communications for the 
presidency and government. It is alleged to be involved in tapping for the security 
services, and if this is true its activity would overlap with that of the technical 
monitoring section of the SRI. 
8 The activities of some of the security services have been discussed by V. G. 
Baleanu in The Enemy Within: The Romanian Intelligence Service in Transition, 
RMA Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1995, 11 pp., and by C. 
Ivanciuc in a series of articles in the Bucharest weekly 22, nos. 17-23 (May-June 
1995). The brief of DSOI is the combatting of organized crime within Romania and 
cross-border crime such as drug- and arms-trafficking. Although its head claims 
independence from 0215, it receives technical support from SRI. Its director in 
1996 was Col. Traian Dima. The number of personnel working in this agency is not 
in the public domain. 
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most pressing of these was the role played by several members of the 
Securitate who were identified on camera when beating students and by¬ 
standers, and who were widely suspected at the time of being members of 
the new security service, the SRI, although it is now alleged that they 
belonged to the agency UM 0215. Whatever their accreditation, no action 
has been taken against these officers. 
In a recent development, an article in the daily Romania libera alleged 
that on the evening of 13 June 1990, two engineers, Camara$escu and 
Ilinescu, called on the miners’ leader, Miron Cozma, at his headquarters in 
Petro$ani, with instructions from the SRI that the miners should not to go 
home after completing their shift but should join the buses and lorries 
which had been provided to take them to the railway station where trains 
would ferry them to Bucharest that night. Cozma allegedly phoned 
President Iliescu to confirm the orders and was told by Iliescu to come to 
his aid in the capital.9 
The miners’ episode, and the serious damage which it did to Romania’s 
image abroad, prompted members of parliament to raise the question of the 
SRI’s accountability. Steps to make it accountable by codifying its powers 
were taken in the National Security Law passed on 26 July 1991. 
Authority for the SRI to break the law, necessary in the interests of 
national security, is given in article 13, and certification of this need is 
provided by warrants of six months’ duration, issued by ‘procurators 
especially designated by the procurator-general of Romania’. The law does 
not specify what standing these procurators should have and there is no 
credible mechanism for the investigation of complaints. A system of 
judicial supervision of the exercise of warrants is therefore lacking in the 
law. 
If these safeguards are wanting, there is no lack of government bodies 
authorized to run security services. Articles 6, 8 and 9 stipulate that the 
SRI, the SIE, the SPP, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of 
the Interior and the Ministry of Justice are all empowered to carry out 
activity related to the defence of national security. There is, however, no 
single minister, as in the case of the United Kingdom, to whom bodies 
involved in national security, as opposed to foreign intelligence, are 
responsible. In the absence of such a minister security operations run the 
risk of being duplicated, confused and unaccountable. The only 
coordinating power rests with the Supreme Defence Council (Consiliul 
Suprem de Aparare a Jarii) , a collective body chaired by the President, 
which appeared to have no constitutional link with parliament. 
9 ‘ Adevarul despre a Ill-a mineriada, 13-15 iunie 1990’, Romania libera, 8 January 
1997. 
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The pernicious effects of this lack of supervision of the SRI were 
demonstrated during a second wave of organized violence. This involved, 
yet again, a miners’ invasion of Bucharest, this time in September 1991. 
From revelations made by Virgil Magureanu, the SRI director, in answer 
to questions from members of parliament about the miners’ actions, it was 
clear that he had advised President Iliescu to force Prime Minister 
Roman’s resignation. The parliamentary clamour for control over 
Magureanu’s activity became irresistible and was instituted on 23 June 
1993, when the Joint Standing Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and 
Senate for Parliamentary Oversight of the SRI was estabished by the 
Romanian Parliament. 
Magureanu endeavoured to remove the stigma from the SRI of being a 
resuscitated Securitate.10 He did not succeed. His own Securitate past 
10 Magureanu came from a humble background and details of his career, published in 
1992, cast an interesting light on the workings of the Securitate. Born Virgil 
Asztalos in March 1941 in the county of Satu Mare at a time when it was under 
Hungarian rule (hence the Hungarian spelling of his father’s name Astali§), his 
secondary schooling was pursued in a textile apprentice school, where he was 
made Communist Youth secretary. In 1964, he enrolled at the Faculty of 
Philosophy at Bucharest University. In his third year he was given a six-month 
bursary to study in Moscow where, some sources suggest, he was recruited by the 
KGB. At this time, it is alleged, he was already working for the Securitate in unit 
UM 0626 (Third Directorate responsible for internal counter-espionage) and his 
recruitment may have been prompted by the fact he had an uncle called Iloc who 
was a Securitate officer in the Bucharest directorate (Academia catavencu, 5, 
1995, 8, 28 February-6 March, p. 3). After graduating in 1969, he was appointed 
assistant lecturer in political science at the Party Academy ‘§tefan Gheorghiu’ in 
Bucharest. At the same time, he adopted his mother’s maiden name, Magureanu, to 
avoid the suspicion that he might be of Hungarian background. In autumn 1969, 
after Colonel Gaddafi seized power in Libya, Magureanu was sent to Libya where 
he worked with KGB officers, presumably to help with the reorganization of the 
security services. Magureanu’s close relations with the KGB officers were 
monitored by the counter-intelligence department of the Securitate and he was 
recalled to Romania. In summer 1971, he was transferred to the department of 
scientific socialism at the university and it was from here that on 1 September 1972 
he was recruited to work under cover in the DIE with the rank of captain. He was 
given the conspiratorial name of Mihai Mihaila and underwent three months of 
training before moving onto the documentation section. On 31 March 1973, he was 
placed on the reserve on the grounds of having been ‘appointed to a civilian job’. 
He returned to the ‘§tefan Gheorghiu’ Academy, presumably working under cover 
since he signed an official secrets document on 27 March 1973 pledging himself 
not to reveal anything about the DIE or his work there. This document provides 
the only clue that Magureanu might have carried out missions abroad. ‘I undertake 
to maintain total silence concerning the cover name of the office where I work and 
over the telephone numbers of UM 0626, as well as concerning the clinic which 
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proved a major obstacle. An opinion poll, conducted between 17 and 22 
January 1997, showed that only 20 per cent of those questioned had faith 
in him, while 32 per cent regarded him as unreliable and 27 per cent as 
totally unreliable.* 11 His efforts to improve the SRI’s image were dogged 
by dissent, in-fighting, scandal and, on occasions, by his own actions. The 
continued presence of a number of Securitate officers in the ranks of the 
SRI was seen as an impediment to Magureanu’s attempts to establish the 
service as a responsible body acting, where relevant, within the law and 
accountable to parliament. By 1993, Magureanu claimed to have dismissed 
80 per cent of the old Securitate officers in the SRI and in a press 
conference on 29 March 1994 added that ‘in recent months 25 per cent of 
the SRTs personnel had been replaced by young officers’.12 
Dissatisfaction about the purges resurfaced in a letter addressed to 
parliament in April 1992 by a group of anonymous SRI officers demanding 
the removal of Magureanu for what they alleged to be his interference in 
the country’s politics. The letter claimed that the ‘approximately 1,500 
officers’ dismissed during the purges of the previous summer had no 
connection with the Communist nomenklatura, whereas former party 
activists in the Securitate had been retained and held senior positions 
within the SRI. Magureanu’s angry response to these accusations, which 
he characterized as a ‘demolition mania’ with ‘incalculable consequences’ 
for the SRI, suggested that there was a ring of truth about the letter’s 
claims.13 
Nevertheless, Magureanu’s determination to imprint his leadership 
upon the SRI and to root out errant officers was undiminished. In January 
and February 1994 he visited several counties on inspection tours and 
replaced the SRI heads in Piatra Neamt, Dolj, and Valcea. In Gorj county, 
however, his appearance alongside the miners’ leader Miron Cozma and 
his exhortation to the miners at a rally there not to march on Bucharest, as 
they had done in June 1990 and September 1991, exposed him once again 
serves this unit, and not to discuss with anyone under any circumstances the fact 
that I carried out certain missions abroad or that I worked under cover abroad’: 
‘Dosarul de securitate al domnului Magureanu’, Tinerama, no. 70, 27 March-2 
April 1992, p. 7. 
11 Romania libera, 7 February 1997. 
12 Romania libera, 30 March 1994, p. 8. An example of a senior Securitate officer 
who simply donned the cap of an SRI chief is Col. F. Viziteu. He was alleged to 
have led the interrogation of the group of engineers at the machine tools factory in 
Ia§i who had planned an anti-Ceau§escu demonstration in the city centre on 14 
December 1989, eight days before the dictator’s overthrow. In 1990 he was made 
head of the SRI in Ia§i {Romania libera, 18 January 1994, p. 8). 
13 V. G. Baleanu, The Enemy Within (see note 8 above), pp. 3-4. 
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to charges of political interference. At the same time, damaging 
accusations appeared in the ultra-nationalist weekly Romania mare, which 
alleged that several Romanian intelligence officials were working for 
foreign agencies.14 
Magureanu used the allegations to settle more scores within the SRI. 
On 7 March 1994, he dismissed Maj.-Gen. Gheorghe Diaconescu, head of 
the SRI’s Division A for counter-espionage.15 The reported grounds for 
Diaconescu’s dismissal were that he had failed to uncover a spy ring 
rumoured to include Lt.-Gen. Marin Pancea, the secretary of the Supreme 
Defence Council and an intelligence and security adviser to Iliescu, but the 
real reason was Diaconescu’s unwise decision to keep a file on his boss 
and on first deputy director Maj.-Gen. Victor Marcu, and his lack of 
discretion when talking to his friends.16 Magureanu also punished those 
14 Romania mare, 21 January 1994, p. 8. 
15 Diaconescu entered the Securitate in 1957 as an officer in the counter-espionage 
directorate. In 1985 he was made deputy head of the Third Directorate dealing 
with the United States (Evenimentul zilei, 12 March 1994, p. 3). Diaconescu was 
replaced by Col. Mihai Lupu. The latter had served from 1983 as deputy head of 
UM 0110 of the Securitate’s Foreign Intelligence Directorate with responsibility 
for counter-espionage operations against Soviet and other Communist intelligence 
agencies and had been appointed in March 1990 as Diaconescu’s deputy: 
Evenimentul zilei, 25 March 1994, p. 3. 
16 Pancea was accused of being a spy for the French secret services in revelations 
made by the mass-circulation daily Evenimentul zilei in its issue of 14 March 1994. 
Pancea’s activity in Romanian intelligence began in 1964, when he was transferred 
from the Third Army in Cluj to the General Staff of Romanian Military Intelligence 
(DIA, Direcpa de Informa pi a Armatei). He was posted as Romanian Military 
Attache to Belgrade and then, in 1972, to Paris where, it was alleged, he recruited 
Tudor Anescu, a French citizen of Romanian origin, as an intermediary for contacts 
with French companies. Evenimentul zilei claimed that the DIE, the foreign 
intelligence department of the Securitate, had concluded that Anescu was a double 
agent, who also worked for the DST, the French security service. In 1986, Pancea 
became head of the Signals Training Command with the rank of Major-General, 
and two years later, after a brief interlude as a departmental head at the Military 
Academy in Bucharest, was sent to a command in Braila. After Ceau§escu’s 
overthrow, he was promoted to Lieutenant-General and for a brief period took 
over the command of DIA before being made secretary to the Supreme Defence 
Council in March 1990. In the same year, his Paris contact Anescu set up, first, an 
import-export company in Romania, and then, with the help of an associate, Lucian 
Cornescu, another Frenchman of Romanian origin, an investment company called 
Ring Oil Investment. The company’s affairs were favoured by Pancea and by 
Major-General Dumitru Penciuc, state secretary in the Ministry of the Interior. 
Anescu arranged for the Ministry of the Interior to be supplied with Renault cars. 
President Mitterand’s visit to Romania in 1993 led the Romanians to conclude that 
the French had privileged knowledge about their position on several matters and 
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held to be responsible for the leak to Romania mare, for whose director, 
Comeliu Vadim Tudor, and many of his associates the SRI director had 
little esteem. Col. loan Juganaru and Col. Tudorache Maravela, officers in 
the records section of SRI, were dismissed.17 
The upheavals in the SRI did not end there. In the same month, Maj.- 
Gen. Dumitru Cristea, a deputy director of the SRI and head of its training 
school, was asked to resign by Magureanu after an alleged love affair with 
one of the female students. When he refused to do so, he was suspended. 
Cristea blamed senior members of the ruling PDSR party for the action 
against him, although their reasons for wanting him removed were never 
explained. Cristea was dismissed from his position at the end of March 
without ceremony. In April, other SRI chiefs were sacked. Col. Constantin 
Pista, head of Division C (responsible for economic counter-sabotage), 
was removed for incompetence, and Col. Traian Ciceu, head of Division A 
(counter-espionage) resigned after secret documents on Romania’s 
political parties and extremist groups went missing.18 
In July 1995, yet another scandal allowed Magureanu to part company 
with his deputy, Lt.-Gen. Victor Marcu, a former Securitate officer in the 
First Directorate. On 21 June, two SRI officers called loan Tinea and Ionel 
Poporoaga were caught filming a group of people in a pavement cafe. In 
the group was a well-known investigative reporter from the daily Ziua, 
which a few weeks earlier had carried an interview with a Russian teacher 
who in the early 1950s had numbered Ion Iliescu amongst his students. 
The teacher claimed that Iliescu had been recruited by the KGB at this 
time as an informer. The daily contended that Iliescu was not merely an 
informer but an agent. As a result of the ensuing uproar Marcu was forced 
by Magureanu to resign. News of the resignation was released to the 
media on 29 July. 
the SIE was charged with investigating whether there was a leak via Anescu. The 
SEE concluded that there was. The counter-intelligence division of the SRI then 
took over the investigation and in December 1993 its head, Major-General 
Gheorghe Diaconescu, reported that the SIE conclusions were unfounded. 
Subsequent press revelations about large dollar payments made to Pancea’s son led 
to further investigations and the discovery of DIE reports about Anescu’s role as a 
double agent. The French, the newspaper alleged, had been given access to the 
secrets of the Supreme Defence Council by Pancea. Pancea was paid by Radu 
Petre Popa, an associate of Anescu, who passed over money to the general’s son, 
Drago§ Pancea. General Pancea was forced to resign his position and was replaced 
by Gen. Ion Magdalena. 
17 Until the overthrow of Ceau§escu, Maravela worked in the Third Directorate 
(counter-espionage) of the Department of State Security (Evenimentul zilei, 4 
March 1994, p. 3). 
18 V. G. Baleanu, The Enemy Within, p. 5. 
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There seems, however, to have been more to this incident than met the 
eye. A good deal of prima facie evidence suggests that the whole affair 
was an attempt by enemies of Magureanu to discredit him. His dismissal of 
Generals Diaconescu and Cristea and the removal or rotation of several 
SRI county chiefs has left a bitter taste among some former Securitate 
officers scattered among the various security agencies. With this in mind it 
is interesting to note that of the SRI divisions, that responsible for 
surveillance was the only one whose activity is believed to be directly 
coordinated by Magureanu, all the other divisions being responsible to Lt.- 
Gen. Marcu. An internal enquiry conducted after the incident by Maj.- 
Gen. Atodoroaie revealed that several officers from the surveillance 
division had strong sympathies for 0215, which had led them in the past to 
pass on information to the counter-intelligence department of the Ministry 
of the Interior (code sign UM 0215). As a result, the entire senior staff of 
the division, headed by Colonel Tolo§, was replaced.19 The strength of the 
division’s leanings towards 0215 was demonstrated by the fact that 
Colonel Lipan, one of Tolo§’s deputies, presented himself within forty- 
eight hours of his dismissal from the SRI with an authorization for transfer 
to 0215 and was immediately made head of the surveillance section of that 
service. 
Another detail which leads in the same direction of a conspiracy to 
ensnare Magureanu is the information, released by the SRI, that the daily 
Ziua was tipped off about the filming by an anonymous phone call. None 
of this information is conclusive but it does offer weight to the arguments 
of those who claimed that disaffected officers who had been transferred to 
0215 were seeking to bring the SRI director down.20 
These changes in the upper echelons of the SRI indicated that 
Magureanu was conducting a general purge of those senior officers whom 
he regarded as a threat to his leadership. None the less, the senior 
positions of the SRI were still occupied by former Securitate officers; and 
opposition to the reform was voiced in the weekly Romania mare, where it 
was driven by Securitate officers with an allegiance to Ceau§escu and 
ultra-nationalist views. These same sources highlighted Magureanu’s 
alleged close links with the KGB and his involvement in a Soviet-backed 
plot against Ceau§escu. Such opponents of Magureanu were joined by 
those who regarded him as anti-Western. There was certainly little 
evidence available to support an argument that the SRI director was a 
convinced democrat and, indeed, many of his statements pointed in the 
other direction, but that did not mean that he was unwilling to accept 
19 These included Tolofs four deputies: Coifescu, Chira, Carlanescu and Lipan. 
20 ‘Scandalul “Terasa Anda”’, Evenimentnlzilei, 5 July 1995, p. 3. 
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political control of the SRI. The question was: whose political control? He 
remained the only leading figure of the December 1989 revolution to have 
retained his leading position after the November 1996 elections. Since the 
position of head of the SRI is in the gift of the president, President 
Constantinescu’s relationship with Magureanu was for many of the 
President’s supporters the acid test of his ability to make a decisive break 
with the past. 
It is at this point that the activity of the two other security services 
merits discussion. 
UM 0215 
The counter-intelligence department of the Ministry of the Interior (code 
sign UM 0215) was set up in the middle of January 1990 in the following 
circumstances.21 On 26 December 1989, Ion Iliescu, president of the 
National Salvation Front Council, placed the Department of State Security 
(DSS) under the authority of the Ministry of National Defence. On 30 
December, Ion Iliescu signed a decree dismantling the DSS and at the 
same time gave Gelu Voican Voiculescu, at that time deputy prime 
minister in the provisional government, responsibility for assembling a new 
security structure. On that same evening, Voiculescu convened an 
extraordinary meeting of all the heads of Securitate units who had not been 
arrested and gave them an assurance that the new government would 
dismember the old Communist police structures but would not take action 
against individual Securitate officers. 
At the beginning of January 1990, General Nicolae Militaru, Minister 
of Defence, gave orders that the entire DSS Directorate for Bucharest (566 
officers) and the majority of men in the Fourth Directorate (responsible for 
21 0215 set up many front companies behind which it exploited its intelligence 
capability to profit from the breaking of the UN embargo on Serbia. Its head is Lt- 
Gen. Gheorghe Dan, a former officer in USLA. Dan began his career in the Second 
Directorate of the DSS, then moved to the Bucharest DSS, and was later 
transferred to USLA. He was made head of the SRI anti-terrorist brigade in March 
1990, head of counter-espionage in SIE (November 1992-February 1993), and 
moved to 0215 in February 1993. He was promoted to Maj.-Gen. in May 1993. 
Below is an outline ofUM 0215’s structure: 
Counter-espionage division 
Head: Col. Gheorghe Stan 
Intelligence division 
Head: Col. Ion Condoiu 
Subdivided into three sections or services 
1. Section for combatting hooliganism (Head: Col. Dumitru Ionea); 2. Section 
for combatting delinquency (Head: Col. Dumitru Constantin); 3. Section for 
economic intelligence (Head: Col. Ion Mandrila). 
Dennis Deletcint 185 
counter-espionage in the army) be placed on the reserve. Voiculescu took 
this opportunity to obtain Iliescu’s agreement to recruit these officers for a 
new security and intelligence organization. It was set up on 1 February/, 
given the title IJM 0215, and placed under the nominal control of the 
Ministry of the Interior. Its first director was Vice-Admiral Cico 
Dumitrescu, but real control remained in the hands of Voiculescu.22 
.After the departure of Admiral Dumitrescu in March 1990, Voiculescu 
installed two associates to the top positions in 0215: Col. Florin Calapod 
(alias Cristescu), an intelligence officer, and Col. Harasa, a former editor 
at the Meridiane Publishing House. In these initial months, officers of 0215 
were given several identities and acted largely at their own discretion. On 
18 February 1990, they were believed to be responsible for the forced 
entry into the government building m an attempt to compromise the 
opposition parties. At the same time, officers from 0215 were involved in 
the printing of anti-Semitic leaflets in Bacau and Bucharest. After the 
establishment of the SRI in March 1990, its new director Virgil 
Magureanu sought to bring 0215 under his control. During the premiership 
of Petre Roman (May 1990-September 1991), with whom Voiculescu was 
on close terms but whom Magureanu heartily disliked, 0215 was allowed 
22 Dan lonescu, ‘UM 0215: A Controversial Intelligence Service in Romania’, 
RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 30, 29 July 1994, p. 28. Voiculescu’s advisor 
during this period was Gen. Nicolae Doicaru, a former head of foreign intelligence 
under Ceau§escu. Voiculescu also sought the help of Col. Viorel Tache, another 
former intelligence officer who, after the defection of Pacepa, was transferred to 
the DSS Bucharest directorate. Tache is currently director of the company 
Georgiana SRL. Voiculescu is alleged to have gathered the Securitate dossiers on 
the major players in the revolution, including that of Magureanu. He was unable, 
however, to locate that of Ion Iliescu (Zina, 24 June 1995, p. 5). Vice-Admiral 
Emil ‘Cico’ Dumitrescu studied at the Military Lycee at Galati (1950-54), the 
Higher Military School at Constanta (1954-58) and then in Leningrad (1958-60), 
where he studied chemistry. Upon his return he was posted to the Chemical Troops 
Command of the army with the rank of Lieutenant-Major and then to the Military 
Institute of Chemical Research. His last post before the revolution was military 
supply officer at the Ministry of Petroleum {Romania libera, 29 June 1995, p. 9). 
In 1995, he was head of the procurement department of the Ministry of the Interior 
(RAMI: Regia Autonoma a Ministerului de Interne) which incorporated the former 
foreign trade company of the Securitate called Dunarea, as well as the Securitate’s 
synthetic diamonds factory. One of the DSS officers allegedly transferred to 0215 
was Col. Ilie Merce, a deputy head of the First Directorate responsible for 
domestic intelligence. Merce is a close friend of the Ceau§escu sycophant Corneliu 
Vadim Tudor. After the revolution, Merce is said to have fed Vadim Tudor, 
President of the Greater Romania Party, with compromising material about his 
political opponents (Ziua, 31 July 1995, p. 8). Merce has denied ever being a 
member of 0215 (Evenimentul zilei, 8 August 1995, p. 4). 
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to double its strength to around 1,000 officers. Magureanu saw this 
development as a threat to his own service and warned President Iliescu of 
0215*s potential use as a personal intelligence service by Roman. It was 
not long before the Roman-Voiculescu group clashed with Magureanu and 
in December 1990, acting with Iliescu’s approval, Magureanu forced 
Voiculescu from his position with 0215. 
Immediately after he took over the post of Minister of the Interior in 
June 1990, Doru Viorel Ursu decided to put 0215 on a legal basis. Its use 
of false identity papers was, at least officially, abandoned and its heads 
were changed. Col. Jenica Iosif was appointed director and Col. Ion 
Condoiu, formerly of the SRI, his deputy. In the spring of 1991, Col. 
Stoian Rusu took over as head of 0215 but in February 1993 the Minister 
of the Interior, General loan Danescu, replaced him with Col. Dan 
Gheorghe, who had been sacked from his post as head of the SRI anti¬ 
terrorist brigade by Magureanu.23 
Judging from the details in operational manuals of 0215 which found 
their way to the offices of a Bucharest daily in March 1994, 0215 had 
resumed certain practices of the former Securitate. These included the 
gathering of information about Romanians living, working, or studying 
abroad, about employees of foreign firms in Romania, and about foreign 
residents. They also showed that 0215 was monitoring the movements of 
political personalities, journalists and trade unionists; 0215 was required to 
enter all sensitive information into the SRI’s computer system.24 
The resulting disquiet led Petre Roman, head of the Commission for 
Defence, Public Order and National Security of the Chamber of Deputies, 
to summon Interior Minister Doru loan Taracila and 0215 head Dan 
Gheorghe to explain themselves. Both denied that 0215 sought to influence 
political developments. They did accept that some officers might have 
exceeded their brief but argued that 0215 was operating in accordance 
with the National Security Law and that those under surveillance were 
suspected of terrorist or criminal links.25 These arguments were accepted 
without demur by Roman, to the surprise of many who remembered his 
previous criticism of the SRI and its alleged part in facilitating the miners’ 
entry into Bucharest in September 1991 (which prompted Roman’s 
resignation as Prime Minister). Strong doubts remain about the 
23 Zig-Zag, 18-24 February 1993, p. 4. Some analysts believe that General Gheorge 
Dan was the controller of Sorin Ro§ca-Stanescu when he worked as an informer 
for USLA, the counter-terrorist unit of the Securitate in the 1980s, and that 
Gheorge feeds information to Stanescu for publication in Ziua. 
24 Romania libera, 25 April 1994, p. 16. 
25 Romania libera, 24 May 1994, p. 3. 
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effectiveness of political accountability of 0215, whose members are 
drawn largely from the ranks of the Bucharest DSS. It is widely suspected 
of trying to take over some of the intelligence-gathering activities of the 
SRI and Magureanu complained of interference by 0215 in a letter to the 
Defence Committee of the Senate in December 1995.26 
SPP 
Similar doubts about accountability concerned the SPP, the service 
responsible for the protection of the President, Romanian party leaders and 
foreign diplomats. It developed from the Unitatea Special'a de Paza §i 
Control, set up to protect the president of the provisional government on 7 
May 1990 under Decree No. 204 of the Provisional Council of National 
Unity. On 15 November 1991 the USPC became the SPP under Law No. 
51.27 The SPP has, according to details given by its head, Maj.-Gen. 
Dumitru Iliescu, during its first-ever press conference on 4 April 1995, 
some 1,500 personnel, most of whom were recruited from the army. It is 
divided into three sections, which deal with security of buildings, VIPs and 
intelligence. Its intelligence and surveillance role came to light in March 
1995 over the case of Horia-Roman Patapievici. Patapievici, a thirty-eight- 
year-old physicist, had been amongst the anti-Ceau§escu protesters 
arrested in Bucharest on 21 December 1989. He made a name for himself 
after the revolution as a political analyst for the weekly 22, the publication 
of the independent Group for Social Dialogue, where he subjected what he 
called the ‘Iliescu regime’ to a scathing critique. It was this anti-Iliescu 
stance which drew him to the attention of the SPP. While Patapievici was 
in Germany in February 1995, his wife was told by a neighbour that a man, 
claiming to be a police officer, had been making enquiries about 
Patapievici’s political beliefs. The officer had allegedly identified himself 
as Captain Soare and said that he was investigating money-laundering 
operations. A GDS press conference exposed these investigations and the 
case was quickly taken up by opposition newspapers. 
They initially faced a problem in identifying ‘Captain Soare’. The SRI 
issued a statement disclaiming any interest in Patapievici’s activity as a 
journalist or in his political ideas and argued that the interest of the media 
26 Ziua, 9 December 1995, p. 1. 
27 The heads of the SPP in 1996 were: Director: Lt.-Gen. Dumitru Iliescu (since 
December 1996, Nicolae Anghel); First Deputy Director and Chief of Staff: Lt.- 
Gen. Gheorghe Aradavoaice; Deputy Directors: Maj.-Gen. Nicolae Banuta and 
Maj.-Gen. Constantin Tucan. According to General Iliescu, the SPP is an 
autonomous service ‘controlled by parliament and coordinated by the Supreme 
Defence Council’ (Press conference, 4 April 1995). 
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was to ‘stir unrest by hounding Romania’s main intelligence service’.28 
Questioned by journalists about the activities of ‘Soare’, the Minister of 
the Interior, Doru loan Taracila, declared that ‘the type of officer like 
“Soare” disappeared with the revolution. It is amazing that someone can 
believe that political police methods are still being practised.’29 Taracila’s 
reply revealed just the kind of obtuseness which characterizes many who 
are responsible for security matters in Romania. The mystery deepened 
when the head of UM 0215, Lt.-Gen. Dan Gheorghe, denied before the 
Senate’s Commission for Defence, Public Order and National Security, 
that his service was involved in the affair. After the hearing, the 
commission’s chairman, Radu Timofte, made the startling suggestion that 
‘Soare’ might belong to ‘an illegal intelligence structure’, thereby giving 
credence to SRI Director Virgil Magureanu’s complaints of interference 
from rival intelligence and security bodies in Romania. 
Just a few days after Justice Minister Iosif Chiuzbaian declared that his 
own ministry’s intelligence unit, the SIO (Independent Operational 
Service), which was charged with gathering information about organized 
crime within the prison service, had no connection with the Patapievici 
case,30 ‘Scare’s’ identity was revealed. He was a Captain Marius Lucian 
of the SPP. 
It was revealed only days after another case of harrassment, this time 
perpetrated by an SRI officer, came to light. Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu, a 
young history lecturer at the University of Ia§i, complained in March 1995 
that his correspondence had been tampered with and that his friends were 
questioned by a certain Major loan Chirila, an officer attached to section 
four of the SRI. In this instance, and in contrast to the Minister of the 
Interior, the SRI reacted rapidly by announcing that Chirila had been 
dismissed in the same month.31 
28 Curierul national, 10 March 1995, p 2. 
29 Romania libera, 16 March 1995, p. 16. 
30 Romania libera, 13 March 1995, p. 3. 
31 Among those who advised Ungureanu on what course of action to take against 
Chirila were Liviu Antonesei, Nicolae Manolescu, §tefan Augustin Doina§, Andrei 
Ple§u and Gabriel Liiceanu (Monitorul, 16 March 1995, p. 1 and Romania libera, 
16 March 1995, p. 16). Ungureanu’s first meeting with Chirila was on 5 September 
1994. Chirila summoned him on the pretext that Ungureanu’s name had been found 
in the papers of a foreigner in Bucharest who was suspected of being a spy. Chirila 
used this allegation to bring up the subject of ‘traitors’ and advised Ungureanu to 
stop writing about minority issues in Romania. In an interview given to a Ia§i 
newspaper, Ungureanu surmised that he had probably become a target of the SRI 
because of his actions during the revolution. On 19 December 1989, he left Ia§i for 
Cluj and on the morning of 21 December was given shelter in the flat of Professor 
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Such cases did little to encourage decision-makers in the major 
Western countries, and in pan-European bodies such as the Council of 
Europe, over the threat posed by discretionary actions of the Romanian 
security services to the exercise of democracy in Romania. When Romania 
was accepted into the Council of Europe in October 1993, there were 
several conditions attached to membership, one of which was that COE 
rapporteurs would visit Romania every six months to assess the 
observance of human rights. When the rapporteurs published their first 
assessment in March 1994, the Romanian government responded in a 
detailed memorandum that the report was inaccurate, and asked to be 
released from the rapporteur mechanism. Some of the refutations in the 
memorandum were themselves questionable. The Council of Europe 
refused. The vigilante behaviour of part of the security apparatus in 
Romania served only to confirm the Council of Europe’s reservations. The 
harrassment of American and British diplomats since 1993, involving entry 
into flats and surveillance in unmarked vehicles, and attempts to intimidate 
locally employed embassy staff, were ascribed by the SRI as the work of 
maverick elements within the various security services whose aim was to 
sour relations between Romania and the West. Damaging these relations, it 
is argued, is on the agenda of those who wish to detach Romania from the 
West. In this respect, there might be seen to be a convergence of interest 
on the part of those who are nostalgic for a Ceau§escu-like autonomy, and 
of those who seek to further a Russian interest. 
President Constantinescu has grasped the nettle of accountability of the 
security services. He was helped in the case of the SPP by Gen. Dumitru 
Iliescu’s behaviour during the election campaign. Dumitru lliescu had 
accused Constantinescu of lying during the election campaign about the 
strength of the SPP, which he alleged that Constantinescu had grossly 
exaggerated. Dumitru lliescu resigned after Ion Iliescu’s defeat. The 
appointment by presidential decree of Nicolae Anghel as head of the SPP 
was announced on 19 December 1996.32 Anghel announced that he would 
conduct a review of the service’s structure before deciding upon any 
changes, including a possible reduction in the number of personnel. The 
Supreme Defence Council, meeting for the first time on 18 December with 
David Prodan. He was wounded in the street protests and taken to hospital. After 
the revolution, his telephone was tapped and his mail intercepted (Tngerii 
Securitatii: De la Soare la Chirila’, Gaudeamus, 27 March-8 April 1995, p. 4). 
32 Nicolae Anghel was born on 7 November 1952. He graduated from the Military 
Academy and rose to become a battalion commander. He went into the reserve in 
1986 with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He completed studies at the National 
Defence College in 1995 (Romania libera, 20 December 1996, p. 3). 
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its new membership since the election of Emil Constantinescu, changed 
the statutes of the SPP to allow a non-serving officer to head the SPP. 
In a further demonstration of Constantinescu’s commitment to the 
Romanian electorate and to the West about making the security services 
more accountable, it was reported on 13 January 1997 that both the SIE 
and UM 0215 would come under parliamentary control. The commission 
of the Senate and Chamber for public order would investigate claims that 
the telephones of public figures and journalists had been tapped by UM 
0215. The move to place SIE under parliamentary control was driven by 
accusations from SRI that SIE officers were encroaching upon their 
territory.33 
The presidential broom extended to the army. Constantinescu 
announced to NATO ambassadors on 23 January 1997 that General 
Dumitru Cioflina had been removed on the previous day as Chief of the 
General Staff and replaced by Major-General Constantin Degeratu, who 
was an alumnus of the Royal College of Defence Studies. Cioflina was 
regarded with suspicion by many senior figures in the Democratic 
Convention for his alleged part in the cover-up of the army’s involvement 
in the Romanian revolution. A series of extracts from a senior officer’s 
diary, published in the daily Romania libera on the anniversary of the 
revolution in December 1996, proved what many Romanians already 
suspected, namely that the army, far from being the defender of the people, 
as it had portrayed itself at the time, had fired on the population in the 
streets of Bucharest during the evening of 21 December, causing many 
deaths. 
Pressure mounted in the independent press for Magureanu’s dismissal. 
In an incisive piece in the influential weekly 22, §erban Orescu accused 
the new government of ‘cohabitation’ with the SRI director for failing to 
dismiss him: ‘If the new administration wants to wipe the slate clean of the 
SRI’s director’s loaded past, there are doubts among those who elected it, 
and in foreign governments, that it is willing to do so. The manner in 
which the post of SRI director is filled has major importance in 
establishing the internal and international credibility of the new regime.’34 
Magureanu considered the article significant enough to warrant a reply. 
Amongst his rejoinders he argued: ‘It seems to me equally important that I 
should remind you that the public declarations which I made in the days 
immediately following the election regarding my willingness to leave my 
job are (additional) proof of the fact that I know how to obey the law. It is 
33 Romania libera, 13 January 1997, p. 24. 
34 §erban Orescu, ‘Noul regim §i d-1 Magureanu’, 22, no. 50, 11-17 December 1996, 
p. 3. 
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the legal right of those in positions of power in the Romanian state to 
retain me as director of the SRI or not. The reference, in this context, to 
unnamed international bodies and the association of the measure of the 
country’s credibility with my remaining in my job is pernicious.’35 
Yet the improvement of Romania’s image in the West was seen by 
Constantinescu and his advisors as paramount in their campaign to achieve 
closer integration with the West: the continued presence of Magureanu as 
head of the SRI compromised the success of that campaign. Against this 
consideration, the President had to calculate the impact of Magureanu’s 
departure upon the SRI itself Economic crime and corruption posed major 
threats to Romania’s security; the country was also expected to play its 
part in the international fight against drug-smuggling and terrorism. In 
order to be effective, the SRI had to be cohesive, efficient, disciplined and 
to have a high morale. The role of the SRI head was to instil these 
qualities. Magureanu had weeded out many of the reprobates of the past 
from the organization and had gone some way in leading it, albeit (one 
suspects) reluctantly, into an era of public accountability. His successor 
would have to continue that work. 
An obvious choice for the succession did not present itself. Constantin 
Neculae loneseu-Galbeni (PNTCD), chairman of the Commission for 
Control and Supervision of the SRI (Comisia de Control §i Supraveghere a 
SRI), announced on 10 January 1997 that Magureanu would complete his 
term of office as SRI head in September,36 and a week later Ion 
Diaconescu, chairman of the ruling Democratic Convention, confirmed 
that Magureanu would not be dismissed.37 Calls for Magureanu to be 
removed before September came from the leaders of the Party of 
Romanian National Unity (PUNR) and the Greater Romania Party (PRM). 
In separate meetings with President Constantinescu on 28 January 1997, 
both Gheorghe Funar and Comeliu Vadim Tudor demanded that 
Magureanu be dismissed. Vadim Tudor called Magureanu ‘the most 
diabolical personality and biggest gangster in Romanian history’.38 
Constantinescu refused to act hastily. The first indication that 
significant change in the leadership of the SRI was on the way was the 
announcement, on 14 March, that Mircea Gheordanescu, a former member 
of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party and since January head 
of the National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports and for the 
Banning of Chemical Weapons, had been appointed First Deputy Director 
35 Virgil Magureanu, 22, no. 51, 17-23 December 1996, p. 3. 
36 Romania libera, 13 January 1997, p. 1. 
37 Dan lonescu, OMR1 Daily Digest, 29 January 1997. 
38 Ibid. 
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of the SRI. Shortly afterwards, Magureanu signalled his own departure by 
telling Constantinescu that he did not regard his occupancy of the position 
of SRI director as ‘eternal’. On 25 April, he tendered his resignation to the 
President and it was immediately accepted. Magureanu declared his 
interest in pursuing a political career. His abilities as a skilled tactician, 
deployed hitherto behind the scenes, mark him out as a figure to watch in 
Romanian politics. As SRI director his merit, and a not inconsiderable one 
in view of the service which he inherited, was that he prevented the SRI 
from being worse than it could have been. 
President Constantinescu nominated Costin Georgescu, a deputy in the 
National Liberal Party, as Magureanu’s successor. Georgescu’s 
appointment was approved in a joint session of the two chambers of 
parliament on 26 May. 
The Romanian government’s announcement on 15 February 1997 that 
it was to introduce a law allowing every citizen access to his or her own 
Securitate file, thereby emulating the example of the German authorities in 
respect of the Stasi files, and that it would publish the files of those in 
public positions, was an astute move. It was, on the face of it, a bold 
attempt to confront the country’s difficult past. It was also a further 
demonstration of its commitment to transparency, coming hard on the 
heels of Prime Minister Ciorbea’s televised press conference on 31 
January 1997, in which he took the population into his confidence by 
revealing the state of the economy, the problems facing the government, 
and pulled no punches about the severity of the measures which he 
planned to take. 
The opening of the Securitate files will provide another gulp of oxygen 
for a population whose cries for honesty, openness and truth had largely 
gone unheeded since 1990. If the period from 1990 to 1996 will go down 
in Romanian history as the period of lost opportunities, marked by the 
failure to complete the revolution of December 1989, then the months 
since the elections of November 1996 have borne witness to a determined 
effort on the part of the new president and government to complete the 
revolution. Those with the mentality of the past have no place in posts of 
responsibility in a truly democratic Romania. Nowhere is this more true 
than in the security services. The new Romanian leadership has already 
demonstrated that it understands this. It will require determination and 
cohesion amongst its supporters for it to succeed in making up for lost 
time. 


